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The thesis results from a research project, combining elements of European law and 
public international law. The project focuses on the different forms of the use of 
force by the European Union in the sphere of the Comm n Security and Defence 
Policy as an integral part of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. It 
examines the conditions under which the European Union can engage in military 
crisis management missions from the perspective of European Union law as well as 
from the perspective of public international law. The main emphasis of the thesis is 
put on the former, analysing the EU’s ambitions to become an international security 
actor from an inside-out perspective. When addressing the vertical dimension of the 
EU and the use of force in more detail, the thesis analyses the extent to which the 
Member States are constrained in the conduct of their national foreign and security 
policy through decisions by the European Union in the sphere of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. With regards to the EU’s legal relationship with the 
United Nations, the thesis examines whether and if so to what extent the European 
Union, although not a member of the United Nations, is bound by UN Security 
Council resolutions in respect of the use of force. Based on the assumption that the 
EU is bound by UN Security Council resolutions imposing economic sanctions, the 
thesis uses a comparative method in order to show tat the EU as an international 
organisation is bound by decisions of the UN Security Council in the sense that the 
EU is obliged to respect the wording and limits of a UN Security Council mandate to 
use force once it decides to contribute with an EU mission. If the EU decides not to 
accept a UN Security Council mandate, the thesis argues that the EU is under the 
obligation not to undermine the success of a UN authorised military intervention, in 
the spirit of a loyalty obligation. Apart from analyzing the interaction of the EU and 
the international legal framework, the thesis also u es a speculative approach in order 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when 
necessary, robust intervention.’1 
 
The European Union is keen on establishing itself as an international security actor 
whose influence mirrors its economic power. Driven forward by the European 
Security Strategy of 20032, which represents the first strategic European concept 
addressing foreign policy as a whole, the European Union has engaged in a variety of 
military crisis management missions in many parts of the world as part of its 
comprehensive concept of crisis management. In the fight against piracy off the 
Somali coast, the European Union is contributing military Operation Atalanta to 
implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) and 1851 
(2008). To protect merchant vessels as well as vessels of the World Food Programme 
that are delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia, Operation Atalanta shall 
 
take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent 
and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed robbery 
which may be committed in the areas where it is preent.3  
 
Operation Atalanta is not being conducted in a postc nflict situation but in a hostile 
environment. The participating military personnel are coming face to face with 
heavily armed pirates. Atalanta, an EU-led military crisis management operation, 
highlights some of the questions that will be raised in this study about the European 
Union as an emerging international military actor and its legal relationship with UN 
Security Council resolutions. 
 
 
                                                
1 European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’ Brussels, 12 
December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> 11[hereinafter 
European Security Strategy]; All electronic sources were last accessed on 17/07/2012. 
2 European Security Strategy (n 1). 
3 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] 
OJ L 301/33 Article 2. 
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Crisis management missions under the auspices of the EU’s common security and 
defence policy may be used in general for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and 
strengthening of international security outside the territory of the European Union.4 
The fulfilment of these tasks can entail a variety of missions, including the non-
exhaustive list of the so called Petersberg Plus tasks. This list has been amended by 
the Treaty of Lisbon and now refers to joint disarmment operations, humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making 
and post-conflict stabilisation.5  
 
All military crisis management missions6 undertaken so far have had the consent of 
host states and have often been accompanied by UN Security Council resolutions 
authorising the use of force.7 In a strict sense, however, a UN mandate is not requi d 
                                                
4 Article 42 LTEU. 
5 Article 43 LTEU. 
6 The European Union has also been engaged in a wide rang  of civilian crisis management missions.  
In practice these include police missions, rule of law missions, border assistance missions, missions in 
support of security sector reform and monitoring missions. 
7 Operation Concordia has been carried out at the request of the FYROM government; and Operation 
AMIS has been carried out at the request of the African Union, see Council Joint Action 
2003/92/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia [2003] OJ L 34/26 Article 1 and Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP on the European 
Union civilian – military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of 
Sudan [2005] OJ L 188/46 preamble para 12. Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA has been welcomed by 
the authorities of Chad and the Central African Republic, see Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on 
the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic 
[2007] OJ L 279/21 preamble para 8. Operation EUFOR RD Congo has been welcomed by the 
authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, see Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the 
European Union military operation in support of theUnited Nations Organisation Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during theel ction process [2006] OJ L 116/98 
preamble para 8. The Somali Transitional Federal Government expressed its appreciation for the EU’s 
support in the context of Operation EUTM Somalia, see Council Decision 2011/843/CFSP amending 
and extending Decision 2010/96/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the 
training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia) [2011] OJ L 198/37 preamble para 6 and Council 
Decision 2010/197/CFSP on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the 
training of Somali security forces [2010] OJ L 87/33. Its predecessor, Operation EU NAVCO, was 
conducted in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, see Council Joint 
Action 200/749/CFSP on the European Union military coordination action in support of UN Security 
Council resolutions 1816 (2008) [2008] OJ L 252/39 preamble para 1. In the context of Operation 
Atalanta the EU is cooperating with the Transitional Federal Government in the fight against piracy, 
see Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] 
OJ L 301/33 preamble para 6. Operation EUFOR Althea is implementing the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP on the 
European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [2004] OJ L 252/10 Article 1. 
Operation ARTEMIS was carried out in order to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1484 
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once an invitation to act by the host state exists. The European Union has 
predominantly undertaken peace-keeping or humanitarian missions during which the 
use of force has been used primarily to protect the civilian population of the host 
state or in self-defence.8 
 
However, the European Union has gone through a profound development as a 
military actor already which can be illustrated by its counter-piracy operation 
Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin. The mandate of operation Atalanta 
includes the protection of vessels chartered by the World Food Programme as well as 
the protection of merchant vessels.9 Atalanta is not only therefore the European 
Union’s first naval operation but it is also carried out to protect the interest of EU 
member states and not merely the interest and rights of third states.10 The European 
Security Strategy (ESS) indicates that the EU could even go further in future by 
undertaking robust military interventions which are carried out without the consent 
of the host state, turning it into a target.11 Thus the European Union could leave the 
path of ‘merely’ conducting peace-keeping and humanitarian missions and could 
engage in robust peace-enforcement. 
 
                                                                                                                                
(2003) that authorised a multinational force in Bunia, see Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on the 
European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2003] OJ L 143/50 Article 
1. The deployment of a multinational force had been requested by the Secretary-General and the 
President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Ituri parties had supported this request, see 
UN Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003). 
 
Apart from Operation Concordia, Operation AMIS and Operation EUTM Somalia, all military crisis 
management operations have been accompanied by Chapter VII UN Security Council resolutions 
authorising the use of force. Some UN Security Council Resolutions recognised EU-led military crisis 
management operations. Operation EUFOR RD Congo has been authorised by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1671 (2006) and UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) authorised the EU to 
deploy an operation in Chad. UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008) welcomed the launch of 
EU Operation Atalanta.  
8 See, for example, Operation ARTEMIS, Council Joint Ac ion 2003/423/CFSP on the European 
Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo [2003] OJ L 143/50; Operation 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP on the European Union military operation 
in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic [2007] OJ L 279/21. 
9 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 3) Article 1. 
10 J Larik points out that operation Atalanta would also serve as an example for the external protection 
of EU citizens, although the mandate lacks a specific re erence. See J Larik, ‘Operation Atalanta and 
the Protection of EU Citizens: Civis Europaeus Unheeded?’ (2011) 3 Perspectives on Federalism 40-
66.  
11 It has also been suggested by P Gordon that the broad scope of the common foreign and security 
policy would cover military interventions. P Gordon, ‘Europe’s Uncommon Foreign Policy’ (Winter 
1997/1998) 22 (3) International Security 82. 
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The EU has the legal capacity and the political wilto engage in peace-enforcement 
operations. The provisions on the common security and defence policy under which 
the EU’s crisis management missions are launched and co ducted in general refer to 
peace-making missions.12 Within the system of the United Nations, peace-making 
traditionally refers only to peaceful means of settling disputes under Chapter VI of 
the UN Charter whereas peace-enforcement is covered by Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.13 Within the context of the European Union, however, peace-making has to 
be understood to include peace-enforcement measures as well.14 Peace-enforcement 
operations use military personnel to enforce a solution.15  In the absence of a 
European army, the European Union depends on its member states to make their 
troops available for European crisis management mission . 
 
The political will of the European Union to engage in the use of force as a last resort 
is expressed in the European Security Strategy.16 The ESS is a political document 
without legally binding force. In the aftermath of the Iraq war in 2003, during which 
the European Union could not speak with one voice, th  ESS was supposed to 
provide the EU with a strategic concept.17 This strategic concept was needed to 
enable the EU to develop its own role as an internaio l crisis management actor. In 
general, ‘[a] security strategy is a policy-making tool which, on the basis of given 
values and interests, outlines long-term overall objectives to be achieved and the 
basic categories to be applied to that end’.18 It provides a ‘reference framework for 
day-to-day policy-making’.19  
 
                                                
12 Article 43 LTEU.  
13 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping, 17 June 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, para 20 [Hereinafter Agenda For 
Peace]. 
14 S Blockmans,  ‘An Introduction to the Role of the EU in Crisis Management’  in S Blockmans (ed), 
The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2008) 9. 
15 Blockmans (n 14) 9. 
16 European Security Strategy (n 1). 
17 S Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’ 
(March 2004) ‘Sécurité & Sratégie’, Paper No. 82, the Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), 
Brussels <http://www.politologischinstituut.be/PE2004/documents/6Biscop.pdf> 6-8. 
18 S Biscop and R Coolseat, ‘The World is the Stage – A Global Security Strategy for the European 
Union’ (December 2003) Notre Europe Policy Papers No. 8 
<http://www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/notre-eur.Policypaper8.pdf> 1. 
19 Biscop and Coolseat (n 18) 1. 
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The European Security Strategy indicates a unique European approach to security 
which is characterised by a comprehensive concept of crisis management that 
approaches different dimensions of security in an integrated way and in a multilateral 
setting. It aspires to prevent conflicts and aims to be reactive only if necessary.20 The 
European Security Strategy responds to a changed global security environment and 
identifies global challenges and key threats. To address these, the ESS develops 
strategic objectives and promotes an international order based on effective 
multilateralism. In the absence of an internationally agreed definition of 
multilateralism,21 the practice and statements of the EU reveal a distinctive approach 
with the United Nations at the centre.22  
 
The EU’s approach to international security is also influenced by its internal values, 
particularly regarding human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. 23 These values 
are supposed to be reflected in the EU’s internatiol action and are important if the 
EU is to establish itself as a legitimate security actor. By putting its internal values 
and principles into concrete forms, the EU will gradu lly shape its profile and 
portfolio in the international community and will contribute to the international 
system. In addition, the EU will create its own legitimacy as an international actor. 
 
The value the EU can add to the international system will be influenced by the role 
the EU creates for itself. In its call for effective multilateralism, the EU highlights its 
commitment to international law and the values of the UN Charter. It recognises the 
primary responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance and restoration of 
                                                
20 Biscop and Coolsaet (n 18) 27, 29. 
21 J Peterson and others, ‘The Consequences of Europe: Multilateralism and the New Security 
Agenda’ (2008) Mitchell Working Paper Series 3/2008, University of Edinburgh Europa Institute 
<http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/file_download/series/41_theconsequencesofeuropemultilateralismandthene
wsecurityagenda.pdf> 2. 
22 K Graham, ‘Towards Effective Multilateralism: The EU and the UN: Partners in Crisis 
Management’EU and Global Governance (November 2004) EPC (European Policy Centre) Working 
Paper No. 13 <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=10822&lng=en> 7; 
J Krause, ‘Multilateralism: Behind European Views’ (2004) 27 Washington Quarterly 48. 
23 A De Vasconcelos (ed), ‘The European Security Strategy 2003-2008: Building on Common 
Interests’ (February 2009) ISS Report No. 5, EU Institute for Security Studies 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/ISS_Report_05.pdf> 33; Biscop and Coolsaet refer to ‘rule-
based multilateralism’in Biscop and Coolsaet (n 18) 30. 
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international peace and security.24 In practice, the European Union is capable of 
providing the United Nations with much needed rapid reaction mechanisms.  
 
Nevertheless, the legal relationship between the European Union and UN Security 
Council resolutions on the use of force is unclear. Unlike all its member states that 
make their military personnel available for EU-led crisis management missions, the 
European Union is not a member of the United Nations. Within the system of 
collective security of the United Nations that is based on the general prohibition of 
the use of force, the UN Security Council has the competence to authorise the use of 
force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter through military sanction resolutions. So 
far, the European Union has only conducted military operations with the consent of 
the host state. However, if it would consider imposing military sanctions against the 
will of the target, the question that needs to be addressed is whether the European 
Union needs first to obtain a UN Security Council mandate to engage in the use of 
force lawfully. In addition, the issue needs to be raised about whether, and if so to 
what extent, the European Union is bound by existing UN Security Council 
resolutions regarding the use of force. Is the European Union legally bound by a UN 
Security Council resolution if it decides to accept a UN mandate? How do UN 
Security Council resolutions affect the EU even if the EU decides not to actively take 
part in a conflict?  
 
1. Research framework 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the European as well as the international 
legal framework for the use of military force in EU-led crisis management missions. 
The use of force comes in many different varieties. Military force can be used to 
maintain international peace and security or to enforce its restoration. The first 
category of peace-maintenance does not include a coercive purpose or intent 
although military personnel is employed and might eventually become involved in 
fighting activities.25 The prominent features of peace-maintenance operations include 
                                                
24 ‘Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is 
a European priority’ European Security Strategy (n 1) 9. 
25 D W Bowett, United Nations Forces: A Legal Study of United Nations Practice (Stevens & Sons, 
The David Davies Memorial Institute, London 1964) 267, 268. 
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some sort of consent by the host state, the observance of impartiality and the limited 
use of force for either the purpose of defence or as a tool of protection with regards 
to an immediate threat.26 Peace-keeping, humanitarian relief and assistance tasks as 
well as preventive diplomacy represent examples of non-coercive use of military 
force.27 
 
Peace-enforcement on the other hand enjoys a strong c ercive element and lacks 
consent and impartiality. Peace-enforcement operations are carried out against a 
particular target and ‘involve the use of armed force in a coercive capacity at varying 
levels of intensity’.28  
 
The thesis will focus on the use of military force by the European Union in general 
but will emphasise peace-enforcement operations. The term peace-enforcement will 
be used interchangeably with military interventions a d military sanctions. Although 
the term sanction is sometimes used in the scholarly debate solely to refer to 
economic coercive measures that fall within the ambit of Article 41 UN Charter and 
in contrast to military interventions, the present study will use the phrases economic 
and military sanctions to underline their shared coer ive elements and their nature as 
enforcement measures.29 In addition, the term sanction has been chosen to underline 
the comparative method used in chapter six, which argues that the analysis of the 
EU’s relationship with UN Security Council resolutions with regards to economic 
sanctions can be transferred to the relationship between the EU and the latter with 
regards to military sanctions, due to the similarities they share. 
 
2. Research questions 
The use of force by the European Union generates a number of questions about the 
EU’s relationship with its member states on the onehand and for its place within the 
                                                
26 T D Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to 
Exercise its Enforcement Powers Under Chapter VII Of The Charter’(1995) 26 Netherlands Yearbook 
of International Law 52. 
27 Gill (n 26) 52. 
28 Gill (n 26) 52. 
29 The term military sanction has also been used by H  Kelsen, ‘Collective Security and Collective 
Self-Defense under the Charter of the United Nations’ (1948) The American Journal Of International 
Law 787 and M Noortmann, Math, Enforcing International Law: From Self-help to Self-contained 
Regimes (Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot 2005) 33. 
 23 
international legal order and in particular for its relationship with the United Nations 
on the other. The European Union does not have a European army and therefore 
depends on capable and willing member states to make their military personnel 
available to it. Member states are not legally obliged to contribute troops to an EU-
led operation but they are under other obligations f upport and assistance. One of 
the research questions is to analyse therefore whether and if so to what extent EU 
member states are constrained in the conduct of their national foreign policies 
through military European crisis management operations. Security and defence 
matters are at the very heart of state sovereignty a d member states have always been 
cautious of giving away their competences in this policy field which is one of the 
reasons why a role for the European Union in security matters is a rather new 
development that gained in speed during the late 1990s.  
 
The second research question concerns the EU’s relationship with the United Nations 
in the context of the use of military sanctions. Of particular interest is the EU’s legal 
relationship with UN Security Council resolutions. In the international legal system, 
the United Nations has been granted the monopoly to use force if keeping the right to 
individual or collective self-defence or the highly disputed concept of the 
responsibility to protect  aside for a moment. The EU is an emerging international 
military actor that is willing to undertake robust military interventions in the future. 
Therefore the need arises to examine the EU’s relationship with the United Nations 
and in particular with UN Security Council resolutions. The aim of this thesis is to 
find out whether and if so to what extent the European Union is bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions with regards to the us of force despite not being a 
member of the United Nations unlike all its member states. The European Union 
makes strong references to the values and principles of the UN Charter that have 
inspired its own creation in its treaties30 and reinforces its call for effective 
multilateralism in its political documents.31 Nonetheless, the European Union avoids 
a clear statement as to whether it regards itself to be bound by the UN Charter and 
UN Security Council resolutions. The European member states also appear to be 
                                                
30 Article 21(2)(b),(c) LTEU. 
31 See for example the European Security Strategy (n 1). 
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divided about whether the EU has the right to deploy military personnel without 
obtaining formal UN Security Council mandates.32  
 
3. Research methods 
To assess the above outlined research questions, the main emphasis of the thesis will 
be put on the perspective of European law itself and o  the question of how the EU 
views itself as an international security provider within the international community 
from an inside-out perspective. By addressing the relationship between the European 
Union and UN Security Council resolutions in particular, the general relationship 
between the European legal order and the international legal order will be addressed, 
as will be the question whether the EU perceives its own legal order to be in a 
hierarchical relationship with international law orwhether it views itself as a 
completely autonomous legal system. 
 
Therefore, the examination of the question of whether e European Union is bound 
by UN Security Council resolutions will use a predominantly doctrinal approach and 
will focus on the EU legal order. The European courts have no jurisdiction within the 
common security and defence policy. Therefore no precedents are available for the 
EU’s relationship with UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use of force. 
The European Court of Justice has nevertheless provided some guidelines on the 
relationship between the European Union and economic UN Security Council 
decisions although most aspects are far from being r solved.33  
 
Based on the assumption that the European Union is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions with regards to economic sanctions in light of the International Fruit 
                                                
32T Hadden (ed), A Responsibility to Assist: EU Policy and Practice in Crisis-management 
Operations under European Security and Defence Policy: A COST Report (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2009) 68; W Wagner, ‘The Democratic Legitimacy of European Security and Defence Policy’ (2005) 
Occasional Paper 57, The European Union Institute for Security Studies 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ57.pdf>27, 28. 
33 See for example Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for 
Transport, Energy and Communications and others, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953 [hereinafter 
Bosphorus]; Case C-177/95 Ebony Maritime SA and Loten Navigation Co. Ltd v Prefetto della 
Provincia di Brindisi and others, Italy [1997] ECR  I-1111 [hereinafter Ebony Maritime]; Case C-
124/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR I-
81[hereinafter Centro-Com]; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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Company case of the European Court of Justice, 34 a comparative method will be 
used to find out whether this relationship can be helpful for the understanding of the 
relationship between the EU and UN Security Council resolutions with regards to the 
use of force.   
 
To allow for a comparison between economic and military sanctions, the thesis will 
outline the similarities and differences between both types of instruments from an 
international as well as from a European legal perspective. In addition, the EU’s own 
comprehensive approach to crisis management will be used to support a comparative 
method between both types of foreign policy instruments. After arguing in favour of 
a comparative method, the criteria established by the European Court of Justice in 
the International Fruit Company case for the functional substitution of the member 
states will be tested against UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use of 
force.  
 
4. Chapter overview  
The examination of the legal framework for the use of military force in EU crisis 
management operations will apply different legal pers ctives. As an international 
organisation that created its own legal order, the following two chapters of the thesis 
will analyse the conditions set up by European law itself that have to be met if the 
EU aims to engage in the use of military enforcement measures. Chapter four and 
chapter six that builds on the findings of the previous chapters, will examine whether 
the European Union has to respect additional conditi s originating from 
international law when it launches and conducts military crisis management 
operations.  
 
But before, chapter two will set out the European lega  framework under the 
common security and defence policy for the use of force by the European Union in 
military crisis management mission. The chapter will start with a historic overview 
of the development of a European role in foreign, security and defence matters in 
                                                
34 Joined Cases 21 to 24-72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit, Netherlands [1972] ECR 1219[hereinafter International Fruit Company case]. 
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order to visualise the resistance of EU member state  to lose some of their sovereign 
powers in this highly sensitive political sphere. The final part of chapter two will set 
out the status quo of the common security and defenc  policy under the Treaty of 
Lisbon and will describe how a European crisis management operation of a military 
nature is launched and conducted in practice.  
 
Following this historic and  descriptive approach, apter three will examine the 
already achieved level of European integration in the common security and defence 
policy by analysing the binding nature of  primary nd secondary law of the EU’s 
common foreign and security policy in order to discover whether the member states 
are already legally constrained in the conduct of their national foreign policies 
through Council decisions adopted within the framework of the EU’s common 
security and defence policy. The assessment of the legally binding nature of Council 
decisions adopted within the common security and defenc  policy is needed to help 
prepare the comparative method used in chapter six.  
 
The analysis of the European legal framework for the use of force will be followed 
by the examination of public international law and its requirements for the lawful use 
of military sanctions. The conditions set up by theCharter of the United Nations 
under Chapter VII for the use of force are predominantly aimed at states.  Therefore 
it will be crucial to find out whether the findings that UN member states need to 
obtain an explicit and a priori mandate by the UN security Council if they plan to 
impose military sanctions, and that once the UN Security Council has adopted a 
military sanction resolution UN member states are bound by its decisions, can be 
transferred to the European Union. In other words, it will be assessed whether the 
European Union needs to comply with additional legal requirements originating from 
general international law and the UN Charter in particular if it wants to resort to the 
use of military force. For this purpose, chapter four will examine the general 
international legal framework for the use of force that has been developed primarily 
with regards to states and regional arrangements in mind.35 Particular emphasis will 
                                                
35 The European Union is not a regional arrangement within the meaning of chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter. See for example, J Cloos, ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management – Putting Effective 
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be put on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the legal effects produced by military 
sanctions and the question of when UN Security Council resolutions stop being 
binding on UN member states.  
 
Chapter six will examine whether these findings canbe transferred to the European 
Union as an emerging international military actor. In order to analyse whether the 
European Union is bound by UN Security Council resoluti ns, chapter six will use a 
unique comparative method. The comparison is unique in the sense that the effects of 
economic sanctions and the effects of military sanctio s within the international legal 
order as well as within the European legal order will be assessed and compared with 
each other. It will be argued that both types of measures create rights as well as 
obligations for UN member states from the perspectiv  of international law. Turning 
to the European Union as an emerging international actor that is adopting and 
implementing economic sanctions and that is adopting Council decisions with which 
military crisis management missions are being launched and conducted, it will be 
held that both types of instruments are binding on the European member states. Both 
types of instruments constrain them in the conduct of their national foreign policies. 
Based on the finding that the European Union is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions with regards to economic sanctions according to the criteria established 
by the ECJ in the International Fruit Company Case, it will be argued that there are 
sufficient similarities between economic and military sanctions within the European 
legal order to test whether these criteria are alsopplicable to the EU’s relationship 
with UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use of force.  
 
In order to prepare the comparative method used in chapter six, chapter five will take 
a closer look at economic sanctions within the European legal order. The EU, which 
uses the term restrictive measures when it refers to anctions, recognizes several 
types of measures. They include diplomatic sanctions like the expulsion of 
diplomats, severing of diplomatic ties or the suspen ion of official visits; the 
suspension of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sports or cultural events; 
trade sanctions like general or specific trade sanctio s and arms embargoes; financial 
                                                                                                                                
Multilateralsim into Practice’ in J Wouters, F Hoffmeister and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and 
the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006) 265. 
 28 
sanctions like the freezing of funds or economic resources, the prohibition of 
financial transactions or restrictions on export credits or investment; flight bans and 
restrictions on admission.36  
 
Within the European context, only economic and financi l sanctions are going to be 
assessed that are adopted by decisions made in the fram work of the common foreign 
and security policy and a related legislative measure based on the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. National implementing measures eg arms 
embargoes and other national measures in response t Council decisions adopted 
within the common foreign and security policy are not included. Although the 
European legal order distinguishes the terms economic and financial sanctions, they 
will both be referred to as economic sanctions in abroad sense.  Since the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, both instruments find their legal basis in the same 
provision in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.37 The 
international legal order does not recognise such a distinction either in the sense that 
both types of measures are covered by Article 41 UN Charter.  
 
The first part of chapter five will outline the European framework for the adoption of 
economic sanctions, including the changes introduce by the Treaty of Lisbon. This 
will be followed by a detailed historical overview of the development of a European 
competence for economic sanctions that combine trad measures with foreign policy 
considerations. Comparable to matters of security and defence, economic sanctions 
are therefore close to the member states’ guarded sphere of state power that they are 
reluctant to lose to the European Union. Nevertheless, the process of European 
integration in the foreign policy arena of economic sanctions can be regarded as 
almost settled today and the European member states are largely constrained in their 
domestic foreign policies in this regard.  
 
                                                
36 See European Commission, Restrictive Measures (2008) 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf#2> and  
 J Kreutz, ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981 - 2004’ 
(2005) Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) paper 45 
<http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/paper45/paper45.pdf> 5, 6.  
37 Article 215 LTFEU. 
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The core of chapter six focuses on the analysis of the EU’s legal relationship with 
UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use of force. Building on the findings 
of the previous chapters, chapter six will examine whether the EU’s legal 
relationship with economic UN Security Council resoluti ns can be helpful for the 
understanding of the EU’s relationship with UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding military sanctions by using the above mentioned comparative method. 
 
So far, chapter two to chapter six have examined the EU and the use of force 
whenever there has been a positive decision to resort to military measures and how 
these decisions affect the European member states on the one hand and the European 
Union itself on the other hand. Chapter seven will test the findings of the previous 
chapters and will examine the legal implications of a silence in the context of the use 
of force, on the background of the war against Iraq in 2003 during which the 
European member states have been deeply divided. They prevented the European 
Union from speaking with one voice and thus from exercising its political weight in 
the world. The EU remained silent in accordance with the absence of a UN Security 
Council resolution authorising the war against Iraq. Some EU member states, 
including the UK, actively contributed to the military operation.38 
 
In the context of silence and the use of force, two problems will be addressed. From 
an international law point of view, it will be questioned whether the silence of the 
UN Security Council can be interpreted as an authorisation for the European Union 
to use military sanctions. Turning to the European legal order itself, it will be 
examined how a silence within the common security and defence policy could 
influence the member states. Thus, it will be questioned whether the European 
member states could be constrained in the conduct of their domestic foreign policies 
through the Union’s common security and defence policy, even when no Council 
decisions in the framework of the common security and defence policy have yet been 
adopted.  
 
                                                
38 D McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ to the Iraq War 2003: International Law in an Age of Complexity (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2004) 11, 12. 
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Thus chapter seven will adopt a more speculative approach and will discuss the 
gradual development of an acquis securitaire through a bottom-up approach. It will 
be argued that the more experience the European Union gains as an international 
crisis management actor, the more patterns of behaviour will develop which will 
make it more difficult for European member states to act unilaterally when faced 
with a specific crisis situation. Patterns will develop that show that the European 
Union addresses specific types of crisis or specific phases of a crisis in particular 
ways. In doing so, the European Union will start to create legitimate expectations to 
act in certain ways when faced with particular situations. Transferring this reasoning 
to the member states, they will find it more difficult in the future to justify unilateral 
domestic measures that do not correspond to these practices. In extreme cases, this 
could indicate that EU member states would have to refrain from acting externally 
even when the European Union has not decided on a cmmon position yet.  
 
5. Main research contribution 
The main research contribution of this thesis is twofold. The legal relationship 
between the European Union and UN Security Council resolutions in the context of 
the use of force has not been examined, to my knowledge, as such. This is probably 
due to the rather new development of the European Union as an international military 
actor. EU-led military crisis management operations conducted in rather hostile 
environments, such as Operation Atalanta, create even more awareness for the need 
to examine the EU’s relation with UN Security Council resolutions. It will be 
particularly questioned whether the EU needs to obtain a UN Security Council 
mandate before it can lawfully engage in the use of force and whether and to what 
extent the EU is bound by UN Security Council resoluti ns authorising the use of 
force. In the context of economic sanctions, the EU’s relationship with UN Security 
Council resolutions has so far been controversially discussed.39 Based on an analogy 
                                                
39 Supporting the view that the EU could be bound by economic Security Council resolutions: P 
Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2004) 438, 439. Rejecting his view is S Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the United 
Nations Security Council and the European Community’ (1993) 4 European Journal of International 
Law 265; also rather negative is  C Eckes, ‘Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures – 
The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments of the Court of First Instance’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal, 85 
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with the International Fruit Company case40 it has been held that the EU, although 
not a member of the United Nations, is bound by economic UN Security Council 
decisions.41 Supporting this view, the thesis uses a comparative method to find out 
what can be learned from the relationship between the EU and economic UN 
Security Council sanctions for the understanding of the EU’s relationship with UN 
Security Council resolutions in the context of the use of force. The comparative 
method is novel since it is based on the claim that economic and military sanctions 
can be compared according to the effects they produce within the international legal 
order as well as within the European legal order. In addition, the EU’s 
comprehensive concept of crisis management is used to support the usefulness of a 
comparison between both types of instruments. 
 
The second major contribution of this research project is the examination of the 
meaning of silence in the context of the use of force. Based on the assumption that a 
silence needs to be qualified so as to have a precise legal meaning, existing literature 
on the UN’s system of vertical centralised law enforcement42 will be used to interpret 
the meaning of silence in the context of the United Nations and whether it can be 
interpreted as an authorisation to use force. In the context of the European Union, it 
will be assessed whether a possible development of an acquis securitaire could 
qualify the meaning of silence in the common security and defence policy to have a 
precise legal meaning. The terminology of an cquis securitaire has been used 
before43 but the thesis will try to define the sources for its development and its 
possible implications for the EU and for its European member states. 
 
                                                
40 Joined Cases 21 to 24-72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit, Netherlands [1972] ECR  I-1219. 
41 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649 para 207. 
42 E De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2004); K Osteneck,  Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die Europäische 
Gemeinschaft: Völker- und europarechtliche Rahmenbedi gungen für ein Tätigwerden der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Bereich von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionsregimen unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Umsetzungspraxis der EG-Organe, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 
Band 168 (Springer Verlag, Berlin 2004); D Sarooshi, T e United Nations and the Development of 
Collective Security: The Delegation by the UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1999.  
43 See, for example, Blockmans (n 14) 3. 
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6. Kadi 
The Kadi case raises several legal issues that will be referred to throughout this 
thesis. So as to provide a consistent overview and to avoid repetition as much as 
possible, the next part will offer a summary of the facts of the Kadi case, an 
overview of the existing literature and a critical assessment of the decisions of the 
Court of First Instance44 and the European Court of Justice.45 
 
The Kadi case deals with targeted sanctions against individuals.46 Smart or targeted 
sanctions against individuals entail complex human rights dimensions. The 
individuals included on sanction lists are the object of far reaching restrictive 
measures including travel bans and the freezing of funds and assets. The inclusion on 
such a list is often the result of mere suspicion and no reasons for the listing need to 
be provided. The listing is not the outcome of a criminal process. Once they appear 
on a list, individuals are not equipped with an effective judicial remedy on the 
international level. They must rely on diplomatic efforts for a successful de-listing 
procedure that can only reached by consensus. 
 
Overall, the Kadi case raises questions about the competence of the European Union 
to adopt sanctions targeted against individuals, the competence of the European 
courts to review Community instruments that implement UN Security Council 
resolutions in the Community legal order, the relationship between European law and 
                                                
44 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649. 
45 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
46 The literature on the development and impact of targeted sanctions is extensive. See for example M 
Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter Sanctions’ (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 43-61; M Brzoska, ‘From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions’ 
(2003) 9 Global Governance 519-535; B Fassbender, ‘Ta geted Sanctions and Due Process: The 
responsibility of the UN Security Council to ensure that fair and clear procedures are made available 
to individuals and entities targeted with sanctions u der Chapter VII of the UN Charter’, Study 
commissioned by the United Nations, Office for Legal Affairs – Office of the Legal Counsel, 20 
March 2006 (final) < http://untreaty.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/Fassbender_study.pdf>; I 
Cameron, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights, Due Process and United Nations Security 
Council Counter-terrorism Sanctions’, Report, Council of Europe, 06/02/2006 
<http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/Texts_&_Documents/Docs%202006/I.%20Cameron%20Report%2
006.pdf>; I Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards nd the European Convention on 
Human Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 159-214; D Cortright and  G A Lopez, 
Sanctions and the Search for Security: Challenges to UN Action (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 
2002).     
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the international legal order, and questions of differing human rights standards. The 
following chapters will address some of these problems. 
 
Chapter four of this thesis, ‘The international legal framework for the use of force’, 
will argue that the UN Security Council is limited by human rights as one of the 
principles and purposes of the UN Charter. The Kadi decisions will be used to 
demonstrate that the criticism the UN Security Council faces in light of human rights 
concerns in the context of targeted sanctions against individuals is of practical 
significance. It bears with it the potential to weak n the central role played by the 
UN Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. At the 
same time, it visualises the importance for the EU to develop its own legitimacy as 
an international security provider, based on its own standard of human rights 
protection. 
 
Chapter five, which will focus on economic sanctions within the European legal 
order, will use the ECJ’s Kadi decision to demonstrate that the European Union has 
to respect European fundamental rights when implementing autonomous or non-
autonomous economic sanction regulations. 
 
Chapter six, assessing the legal relationship between the European Union and UN 
Security Council resolutions in more detail, will utilise the European courts’ 
arguments regarding the relationship between the European legal order and the 
international legal order to argue that the EU is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions but that this binding nature is limited by the EU’s own standard of human 
rights protection. 
 
6.1. Kadi – facts of the case  
In the fight against international terrorism, the UN Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1267 (1999), condemning the training and sheltering of terrorists on 
Afghan territory. 47  It demanded that the Taliban turn over Usama bin Laden. To 
encourage compliance with this demand, paragraph 4 (b) of Resolution 1267 (1999) 
                                                
47 For the facts of the Kadi case see Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission 
[2005] ECR II-3649 paras 10-36. 
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provided that all states must freeze funds and other financial resources, including 
funds derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly 
by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the Taliban, as 
designated by the Sanctions Committee.  
 
To implement UNSCR 1267 (1999), the Council adopted Common Position 
1999/727/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Taliban.48 On the legal 
basis of Articles 60 and 301 EC, Community Regulation 337/2000 followed,49 which 
provided for the freezing of funds and a flight ban. On several occasions, the UN 
Security Council adopted new resolutions in order to strengthen the flight ban and 
the freezing of funds. The European Union reacted to all changes and adopted 
corresponding common positions and Community regulations in its desire to 
implement the UN sanction regime against the Taliban and their supporters in the 
European legal order.  
 
The European member states are obliged under international law to implement 
mandatory UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (1999) in their domestic legal 
orders as members of the United Nations. The legal si nificance of the Community 
regulation implementing Resolution 1267 (1999) is that it creates a Community law 
obligation for the European member states to give eff ct to the Security Council 
decision as well. Therefore European member states would not only be violating 
international law but also EU law if they would not carry out the mentioned targeted 
sanctions against the listed individuals. 
 
Mr Kadi appeared on the list of persons suspected of supporting terrorism drawn up 
by the Sanctions Committee. This UN list was annexed to Council Regulation No 
881/ 2002 ‘Specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities 
associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban’ that was 
adopted on the legal basis of Articles 60, 301 and 308 EC and to implement UN 
                                                
48 Council Common Position 1999/727/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Taliban [1999] 
OJ L 294/1. 
49 Council Regulation (EC) No 337/2000 concerning a flight ban and a freeze of funds and other 
financial resources of the Taliban of Afghanistan [2000] OJ L 43/1. 
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Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002).50 In reaction to the freezing of his funds 
and a travel ban, Mr Kadi challenged the lawfulness of Community regulation No 
881/2002 by alleging three breaches of human rights, namely the right to a fair 
hearing, the right to respect of property and of the principle of proportionality, and 
the right to effective judicial review.51  
 
Only if the Court of First Instance would annul thecontested Community Regulation, 
it would stop being directly applicable in all EU me ber states and Mr Kadi’s funds 
could be freed, at least from a European legal perspective. Nonetheless, from an 
international law perspective, the EU member states would still be duty bound to 
implement targeted UN sanction resolutions. 
 
The Court of First Instance did not annul the contested EC regulation and Mr Kadi 
remained on the list of persons whose funds were frozen. Mr Kadi appealed against 
this decision and the European Court of Justice found the contested regulation to be 
in breach of Mr Kadi’s fundamental rights.52  
 
The following section summarises the main findings of the Court of First Instance, 
Advocate General Maduro,53 and the European Court of Justice. All have been 
widely discussed in the literature and have been subject both to praise and to 
criticism. The purpose of the next section is to prvide an overview of the different 
approaches that have been taken and to highlight the impact of the Kadi decision. 
This will be followed by the author’s own take on the Kadi case.  
                                                
50 Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 
imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated 
with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) 
No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the 
flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of 
Afghanistan [2002] OJ L 139/9. 
51 Kadi (n 47) para 59.  
52  The situation of Mr Kadi is far from being solved. In 2008, the permanent representative of France 
to the United Nations, acting on behalf of the European Union, requested the UN Sanctions 
Committee for a disclosure of the reasons for Mr Kadi’s listing. In response to this summary, the 
Commission intended to adopt a legal act so that Mr Kadi should remain on the list in Annex I to 
Regulation 881/2002. Mr Kadi successfully challenged Commission Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008 
of 28 November 2008. See Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Commission f 30 September 2010. 
The Commission has appealed against the decision of the General Court. See Case C-584/10 P. 
53 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-402/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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6.2. Kadi and the Court of First Instance 
When addressing the question of whether the Community regulation that gave effect 
to a UN Security Council resolution within the EU legal order violated Mr Kadi’s 
fundamental rights, the Court of First Instance54 started its assessment with the 
question of whether it was competent to review the contested regulation. In 
substance, it reasoned that if the Community had no discretion to implement the 
respective UN Security Council resolution, any judgment of the contested regulation 
would amount to judicial scrutiny of a decision of the UN Security Council for which 
it would have no competence. Therefore the CFI in a first step approached the 
question of the relationship between the European lgal order and the international 
legal order and in particular whether the European Community was bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions. The CFI argued in favour of the primacy of the UN 
Charter over domestic law as well as over internatio l treaty law.55 The CFI came to 
this conclusion after considering norms of international law and after analysing the 
EC Treaty. 
 
The CFI held that from the standpoint of international law, the obligations of UN 
member states would prevail over all other obligations stemming from either 
domestic or international treaty law, including obligations under the Community or 
the ECHR.56 Turning to EU law, the CFI found that that the EC Treaty would respect 
the member states’ duty under international law to give precedence to their UN 
Charter obligations through Articles 307(1) EC and Article 297 EC.57 Both 
provisions would justify domestic member state measures that deviate from EC law 
if they are necessary to fulfil UN legal obligations.58  
 
Overall, the Community would have to take all necessary measures to ensure that 
those UN Security Council resolutions binding on all EU member states are put into 
                                                
54 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649 [hereinafter Kadi]. 
55 Kadi (n 54) para 181. 
56 Kadi (n 54) para 181. 
57 Today’s Articles 351 LTFEU and 347 LTFEU. 
58 Kadi (n 54) paras 185-188. 
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effect.59 The CFI thus concluded that the rules of general international law as well as 
specific EC treaty provisions would ask the member states to ‛leave unapplied any 
provision of Community law, whether a provision of primary law or a general 
principle of that law, that raises any impediment to he proper performance of their 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations’60.  
 
The CFI went on to state that  
 
unlike its Member States, the Community as such is not directly bound 
by the Charter of the United Nations and that it isnot therefore required, 
as an obligation of general public international law, to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of 
that Charter. The reason is that the Community is not a member of the 
United Nations, or an addressee of the resolutions f the Security 
Council, or the successor to the rights and obligations of the Member 
States for the purposes of public international law.  
 
Nevertheless, the Community must be considered to be bound by the 
obligations under the Charter of the United Nations in the same way as 
its Member States, by virtue of the Treaty establishing it.61 
 
The CFI came to this conclusion using two arguments. First, it held that member 
states would have acted under circumscribed powers hen creating the European 
Community. Thus they could not have transferred more powers to the EC than they 
possessed themselves.62 
 
Second, it held that old Articles 224 EEC and 234 EEC63 would demonstrate that the 
member states wanted to fulfil their UN Charter obligations through their 
membership of the EC. By drawing an analogy with the International Fruit 
Company Case, the CFI argued that the Community would have functio ally 
substituted the member states in the sphere of economic sanctions.64  
 
                                                
59 Kadi (n 54) para189. 
60 Kadi (n 54) para 190. 
61 Kadi (n 54) paras 192-193. 
62 Kadi (n 54) paras 194-195. 
63 Today’s Articles 351 LTFEU and 347 LTFEU. 
64 Kadi (n 54) paras 196-203. 
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The CFI held that 
 
[i]t therefore appears that, in so far as under theEC Treaty the 
Community has assumed powers previously exercised by Member States 
in the area governed by the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions 
of that Charter have the effect of binding the Community.65 
 
Following that reasoning, it must be held, first, that the Community may 
not infringe the obligations imposed on its Member states by the Charter 
of the United nations or impede their performance and, second, that in 
the exercise of its powers it is bound, by the very Treaty by which it was 
established, to adopt all the measures necessary to enable its Member 
States to fulfil those obligations.66 
 
From this, the CFI concluded that the Community is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions and would be required by its own legal order, the Community order, to 
give effect to UN Security Council resolutions.67 It rejected the view of the 
Community legal order to be a legal order independent of the United Nations, 
governed by its own rules of law.68  
 
In a second step and in consequence of the binding nature of UN Security Council 
resolutions, the CFI held that it would be limited in reviewing the contested 
regulation in light of European fundamental rights.69 It argued that regarding the 
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions i the Community legal order, 
the Community institutions would have ‘acted under circumscribed powers, with the 
result that they had no autonomous discretion. In particular, they could neither 
directly alter the content of the resolutions at issue nor set up any mechanism 
capable of giving rise to such alteration.’70  
 
Overall, it held that: 
 
[a]ny review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation, 
especially having regard to the provision or general principles of 
                                                
65 Emphasis added. 
66 Kadi (n 54) paras 203, 204. 
67 Kadi (n 54) para 207. 
68 Kadi (n 54) para  208. 
69 Kadi (n 54) para 209. 
70 Kadi (n 54) para 214. 
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Community law relating to the protection of fundamental rights, would 
therefore imply that the Court is to consider, indirectly, the lawfulness of 
those resolutions.71 
 
In particular, if the Court were to annul the contested regulation, as the 
applicant claims it should, although that regulation seems to be imposed 
by international law, on the ground that that act infringes his fundamental 
rights which are protected by the Community legal order, such annulment 
would indirectly mean that the resolutions of the Scurity Council 
concerned themselves infringe those fundamental rights. In other words, 
the applicant asks the Court to declare by implication hat the provision 
of international law at issue infringes the fundamental rights of 
individuals, as protected by the Community legal order.72 
 
In a third step and despite claiming not be competent o review a Community 
instrument that is giving effect to UN Security Council decisions in the light of 
European fundamental rights as part of Community law,73 the CFI then found itself 
to be competent to indirectly review UN Security Council resolutions in the light of 
jus cogens. 74 
  
The Court of First Instance considered the right to respect for property, the right to 
be heard as well as the right to effective judicial review as forming part of jus 
cogens.75 Although the CFI acknowledged that the procedure off red by the Sanction 
Committee for the de-listing of individuals would not confer a direct right for the 
concerned persons to make themselves heard by the Committee and that ‘[t]hose 
persons are thus dependent, essentially, on the diplomatic protection afforded by the 
States to their nationals’76, the Court found no violations of Mr. Kadi’s fundamental 
human rights and in particular the right to be heard or the right to effective judicial 
review. 
 
When Mr Kadi appealed against the decision of the Court of First Instance, neither 
Advocate General Maduro nor the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice 
followed the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in substance. 
                                                
71 Kadi (n 54) para  215. 
72 Kadi (n 54) para 216. 
73 Kadi (n 54) para 225. 
74 Kadi (n 54) para 231. 
75 Kadi (n 54) paras 233-292. 
76 Kadi (n 54) para 267. 
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6.3. Kadi and the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro 
In respect of the relationship between the internatio l legal order and the 
Community legal order, Advocate General Maduro77 held that  
 
[t]he relationship between international law and the Community legal 
order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international 
law can permeate that legal order only under the conditi ns set by the 
constitutional principles of the Community.78 
 
Although the ECJ would take great care of the Community’s obligations stemming 
from international law, the Court would try to preserve the constitutional foundations 
created by the EC treaty itself.79 Therefore it would be incorrect to assume that once 
the Community is bound by a rule of international law, the courts would have to 
apply it in the European legal order unconditionally.80 There would be no legal basis 
in the EC Treaty that would allow the conclusion that Community measures 
implementing UN Security Council resolutions would have ‘supra-constitutional 
status’ and thus need to be immune from judicial review.81 The argument put forward 
by the UK that Article 307 EC82 in conjunction with Article 10 EC83 would require 
the Community not to prevent the member states from fulfilling their obligation to 
implement UN Security Council resolutions would not be convincing.84 Rejecting 
this view, Advocate General Maduro held that, 
 
[a]t first sight, it may not be entirely clear how Member States would be 
prevented from fulfilling their obligations under the United Nations 
Charter if the Court were to annul the contested regulation. Indeed, in the 
absence of a Community measure, it would in principle be open to the 
Member States to take their own implementing measures, since they are 
allowed, under the Treaty, to adopt measures which, though affecting the 
functioning of the common market, may be necessary for the 
                                                
77 Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C 402/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351[hereinafter AG 
Maduro]. 
78 AG Maduro (n 77) para 24. 
79 AG Maduro (n 77) para 24. 
80 AG Maduro (n 77)  para 24 
81 AG Maduro (n 77) para 28. 
82 Today’s Article 351 LTFEU. 
83 Today’s Article 4(3) LTEU. 
84 AG Maduro (n 77) para 29. 
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maintenance of international peace and security. None the less, the 
powers retained by the Member states in the field of security policy must 
be exercised in a manner consistent with Community law. In the light of 
the Court’s ruling in ERT, it may be assumed that, to the extent that their 
actions come within the scope of Community law, the Member States are 
subject to the same Community rules for the protection of fundamental 
rights as the Community institutions themselves. On that assumption, if 
the Court were to annul the contested regulation on the ground that it 
infringes Community rules for the protection of fundamental rights, then, 
by implication, Member States could not possibly adopt the same 
measures without – in so far as those measures came within the scope of 
Community law- acting in breach of fundamental rights as protected by 
the Court.85 
 
Furthermore, Advocate General Maduro emphasised that Article 307 EC would not 
allow derogation from Article 6(1) TEU which provides that ‛the Union is founded 
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law’.86   
 
6.4. Kadi and the European Court of Justice 
Regarding the scope of judicial review, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Justice87 largely agreed with Advocate General Maduro and recall d first that the 
Community is based on the rule of law 
 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid 
review of the conformity of their acts with the basic constitutional 
charter, the EC Treaty, which established a complete system of legal 
remedies and procedures designed to enable the Court of Justice to 
review the legality of acts of the institutions.88  
 
Second, it pointed out that ‘an international agreem nt cannot affect the allocation of 
powers fixed by the Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the Community legal 
system’.89 Third, the Grand Chamber recalled that fundamental rights constitute an 
integral part of the general principles of law and that respect for human rights would 
                                                
85 AG Maduro (n 77) para 30. 
86 AG Maduro (n 77) para 31. 
87 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351[hereinafter Kadi (Grand Chamber)]. 
88 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 281. 
89 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 282. 
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be a condition for the lawfulness of Community acts.90  The conclusion the Court 
drew from these three observations was that 
 
the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the 
effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental 
rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is 
for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaties.91 
 
The Court acknowledged the primacy of UN Security Council resolutions in 
international law.  In contrast to the Court of First Instance, it nevertheless concluded 
that any judgment stating that a Community instrument intending to give effect to 
such a resolution would be in breach of a higher rule of the Community legal order 
would not challenge the primacy of that resolution in the international legal order.92 
It found no legal basis in the EC Treaty that would provide for the immunity from 
jurisdiction of a Community instrument implementing a UN Security Council 
resolution.93 Neither Article 307 EC nor 297 EC could ‘be understood to authorise 
any derogation from the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU as a foundation of the 
Union’.94  
 
It stated that by virtue of Article 300(7) EC, 
 
supposing it to be applicable to the Charter of the United Nations, the 
latter would have primacy over acts of secondary Community law. That 
primacy at the level of Community law would not however, extend to 
primary law, in particular to the general principles of which fundamental 
rights form part.95 
 
                                                
90 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) paras 283, 284. 
91 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 285. 
92 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 288. 
93 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 300. 
94 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) paras 301-303. 
95 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) paras 306-308. 
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The Court stressed the autonomy of the Community legal order and confirmed its 
jurisdiction to review the Community regulation giving effect to a UN Security 
Council resolution in the light of its internal system of fundamental rights.96  
 
The Court did not resort to the concept of jus cogens as the Court of First Instance 
had done. It also did not set out to examine indirectly whether the UN Security 
Council had observed this standard of peremptory noms with its sanction decisions. 
Rather it directly assessed the lawfulness of the Community regulation in the light of 
European fundamental rights as general principles of EC law. The European Court of 
Justice came to the conclusion that Mr Kadi’s fundamental right to respect for 
property had been infringed and that the contested regulation implementing UN 
Security Council resolution had to be annulled.97  
 
6.5. Literature review 
Both Kadi decisions as well as the Opinion of Advocate General Maduro have been 
subject to a wide and diverse academic debate. All three decisions have been praised 
and criticised for a variety of reasons. The following section will offer a brief 
overview of the existing literature and is by no means exhaustive.98 In general, most 
authors have agreed with the European Courts that saw in Kadi the need to address 
the legal relationship between the European legal order and the international legal 
order. This relationship has been discussed in terms of a monist approach of the 
CFI99  and dualist approach of the ECJ100 or as part of the fragmentation of 
international law.101 In contrast, Piet Eeckhout has suggested that targeted economic 
sanctions against individuals would rather highlight an internal EU law conflict. 
                                                
96 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 317. 
97 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) paras 371,  372. 
98 For another literature survey see S Poli and M Tzanou, ‘The Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the 
Literature’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of European Law 533-558. 
99 C Tomuschat, ‘The Kadi Case: What Relationship is there between the Universal Legal Order under 
the Auspices of the United Nations and the EU Legal Order?’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of European Law 
657. 
100 Tomuschat (n 99) 659; R Pavoni, ‘Freedom to Choose the Legal Means for Implementing UN 
Security Council Resolutions and the ECJ Kadi Judgment: A Misplaced Argument Hindering the 
Enforcement of International Law in the EC’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of European Law 629. 
101 For a systematic overview of the different approaches applied by the CFI, AG Maduro and the ECJ 
see G De Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice an the International Legal Order after Kadi’ (2009) 
Jean Monnet Working Paper No 01/09 
<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/papers/09/0901 1.pdf> 33, 34. 
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Namely it would be a conflict between ‘the Community law imperative to respect 
fundamental rights and the Community law imperative o respect UN law’.102 Martin 
Scheinin sees in Kadi evidence of existing tensions within the international legal 
order as well as of tensions within the European legal order.103  
 
6.5.1. The Court of First Instance and the relation ship of the European 
legal order and international law 
The Court of First Instance’s Kadi decision has been welcomed by some for its 
openness towards public international law. By arguin  in favour of the primacy of 
international law over EC law, it was held that theCFI would follow the European 
Courts’ previous case law that has been characterised by a general friendliness 
towards international law or in terms of monism. It has also been positively 
recognised that the judgment of the CFI, by refusing to review a Community 
instrument that is giving effect to UN Security Council resolutions in the light of 
European fundamental rights, would not challenge the role of the United Nations in 
the context of sanctions. It has been suggested that if the CFI would have used its 
own standard of human rights protection instead of an international ordre public that 
is defined by public international law to review the contested sanction regulation, UN 
member states could have been encouraged to do the sam .104 They could stop 
implementing binding UN Security Council resolutions, using their domestic ordre 
public as a justification.105 It has been argued that this could seriously undermine the 
system of the United Nations.106  
 
The legal arguments used by the Court of First Instance to support the thesis that the 
European Community is bound as a matter of EC law by UN Security Council 
                                                
102 P Eeckhout, ‘Community Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights, and UN Security Council 
Resolutions. In Search of the Right Fit’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 192. 
103 M Scheinin, ‘Is the ECJ Ruling in Kadi Incompatible with International Law?’ (2009) 28 Yearbook 
of European Law 637. 
104 A Von Arnauld, ‘UN-Sanktionen und gemeinschaftsrechtli her Grundrechtsschutz: Die ‘Soweit-
Rechtsprechung’ des Europäischen Gerichts Erster Instanz’ (2006) 44 Archiv des Völkerrechts 210 
105 Von Arnauld (n 104) 210. 
106 As will be shown later, the practice of the CFI to review UN Security Council resolutions 
‘indirectly’ in the light of jus cogens is not without problems either. 
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resolutions have been supported by a few scholars.107 They agreed with the Court 
that the member states would have acted under circums ribed powers when joining 
the European Economic Community. By creating an international organisation 
between them, they could not have transferred more p wers to the EEC than they 
themselves possessed. Thus the European Economic Comunity and thereafter the 
European Community would have been linked to the EU member states’ obligation 
to fulfil their UN Charter obligations from the beginning.108  
 
The  analogy the Court draws with the International Fruit Company case109 by 
speaking in favour of a functional substitution of the European member states in the 
sphere of economic and financial sanctions through the European Community has 
been critically received.110  Those who support the Court’s argument of a functio al 
substitution usually do not count an exclusive Community competence amongst the 
necessary requirements for this concept.  They argue that although the Community 
would not enjoy exclusive competence in the sphere of conomic sanctions, the 
Community would nevertheless have systematically imple ented economic UN 
Security Council sanctions in practice which they regard to be sufficient.111 
Nonetheless, there are also those, who reject the analogy with the International Fruit 
Company case, and basically ask for an exclusive Community competence for a 
functional substitution.112 
 
However, the consequence the Court draws from this finding, namely the primacy of 
international law and in particular the UN Charter over EC law without 
distinguishing between secondary or primary EU law, has predominantly been 
                                                
107 Von Arnauld (n 104) 201-216; L Martínez, ‘Bad Law for Good Reasons: The Contradictions of the 
Kadi Judgment’(2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 339-357. 
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criticised.113 It has been held that in particular such provision as today’s Articles 
347 LTFEU and 351 LTFEU, which allow EU member states o derogate from EC 
law under certain strict conditions to give effect to UN Charter obligations, would 
not allow the Community itself to disregard some of its constitutional foundations, 
including respect for the rule of law and European fundamental rights.114  
 
Others have argued that the CFI’s view in Kadi would be contrary to the ECJ’s 
earlier case law on international law, fundamental rights and in particular to its 
judgment in Bosphorus.115 In Bosphorus,116 the ECJ had to interpret Council 
Regulation No 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the European 
Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia117 as part of a 
preliminary reference procedure initiated by the Supreme Court of Ireland.  
Regulation 990/93 was adopted by the Council to give effect to the decision of the 
Community and the member states, meeting within the framework of political 
cooperation to implement in the EEC certain aspects of he sanctions imposed by the 
UN Security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including Resolution 820 (1993). 
Back then, the CFI spent little time assessing a possible infringement of fundamental 
rights through the Council regulation but also did not signal any problems just 
because the Community instrument in question was giving effect to a UN Security 
Council resolution in the Community legal order.  
 
It has been noted by many that the CFI’s refusal to review a Community instrument 
that is giving effect to a UN Security Council resolution within the EU legal order in 
light of European fundamental rights would result in an inadequate protection of 
                                                
113 M Karayigit, ‘The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments: The Scope of the EC Competences in Respect of 
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human rights within the EU legal order. This situation would entail the potential of 
creating a ‘solange’ situation that ultimately can damage the supremacy of the EU 
legal order.118 The solange doctrine refers to the readiness of the European member 
states, and in particular Germany, not to exercise jurisdiction over EC acts in light of 
domestic human rights as long as the Community would provide an equivalent level 
of human rights protection. Similar to the solange doctrine, it has also been 
suggested that the refusal of the CFI to review Community acts in light of European 
fundamental rights could trigger the exercise of a second type of solange reasoning, 
but this time within the relationship between the European Union and the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and in particular 
highlights the unclear division of competence betwen the European Court of Justice 
and the European Court on Human Rights.119  In Bosphorus, 120 the ECrtHR viewed 
itself as competent to review secondary EU law indirectly but it also held that it 
would not make use of its jurisdiction if the European Union would offer an 
‘equivalent’ or ‘comparable’ standard of human rights protection as the one 
guaranteed by the European Convention.121 Although the level of human rights 
protection would not need to be ‘equivalent’, the ECrtHR would resume its 
competence to review secondary EU law in case ‘thatthe protection of Convention 
rights was manifestly deficient’.122   If the European Court of Human Rights would 
regard the level of human rights protection offered by the European Courts to be 
manifestly deficient, European member states would be liable under the 
Convention.123 In the absence of a clear definition of what is meant by ‘manifestly 
deficient’ it has been pointed out by others that it would also be possible for the 
ECrtHR to accept the Court of First Instance’s Kadi decision, which would avoid a 
                                                
118 Karayigit (n 113) 401; B Kunoy, ‘The Jurisdiction of the ECJ to Review the Legality of the 
Transposition of an International Act in the EC Legal Order’ (2007) 76 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 35; Eeckhout (n 102) 202. 
119 N Lavranos, ‘UN Sanctions and Judicial Review’(2997) 76 Nordic Journal of International Law 
16; Joris Larik refers to ‘upward solanging’as opposed to ‘downward solanging’ in J Larik, ‘Two 
Ships in the Night or in the Same Boat together? Why the European Court of Justice Made the Right 
Choice in the Kadi Case’ (2009) EU Diplomacy Papers 3/2009, Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/11436/1/EDP_3_2009_Larik.pdf> 19. 
120 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS, v. Ireland (App No. 45036/98) ECHR 30 June 2005 
[hereinafter Bosphorus v Ireland]. 
121 Bosphorus v  Ireland (n 120) para 155. 
122Bosphorus v  Ireland (n 120) paras 155 and 156; Lavranos (n 119) 9. 
123 Karayigit (n 113) 402, 403.   
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clash between the European legal order and the Convention, but would result in the 
complete lack of judicial protection against UN Security Council resolutions targeted 
against individuals.124 International law does not provide for judicial review 
mechanisms for UN Security Council decisions anyway and national courts of the 
member states that in theory could provide for effectiv  remedies against acts of their 
national authorities that are implementing sanction decisions are limited in their 
scope of review by the supremacy of the EU sanction regulation.125 
 
6.5.2. The Court of First Instance’s approach to Eu ropean fundamental 
rights and jus cogens 
Although the Court refused to review the contested Community regulation in light of 
European fundamental rights it nonetheless held itself competent to ‘indirectly’ 
review the UN Security Council sanction resolution n light of jus cogens. The Court 
of First Instance’s approach to the question whether int rnational organisations and 
in particular the United Nations are bound by human rights in the form of jus cogens 
has been largely welcomed.126  Nevertheless, the Court’s take on jus cogens itself 
was viewed rather more critically by most. What constitute norms of jus cogens is 
highly debated and so far most scholars recognise the limited nature of the concept of 
jus cogens and only consider norms such as the prohibition of genocide, torture, 
racial discrimination, the prohibition against slavery as well as the prohibition of the 
use of force to be included.127 By examining whether the UN Security Council has 
violated the right to a fair hearing, the right to respect of property in conjunction with 
the principle of proportionality and the right to effective judicial review in terms of 
jus cogens, the Court thus appeared to apply a unique European approach to erga 
omnes norms. It has been argued that the CFI’s unique appro ch to jus cogens would 
                                                
124 Lavranos (n 119) 9; J Heliskoski, ‘Case T-253/02, Chafiq Ayadi v. Council, Judgment of the Court 
of First Instance of 12 July 2006 ; Case T-49/04, Faraj Hassan v. Council and Commission, Judgment 
of the Court of First Instance of 12 July 2006, nyr’(2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 1157. 
125 Eckes (n 112) 87. 
126 See for example Karayigit (n 113) 389-390; P Eeckhout, ‘EC Law and UN Security Council 
Resolutions – In Search of the Right Fit’ in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice of 
EU External Relations: Salient Features of a Changing Landscape (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2008) 114.  V Arnauld refers to the Court’s review in the light of jus cogens as a 
‘soweit’doctrine in contrast to a ‘solange’ solution (n 104). 
127 Examples mentioned by Eeckhout (n 126) 115. 
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contribute to the fragmentation of international law.128 Only a small minority 
appreciated the Court’s take on jus cogens and held that the Court’s reasoning might 
have the ability to advance the concept of jus cogens in international law.  
 
The CFI’s unique take on jus cogens and its readiness to judge the UN Security 
Council has been viewed as providing an example for other regional and national 
courts to do the same.129 It has been suggested that this practice would have the 
potential to undermine the unity, coherence and effectiveness of UN sanction 
regimes and in the long run would bear with it the potential of questioning the 
authority of the UN Security Council whose ability o perform its tasks under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter would be weakened.130 By some this has been 
interpreted as an opportunity for the Security Council to react. It has been held that 
these existing dangers would ask the Security Council to ‘develop its own 
comprehensive system for human rights protection’.131  
 
6.5.3. The Approach of Advocate General Maduro and the European 
Court of Justice 
Rejecting the reasoning of the Court of First Instace, Advocate General Maduro and 
the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice argued in favour of the 
autonomy of the Community legal order and in consequence also for the competence 
of the European Courts to review secondary Community law in the light of European 
fundamental rights. Advocate General Maduro and the ECJ predominantly discussed 
whether the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions in the European 
legal order could ignore European fundamental rights protection. In general, both 
decisions have been predominantly well received andmost forwarded criticism 
seems rather picky.  
 
Advocate General Maduro and the European Court of Justice have been criticised for 
focusing merely on the compatibility of the Community instrument in light of human 
                                                
128 Larik (n 119) 10. 
129 R A Wessel, ‘Editorial: The UN, the EU and Jus Cogens’ (2006) 3 International Organizations 
Law Review 6. 
130 Wessel (n 129), 6. 
131 Wessel (n 129) 6. 
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rights and for not examining the legality of the listing procedure in abstract terms.132 
It has also been negatively commented upon that AG Maduro only briefly addressed 
the question of Article 103 of the UN Charter and that the European Court of Justice 
did not address the issue at all.133 In addition, the outcome of the ECJ’s judgment has 
been praised by Riccardo Pavoni whereas its methods ave been criticised. Pavoni 
argued that the Court could have reviewed the contested regulation in light of human 
rights as part of customary international law instead of applying a European 
fundamental rights standard.134 He suggests that if the Court would have done the 
latter, the Kadi case could be of more significance as it could have served as 
international law precedent.135A more fundamental criticism, however, is that both 
avoided clear statements about whether the European Union is legally obliged to 
implement UN Security Council resolutions.136  
 
On a more positive note, it has been indicated that t e ECJ’s Kadi decision could 
create a competition between the ECJ and the ECtHR in theory and might inspire the 
latter to revise its case law concerning human rights questions in the context of the 
implementation of UN sanctions.137 It has also been noted that the ECJ’s approach to 
reviewing Community instruments implementing UN Security Council resolutions in 
light of fundamental rights would satisfy the ECtHR’s doctrine of equivalent 
protection and would thus prevent European member states from being held 
responsible under the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms.138   
 
It has also been positively recognised that the ECJ’s judgment would represent a 
good balance between the role of human rights within e EU legal order and the 
                                                
132 Scheinin (n 103) 640.  
133 Tomuschat (n 99) 660. 
134 Pavoni (n 100) 630, 631. 
135 Pavoni (n 100) 631. 
136 D Halberstam and E Stein, ‘The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of Sweden: 
Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order’ (2009= Jean Monnet Working 
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need for UN member states to comply with their UN Charter obligations.139 At the 
same time, the Court would nonetheless send a warning signal to the UN Security 
Council and would thereby require it to reform its regime of targeted sanctions.140 
 
7. The author’s own take on Kadi 
7.1. Assessment of the reasoning of the Court of Fi rst Instance 
Regarding the relationship between the Community legal order and international law, 
I support the analogy the Court of First Instance draws with the International Fruit 
Company case. As will be explained in detail in chapter six, the European Union has 
functionally substituted the European member states in respect of economic 
sanctions. However, I disagree with the conclusion the Court draws from this finding 
and in particular UN Security Council resolutions would enjoy primacy even over 
primary EU law, including European fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of 
law. 
 
The Court’s assessment is in clear violation of constitutional principles underpinning 
the European legal order. The respect of fundamental rights is considered to be a 
condition for the lawfulness of any EU act. The European courts so far have put a 
strong emphasis on the protection of fundamental rights that constitute general 
principles of Union law.141 To make an exception from this rule just because the 
Community measure is implementing a decision of the UN Security Council is not 
required by the EU Treaties itself. Neither Article 347 LTFEU nor Article 351 
LTFEU can justify derogation from Article 6 TEU and the general principles of 
Union law.  
 
Although the Court is correct in assuming that the UN Security Council’s discretion 
to adopt sanction resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is limited by the 
norms of jus cogens, which will be discussed in chapter four, the Court nevertheless 
chooses a wrong take on the concept of jus cogens. It is still unclear who the 
competent authority to judge the Security Council is. But maybe more importantly, if 
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the Security Council is to be judged in the light of jus cogens norms, the CFI should 
have addressed the issue of what constitute norms of ju cogens, a topic that is highly 
disputed. So far, the concept of jus cogens is predominantly limited to norms such as 
the prohibition of use force, slavery, genocide, torture as well as racial 
discrimination.142 By discussing the right to property as a jus cogens norm, the Court 
of First instance appears to be judging the Security Council against a unique 
European concept of peremptory norms. Not only is the Court’s approach to the 
concept of  jus cogens  doubtful, but it also cannot compensate for its refusal to grant 
judicial review in the light of European fundamental rights. The standard of review 
provided for by general principles of Union law is much greater than that of jus 
cogens.143 In addition, by using the concept of jus cogens, the Court’s carefully 
phrased indirect review of UN Security Council decisions via the Community 
regulation also turns into a rather direct scrutiny144 with difficult implications for the 
UN’s system of collective security and the overall authority of the UN Security 
Council as such,145 which will be discussed in chapter four. 
 
The conclusion of the Court of First Instance in Kadi was that UN Security Council 
resolutions enjoyed primacy even over primary EU law including European 
fundamental rights. This entails problematic consequences for European member 
states, for the functioning of the EU system itself and for the relationship between the 
EU legal order and the European Convention on Fundamental Rights as mentioned 
above.  
 
7.2. Assessment of the reasoning of the European Co urt of Justice 
With its Kadi decision, the European Court of Justice fulfils its primary function of 
safeguarding the European legal order. The Court solve  the Kadi case with the legal 
tools available in its own legal system. It confirms the central role played by 
European fundamental rights and the rule of law as the backbone of its legal system. 
By doing so, the Court not only acts in accordance with Article 6 LTEU and its 
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143 Eeckhout (n 142) 109. 
144 Eeckhout (n 142) 116. 
145 See for example Wessel (n 129) 6. 
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constitutional requirements  but it also avoids theabove mentioned two solange 
dangers inherent in the CFI’s decision that could have seriously undermined the 
internal legitimacy of the European project itself. By determining the hierarchy of 
international law within its own legal order, the Court did not act any differently 
from states that decide how international law should enter their domestic legal 
system. In general, international law does not decide about its status within a 
respective legal order. The Court’s approach is also in line with its previous case law, 
in particular with regards to international agreements and decisions of international 
organisations. They form an integral part of the EU legal order but they rank below 
primary EU law.146 By emphasising the EU’s internal commitment to fundamental 
rights and the rule of law as the backbone of the EU legal order, the ECJ could not 
avoid promoting its values to the outside world and projecting a critical view on the 
sanctioning practice of the UN Security Council in light of human rights concerns. 
However, it must be admitted that this practice wasfollowed by the EU without any 
questioning at first.  
 
Despite this praise for the ECJ’s Kadi decision in general, the judgment left several 
questions about the precise relationship between th European legal order and UN 
Security Council resolutions unaddressed. The ECJ only offered a clear indication of 
the limit of the possible binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions by stating 
that they could not enjoy primacy over primary EU law. The question of whether 
they enjoy primacy over secondary EU law was avoided by the Court. In line with its 
previous judgments in Bosphorus147 and Ebony Maritime148, it held that when 
adopting a Community instrument as part of the second stage of the process of the 
imposition of economic sanctions in case the EU is implementing a UN Security 
Council resolution, the Community would have to ‘take due account of the terms and 
objectives of the resolution concerned and of the rel vant obligations under the 
Charter of the United Nations relating to such implementation’.149 The need to 
interpret a Community instrument in light of a UN Security Council decision 
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indicates that they could be binding but does not offer an argument which could not 
be rebutted.  
 
In other words, UN Security Council resolutions could be binding on the EU but if 
they were to be, they would have to respect in particular the general principles of EU 
law comprising amongst other things the EU’s own standard of European 
fundamental rights. The way the Court achieved this result was by pointing to Article 
300(7) EC.150 This provision refers to agreements concluded by the Community and 
provides that these agreements are binding on the member states but also on 
Community institutions. The European Union has not h wever and, for the time 
being, cannot sign and ratify the Charter of the United Nations which is only open to 
the membership of states. In a second step, however, th  Court showed how this 
obstacle could be overcome. It referred to its earli r decision in Intertanko151 that is 
substantially linked to the International Fruit Company case. Both cases refer to the 
concept of functional substitution.152 Both cases deal with the situation in which the 
European Union although not a party to an internatio l agreement to which all of its 
member states are parties is bound by that agreement, based on the fact that the 
European Union has taken over the powers previously exercised by the member 
states in this field of policy. Nonetheless, the Court then fell short of assessing 
whether the criteria for a functional substitution f the member states through the 
European Union with regards to economic sanctions are met.153 This will be 
discussed in chapter six. 
 
                                                
150 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 87) para 306. 
151 Case C-308/06 International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Inertanko), International 
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latter would have primacy over acts of secondary Community law (see, 
to that effect, Case C308/06 Intertanko and Others [2008] ECR 
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8. The impact of Kadi 
The Kadi case created awareness of the unresolved legal relationship between the 
European legal order and the international legal order. So far, the European Union 
had emphasised its strong commitment to internationl law and the principles of the 
United Nations without explicitly addressing the issue of whether or not the EU is 
legally bound by it. The Kadi case demonstrated that there could be differences 
between the EU system and the UN system particularly regarding applicable human 
rights standards. 
 
The human rights threshold provided by the European l gal order differs from the 
human rights threshold applicable to the United Nations. It will be argued in chapter 
four that the UN Security Council is bound by the core of human rights and the core 
of international humanitarian law when it acts under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.154 The core content of human rights by which the UN Security Council is 
bound can be derived from the human rights instruments that have been developed 
under the umbrella of the United Nations.155 Although the Security Council is not a 
party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil or Political Rights (ICCPR) or to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), for example, these human rights 
instruments have been said to reflect the UN’s notio  of human rights, as indicated 
by Article 1(3) UN Charter.156 The non-derogable rights expressed in these 
instruments have to be respected by the UN Security Council when acting under 
Chapter VII.157 Most of the non-derogable rights mentioned in the ICCPR enjoy the 
status of jus cogens. This reinforces the Security Council’s obligation not to infringe 
them.158 Derogable rights can be limited in times of emergency, subject to 
                                                
154 For a detailed discussion of the core content of international human rights and international 
humanitarian law, see De Wet (n 42) 198-215. 
155 De Wet  (n 42) 199. 
156 De Wet (n 42)  199, 200. 
157 Article 4 (2) ICCPR refers, for example, to the right to life; the prohibition of torture or cruel, 
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158 De Wet (n 42) 201. 
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proportionality considerations.159 Even in the case of derogable rights, the Security 
Council needs to respect the essential content of each right.160 
 
The core content of international humanitarian law refers to the rules concerned with 
the means and methods of warfare as well as to the treatment of civilians.161 It has 
been held that the essence of these norms which the UN Security Council has to 
respect can be found in common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.162 
Article 3 refers to a ‘minimum’ standard of protection and prohibits torture, violence 
to life and persons, mutilation, outrages on personal dignity and the passing of 
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment, for 
example. 
 
The core content of international human rights and international humanitarian law 
that the UN Security Council is bound by differs from the European fundamental 
rights that the European Union has to respect as general principles of Union law.163 
The European fundamental right system recognises th rig t to a fair hearing, the 
right to respect of property and the right to effective judicial review which have been 
challenged in the Kadi case. These rights, however, do not form part of the core of 
international human rights. It has been held that rega ding the protection of human 
rights the European system is more developed than international law. 164 
 
The indirect criticism of targeted sanctions against dividuals and in particular the 
methods of listing and de-listing of persons and entiti s within the European legal 
order in Kadi, created increased awareness for their shortcomings at the international 
level and might have been influential in the still reluctant reform process surrounding 
the de-listing procedure.165 In 2003, the Security Council asked states within a 
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declaration on the issue of combating terrorism to ‘ensure that any measure taken to 
combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, and 
should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in particular 
international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law’.166 
 
UN Resolution 1730 (2006) introduced a focal point, established within the 
Secretariat to receive de-listing requests from indiv duals who do not want to address 
their state of residence of citizenship.167 Nevertheless, the Committee still decided by 
consensus over a de-listing request.168 In 2009, the focal point was abolished in 
favour of the Office of the Ombudsperson that shall assist the Committee in the de-
listing process.169 The Ombudsperson that shall be an ‘eminent individual of high 
moral character, impartiality and integrity with hig  qualifications and experience in 
relevant fields, such as legal, human rights, counter-terrorism and sanctions’ and is 
involved in three two-month long stages of the de-listing process of ‘information 
gathering’, ‘dialogue’ and ‘Committee Discussion and Decision’.170 But there is as 
yet no change regarding the consensus requirement. 
 
In the context of targeted sanctions against individuals, the Kadi case created 
awareness of the unresolved relationship between th European legal order and the 
international legal order. It questioned whether and if so to what extent the EU is 
bound by economic UN Security Council resolutions ad it particularly scrutinised 
whether European human rights could pose a limit for heir possible binding nature. 
The legal relationship between the European Union as an emerging international 
military actor and UN Security Council resolutions i  the context of the use of force, 
too is unresolved. The European Union, unlike all its member states, is not a member 
of the United Nations but it is engaged in military crisis management operations. 
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<http://lsr.nellco.org/yale/student/papers/40> 13. 
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Operation Atalanta, that implements Chapter VII UN Security Council resolutions, 
has been welcomed by the UN Security Council for its contribution to the fight 
against piracy.171 The operation mandate includes the use of force, not merely in self-
defence.172 The following chapters will examine the European Union as an emerging 
international military actor and its legal relationship with UN Security Council 
resolutions. 
 
                                                
171 UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008). 
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Chapter 2: The EU and the use of force: A European perspective 
 
Introduction 
The European Union has so far been engaged in nine crisis management missions of 
a military nature.1 All of these missions have been carried out with the consent of the 
host state.2 They have often been accompanied by a UN Security Council resolution 
authorising the use of force,3 although a UN mandate is not required in a strict sense, 
once the host state has consented to the deployment of military personnel for a 
specific purpose on its territory. In addition to these already conducted crisis 
management operations, the European Union has expressed the political will4 and is 
equipped with military capabilities for engaging in peace-enforcement operations. 
Robust military interventions against targets raise difficult questions about the 
relationship of the European Union as an internatiol actor and the United Nations.  
 
All European crisis management missions of a military nature – with or without the 
consent of the host state – take place within the framework of the EU’s common 
security and defence policy. The aim of the present chapter and of chapter three 
below is to analyse the European legal framework for the use of military force during 
                                                
1 Operation CONCORDIA/FYROM, Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP on the European Union 
military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [2003] OJ L 34/26; Operation 
ARTEMIS, Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of on the European Union military operation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo [2003] OJ L 143/50; Operation EUFOR Althea, Council Joint Action 
2004/570/CFSP on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina [2004] OJ L 
252/10; Operation AMIS, Council Joint Action 2005/57/CFSP on the European Union civilian – 
military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan [2005] OJ L  
188/46; Operation EUFOR RD Congo, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union 
military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process [2006] OJ L 116/98; Operation EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA, Council Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of on the European Union military operation in the 
Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic [2007] OJ L 279/21; EUNAVFOR Operation 
Atalanta, Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of on a European military operation to contribute to 
the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast 
[2008] OJ L 301/33; Operation EUTM Somalia, Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP on the launch of a 
European Union military mission to contribute to the raining of Somali security forces (EUTM 
Somalia) [2010] OJ L 87/33. 
2Some operations have been carried out by the explicit request of the host state or a regional 
organisation. Operation Concordia has been carried out at the request of the FYROM government. 
Operation AMIS has been carried out on the request of the African Union. 
3 Operation EUFOR RD Congo has been authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006). 
4 See for example European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy’ Brussels, 12 December 2003 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> 11[hereinafter European Security 
Strategy]. 
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the conduct of EU crisis management missions. The analysis of the common security 
and defence policy will offer an insight on how the European Union organises itself 
as an emerging international military actor from an inside-out perspective. The 
question of whether the European Union must fulfil additional requirements 
originating from public international law and its relationship with the United Nations 
when conducting military operations without the conse t of the host state will be 
discussed in chapters six and seven. Chapter six will pay special attention to the 
question of whether the European Union needs to obtain a UN Security Council 
mandate before resorting to the use of force. Chapter seven will then assess whether 
the European Union is bound by UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use 
of force once they are in place although the European Union is not a member of the 
United Nations 
 
The present chapter, ‘The EU and the use of force: A European perspective’, will be 
structured in three parts. By using a descriptive approach, the development of the 
common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy 
will be outlined in part one, with the aim of illustrating the gradual process of 
European integration in the EU’s external relations. Particular emphasis will be put 
on the EU as a military actor, whose development has been characterised by many 
set-backs because of the reluctance of European member states to give away some of 
their powers in security and defence matters. It will be shown that former attempts to 
coordinate member state action in this highly political and sensitive area have been 
too ambitious at times and have been followed by long cooling-off periods. The 
member states have found it easier to cooperate gradually on foreign affairs issues on 
a political level; attempts to coordinate European defence issues have been dormant 
for some time. A major breakthrough was achieved with the Treaty of Maastricht 
which codified the informal arrangements between the European member states with 
regards to the coordination of their domestic foreign policies and introduced a 
provision that recognised the goal of the ‘eventual fr ming of a common defence 
policy, which might in time lead to a common defenc.’ 5 
 
                                                
5 Article J.4 TEU (Maastricht version). 
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Especially during the last two decades, the ongoing process of European integration 
within foreign, security and defence matters has been heavily influenced by 
international moments of crisis during which the European Union felt unable to react 
in a way that would correspond to its economic influence in the international 
community.6 Overall, the development of a European common foreign and security 
policy and the increased commitment to a common defence policy has been 
characterised by a bottom-up approach outside the treaty framework and through an 
institutionalisation of past practices that gradually led to the introduction of new 
institutions, procedures and structures. 
 
Although it still lags behind the development of the common foreign and security 
policy, European development in security and defence matters got new impetus 
through the shortcomings experienced by the European Union during the Kosovo 
crisis of the 1990s, during which the EU was incapable of significantly influencing 
the violent outbreaks in its neighbourhood. The St Malo Declaration by France and 
the United Kingdom, which asked for the creation of an operational capability for the 
European Union to enable it to fulfil its role on the international scene, influenced 
subsequent European Council meetings. These meetings led to the creation of 
civilian and military capabilities needed for preparing the EU for crisis management 
operations. They also encouraged the introduction of ew bodies, designed to equip 
the EU to become an international crisis management actor. The inability of the 
European Union to speak with one voice during the war against Iraq in 2003 
encouraged the drafting of the European Security Strategy of 2003,7 the first strategic 
document of the European Union.8 In the same year the European security and 
defence policy became operational. In January 2003, the EU began its first civilian 
crisis management mission – the police mission EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 
                                                
6 In general, the development of security structures seems to have made most progress in the aftermath 
of an international crisis or conflict. For a detailed discussion on the reform of the United Nations see
S Chesterman, ‘Reforming the United Nations: Legitimacy, Effectiveness and Power after Iraq’ 
(2006) 10 Singapore Year Book of International Law 59. 
7 European Security Strategy (n 4). 
8 For a detailed analysis of the European Security Strategy, see S Biscop, ‘The ABC of the European 
Union Security Strategy: Ambition, Benchmark, Culture’ in S Blockmans (ed), The European Union 
and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 55-73. 
9 Council Joint Action (2002/210/CFSP) on the European Union Police Mission  EUPM in Bosnia 
Herzegovina [2002]OJ L 70/1. 
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The first crisis management operation of a military nature, Operation CONCORDIA, 
followed in March.  
 
Part two of the chapter will outline the status quo of the EU’s common security and 
defence policy under the Treaty of Lisbon. The focus will be put on the procedures 
and instruments with which European crisis management missions are undertaken. 
The chapter will be concluded by a brief overview of h w a European military crisis 
management operation is launched and conducted in practice. 
 
Part 1 
The development of a common foreign and security po licy and a 
common security and defence policy – from the 1950s  to the Treaty of 
Nice  
EU-led crisis management missions of a military nature ake place under the auspices 
of the common security and defence policy. The development of the common 
security and defence policy can only be understood within the context of the 
development of the common foreign and security policy of which it forms an integral 
part.10 The following will describe the historic development that led to the equiping 
of the European Union with military capabilities and thus enabled the European 
Union to become a military crisis management actor.  
 
1. The European Defence Community and the European Political 
Community – too ambitious too soon 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Robert Schuman proposed in 1950 to 
secure peace in Europe and in the world by placing the key industries of Germany 
and France under a High Authority and by offering other states the possibility to join 
the common organisation at a later stage.11 This proposal led to the foundation of the 
European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) in 1951. In parallel to the birth of 
European economic integration, the Korean conflict of 1950 inspired proposals for 
                                                
10 Article 42 (1) LTEU. 
11 Robert Schuman, Declaration of 9 May 1950 <http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm> 
paras 2, 4. 
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European defence cooperation.12 After Churchill had articulated the idea of a 
European Army under the command of a European Minister of Defence in August of 
1950, the Pleven Plan by the French minister of defence went a step further and 
suggested to incorporate the European Ministry of Defence in an institutional 
structure similar to the one of the European Coal and Steal Community.13 The Pleven 
Plan was built into the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community14 
which was signed by all the member states of the European Coal and Steal 
Community in 1952.15 The European Defence Community (EDC) was supposed to 
enjoy legal personality16 and it was designed to be supranational in nature.17  
 
The Community was structured around a collective defence clause and one of the 
Treaty’s aims was to set up a permanent European army that should operate within 
the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.18 The Treaty obliged the member states to 
contribute troops which should melt into a European army.19 At the same time, the 
Treaty prohibited them in general from keeping national armies and only allowed the 
upkeep of national troops in strictly defined circumstances.20 
 
The ambitions of the EDC Treaty regarding the merger of the member states’ armed 
forces goes beyond today’s integration of member state ’ troops within the European 
Union or NATO.21 The provisions on the permanent European army also show that 
the European Defence Community, as indicated by its name and by its context in the 
Cold War, was solely concerned with the defence of Western Europe against possible 
                                                
12 R A Wessel, The European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy: A Legal Institutional Perspective 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1999) 2. 
13 Wessel (n 12), 2. 
14Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (Paris, 27 Mai 1952) [hereinafter EDC]. 
15 Wessel (n 12) 2. 
16 Article 7 EDC. 
17 Article 1 EDC. For a detailed analysis of the European Defence Community see M Trybus, ‘The 
Vision of the European Defence Community and a Commn Defence for the European Union’ in M 
Trybus and N D White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 13-42. 
The European Defence Community was build around the Board of Commissioners that would have 
been equipped with the powers to adopt decisions biding on its member states, sometimes by 
qualified majority voting. The Court of Justice of the ECSC would have had jurisdiction over the 
EDC. Article 24, Article 52 EDC. 
18 Article 2 EDC.  
19 Article 9 EDC 
20 See chapter II and in particular Article 10 EDC for more details. 
21 Trybus (n 17) 26 with regards to NATO and WEU. 
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Soviet threats.22 A security policy was missing and if the member states wanted to 
participate in humanitarian, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement 
missions, they would have to do so within the context of the UN but outside the EDC 
framework.23 Today, the European security and defence policy is concerned mainly 
with security issues instead. 
 
As provided for by the EDC Treaty,24 the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC asked the 
Assembly to draft a Statute for a European Politica Community25 under the 
leadership of the president of the Assembly, the Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak.26 In 
March 1953 the Statute was adopted. It included the taking-over of the existing 
powers of the ECSC and the signed but not ratified EDC by the institutions of the 
European Political Community.27 Among other things, the draft Treaty embodying 
the Statute of the European Community aimed at ensuring the coordination of the 
foreign policies of the member states28 and envisaged that the European Political 
Community would form a legal union with the ECSC and the EDC.29 Like the EDC 
before, the European Political Community was supposed to be supranational in 
nature30 and would have had a ‘juridical personality’.31 However, in August 1954, 
the French Assemblée Génerale refused to ratify the Treaty establishing a European 
Defence Community due to its supranational elements, and thereby automatically 




                                                
22 Trybus (n 17) 30. 
23 Trybus (n 17), 30. 
24 Artikel 38(2) EDC.  
25 Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community (10 March 1953) [hereinafter 
DTSEC]. 
26 Wessel (n 12) 2. 
27 Wessel (n 12) 2. 
28 Article 2 DTSEC.  
29 Article 5 DTSEC. 
30 Article 1 DTSEC. 
31 Article 4 DTSEC. 
32 F Cameron, The Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Past, Present and Future 
(Sheffield Academic Press, Sheffield 1999)16; J W De Zwaan, ‘Foreign Policy and Defence 
Cooperation in the European Union: Legal Foundations’  i  S Blockmans (ed), The European Union 
and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 19; Trybus 
( n 17) 20; Wessel ( n 12) 3; 
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2. De Gaulle and Fouchet 
In the following years, the idea to create a common foreign policy as well as a 
common defence policy was never given up completely by the six EEC member 
states of the European Economic Community (EEC). In March 1961, De Gaulle 
presented the first Fouchet Plan.33 The plan consisted of a draft Treaty for a Union of 
States, aiming amongst other things for the adoption of a common foreign policy and 
a common defence policy.34 In the November version of 1961, France outlined that
the common defence policy would strengthen the Atlantic Alliance.35 However, De 
Gaulle chose to prepare a new proposal, Fouchet II.36 The second Fouchet Plan 
dropped amongst other initiatives the plan of cooperation with NATO and the 
creation of a Secretary General and thus caused friction between France and the other 
EEC member states.37 The persistent opposition of Belgium and the Netherlands 
ended the Fouchet process in 196238 and demonstrated that cooperation in matters of 
foreign policy lies at the very heart of state sovereignty that the member states are 
reluctant to lose.39 Nonetheless, both Fouchet plans encouraged a discuss on on 
highly sensitive security issues and could be regarded as a guide for following 
attempts of European cooperation.40 
 
3. European Political Cooperation: from the adoptio n of reports to the 
codification in the Single European Act 
It was not until 1969 that the project of political cooperation obtained new impetus 
through the adoption of reports that primarily recognised past practices of the foreign 
ministers of the member states. The system of European Political Cooperation was 
intergovernmental in nature and was guided by rules of international law. Therefore 
                                                
33 Cameron (n 32) 16. 
34 Wessel (n 12) 4. 
35 Wessel (n 12) 4. 
36 Wessel, (n 12) 5. 
37 Wessel (n 12) 5. 
38 Wessel (n 12) 5. 
39 S A Pappas and S Vanhoonacker, ‘CFSP and 1996: A New Intergovernmental Conference, an Old 
Debate?’ in S A Pappas and S Vanhoonacker (eds) The European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy: The Challenges of the Future, Proceedings of EIPA Colloquium, Maastricht, 19-20 
October 1995 (European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht 1996) 6. 
40 Cameron (n 32) 16. 
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‘the principles of consultation, consensus and confide tiality’ have been dominant.41 
The member States avoided formal and legally binding commitments and rather 
chose ‘gentlemen’s agreements’.42  The adopted reports entailed no legally binding 
obligations.43  
 
With a view to future European developments in security and defence matters, it is 
interesting to note that the London Report included a paragraph on ‘Crisis 
Procedures’ which stated that  
 
[i]n order to improve the capacity of the Ten to react in an emergency, 
working groups are encouraged to analyse areas of potential crisis and to 
prepare a range of possible reactions by the Ten.44 
 
The results achieved by European Political Cooperation have been dominated by the 
notion of the ten foreign ministries of the member states and not so much of a 
distinct ‘European’ approach. The member states were cautious of guarding their 
national competences. The predominant way they tried to approach the project of 
European Political Cooperation was comparable to a national approach to foreign 
policy - by keeping it mainly reactive in nature. Nonetheless, the Ten also felt the 
need to be part of the international community and to shape events in a way that 
corresponded to their combined economic weight in the world. To achieve this goal, 
they recognised the importance of speaking with one voice and to consult each other 
particularly regarding common positions and even seeking joint action in the 
future.45 Therefore, first signs of European integration started to show. 
 
In 1986, the EPC was finally codified by the Single European Act and thus acquired 
the status of primary law.46 The Single European Act (SEA) built heavily on the 
                                                
41 RG Bono, ‘Some Reflections on the CFSP Legal Order’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 
338. 
42  Bono  (n 41) 338. 
43  E Stein, ‘European Political Cooperation (EPC) as a Component of the European Foreign Affairs 
System’ (1983) 43 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 52. 
44 Report on European Political Co-operation issued by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 13 
October 1981 (London Report) Press and Information Office, Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 
1988, part II, para 13 [hereinafter London Report]. 
45 See Part I of the London Report (n 44). 
46 Bono (n 41) 339. 
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previously achieved forms of cooperation47 and predominantly codified past 
practices. Despite the inclusion of the already existing European Council into the 
SEA,48 Article 30 SEA neither created new institutions nor granted existing ones any 
law making power.49  The Treaty obligations rested with the High Contracting 
Parties50 who ‘shall endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European 
Foreign Policy’.51 
 
Although it seemed to avoid the language of legal obligations by using the term 
‘endeavour’, the Single European Act also contained hard law terms such as ‘shall 
ensure’. Title III of the SEA was guided by the principle of consensus and the 
decisions about European cooperation were of a rather political nature, governed by 
international law.52  
 
With regards to matters of security and defence, th Single European Act formally 
recognised the necessity of establishing a European ide tity on the international 
scene, a goal that had already been expressed by the London Report. Back then, 
however, the emphasis had been put on the ten member stat s’ combined influence in 
the world and not on Europe as such. Now the SEA stated that,  
 
 [t]he High Contracting Parties consider that closer co-operation on 
questions of European security would contribute in an essential way to 
the development of a European identity in external policy matters. They 
are ready to co-ordinate their positions more closely on the political and 
economic aspects of security.53 
 
However, these still rather vague commitments were not supposed to undermine the 
framework of the Western European Union (WEU) or of NATO.54 The Single 
European Act was merely concerned with security issue  but did not ask for defence 
                                                
47 Article 1 (3) SEA. 
48 Bono (n 41) 340. 
49 E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2002) 43. 
50 The SEA therefore changed the terminology used in the reports on the EPC from ‘Member States’ 
into ‘High Contracting Parties’. 
51 Article 30 (1) SEA. 
52 Bono (n 41) 339. 
53 Article 30 (6) SEA. 
54 Article 30 (6)(c) SEA. 
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commitments.55 It demonstrated a clear departure from the ideas of the European 
Defence Community that had predominantly focused on efence. 
 
4. Treaty of Maastricht 
The Treaty of Maastricht that came into force in 1993 established for the first time a 
common foreign and security policy, albeit outside th supranational Community 
legal order. An initiative by the Dutch Government to include the common foreign 
and security policy into the former had failed.56 In fact, the creation of the three pillar 
system of the European Union has been viewed as a compromise between those 
member states wishing to deepen European integration through supranational 
methods and between those member states strongly relying on the concept of 
intergovernmental cooperation to safeguard their nat o l sovereignty.57  
 
Throughout the provisions on the common foreign andsecurity policy, the Treaty 
refers to the ‘Union’ and/or the ‘Member States’ and thereby abandons the language 
used in the Single European Act that merely referred to the High Contracting Parties 
in its  provisions on European cooperation in foreign policy.58  The Treaty explicitly 
sets out the obligation of the Union and its member states to ‘define and implement a 
common foreign and security policy’.59 The policy itself is broad and vaguely 
defined as it shall cover ‘all areas of the common foreign and security policy’.  
 
The objectives of the common foreign and security policy place the European Union 
within the international community but at the same time stress the EU’s confidence 
in its own values and interests. The objectives include the Union’s commitment to 
preserving and strengthening international peace and security in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter, the promotion of inter ational cooperation and a strong 
commitment to democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  Apart from its desire to play a role as an international actor, 
                                                
55 Denza (n 49) 45. 
56 Wessel (n 12) 9. 
57  R A Wessel, ‘The State of Affairs in EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in the 
Treaty of Nice’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 271; Wessel (n 12) 8. 
58 M R Eaton, ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in D O’Keeffe and M Towmey (eds), Legal 
Issues Of The Maastricht Treaty (Chancery Law, Publishing Ltd, Chichester 1994) 220. 
59 Article J.1(1) TEU. 
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the EU also aimed ‘to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and 
independence of the Union’ and thereby emphasised its vision of being an 
autonomous international player based on its own values. The importance of this 
objective was underlined by its systematic context within Article J. 1(2) TEU, where 
it is mentioned as the first of all foreign policy objectives.60 The Treaty on European 
Union created legal obligations for the member state  to pursue its objectives and 
moves away from the soft terms used in the Single European Act.61  
 
In respect to security and defence matters considerable progress was also made.  
Article J.4 explicitly referred to security and defence issues and mentioned in its first 
paragraph the 
 
eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in 
time lead to a common defence.  
 
This wording is the result of a compromise between those member states that 
welcomed the connection between security policy anddefence issues and those 
member states that rejected any involvement of the Union in defence matters.62 
Another compromise entailed in the Maastricht Treaty with respect to security and 
defence issues could be found in Article J.4(2) TEU, introducing a procedure 
concerning defence matters. According to this provisi n, the WEU which was 
supposed to form an integral part of the development of the Union was requested by 
the Union to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have 
defence implications. The provision was the outcome f the increased awareness that 
it is not manageable to completely exclude defence decisions from general decision-
making in the EU.63  
 
The WEU member states that were also members of the European Union stated in a 
declaration that was annexed to the Treaty that their goal would be  
                                                
60 The relationship between the EU legal order and the international legal order will be discussed in 
more detail in chapter six. 
61 Eaton (n 58) 220. The usage of the term ‘endeavour’ f r example has been abolished. 
62 Eaton (n 58) 218; D Hurd, ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (1994) 70 
International Affairs 426; Wessel (n 57) 271, 271. 
63 Wessel (n 57), 271, 272. 
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to strengthen the role of the WEU, in the longer term perspective of a 
common defence policy within the European Union which might in time 
lead to a common defence, compatible with that of the Atlantic 
Alliance.64    
 
They also expressed ‘the need to develop a genuine European security and defence 
identity and a greater European responsibility on defence matters’.65 However, 
Denmark, not a WEU-member, was allowed to opt out from the implementation of 
decisions and actions of the Union having defence implications66 to enable the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
 
5. Treaty of Amsterdam 
In 1996, an Intergovernmental Conference began to review the Treaty on European 
Union and in particular its provisions related to defence issues. This process led to 
the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The Treaty of Amsterdam 
introduced procedural changes, aimed at facilitating the adoption of instruments with 
which the common foreign and security policy were to be conducted. From then on, 
common provisions and joint actions could be adopted by qualified majority when no 
defence or military matters were concerned.67 Nevertheless, the impact of this 
novelty was limited as the Treaty also introduced possibilities of blocking the use of 
qualified majority voting (QMV) for important and stated reasons of national policy. 
Apart from the increased use of QMV, the possibility of a qualified or constructive 
abstention was introduced. When decisions have to be taken by the Council acting 
unanimously, abstention by member states does not prevent the adoption of such 
decisions. When a member state abstains in a vote but qualifies its abstention through 
a formal declaration, this particular member state does not have to apply this 
decision. In light of the principle of mutual solidarity, the abstaining member state is 
                                                
64 Declaration on Western European Union, annexed to the Treaty on European Union, 29 July 1992, 
OJ C 191 [hereinafter Declaration on Western European Union ] para 1. 
65 Declaration on Western European Union (n 64) para.1. 
66 Declaration on Denmark and the Treaty on European Union, Annex 1,section C, 31 December 
1992 OJ C 348.  
67 Article 23(2) TEU. 
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under the negative obligation to ‘refrain from any action likely to conflict with or to 
impede Union action based on that decision’.68  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced new bodies and institutions. It established 
the Secretary-General of the Council who also acted as the High Representative for 
the common foreign and security policy. The Secretary-General was assigned with 
two main functions. On the initiative of the Presidency, he represented the Union in 
relation to third countries.69 On his own initiative, he formulated, prepared, and 
implemented documents that indicated the diplomatic options for the European 
Union.70  In response to claims that the common foreign and security policy would 
lack a common approach to diplomatic matters,71 a Declaration on the Establishment 
of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit was annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Its tasks included the monitoring and analysing of CFSP developments, the 
identification of Union interests, and the timely aert of dangerous situations and the 
preparation of policy options.  
 
It is probably in the area of security and defence that the Treaty of Amsterdam 
introduced the most significant changes. Article 17 TEU referred to ‘the progressive 
framing of a common defence policy’ leading to a common defence if the European 
Council should so decide.72 In contrast to the Treaty of Maastricht, the Union did not 
simply ask the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union, 
but now the European Union availed ‘itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement 
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications’.73 Furthermore, 
with the integration of the Petersberg tasks in the Tr aty of Amsterdam, the WEU 
acquis was incorporated into the CFSP framework.74  
 
                                                
68 Article 23(1) TEU. 
69 Article 26 TEU. 
70 F Dehousse, ‘After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
European Union’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 534. 
71 Dehousse (n 70) 532. 
72 Article 17 TEU. 
73 Article 17(3) TEU ; Wessel (n 57) 272. 
74 Article 17(2) TEU. 
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The Petersberg missions, defined by the WEU in 1992, entail three kinds of tasks - 
namely humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.75 
 
The significance of the introduction of the Petersbg missions into the Treaty of 
Amsterdam was twofold. Not only did it introduce a policy for the Union’s defence 
ambitions but also the neutral European member states have had to recognise their 
responsibility in the international security system.76 With the inclusion of peace-
keeping missions, the Treaty of Amsterdam was the first treaty of an international 
organisation to codify this concept.77  
 
The Treaty of Amsterdam brought about procedural chnges and introduced new 
institutions in the field of the common foreign and security policy. These changes 
were needed to provide the EU with a more functional common foreign and security 
policy by making it easier to come to decisions within the CFSP and by creating a 
central position, the High Representative, which could help the Union to shape its 
identity on the international scene. In relation to defence matters, the Treaty also 
shaped the EU’s profile by incorporating possible tasks that could be carried out in 
the future and thereby offered a more concrete concept of what could constitute a 
European defence. 
 
6. The St Malo Declaration of 1998 and the European  Council meeting in 
Cologne of 1999: the birth of the European Security  and Defence Policy 
In the time between the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Treaty of Nice, 
the European Union made profound progress in the development of a European 
defence policy. Especially since December 1998, the concept of  European defence 
had been pushed forward as never before. This process was a reaction to 
international events that left the EU feeling paralysed while having to watch conflicts 
spiralling out of control on its doorstep. The following section will look at the 
                                                
75 More information on the WEU and the Petersberg tasks will follow below. 
76 Dehousse (n 70) 536.  
77 F  Pagani, ‘A New Gear in the CFSP Machinery: Integration of the Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty 
on European Union’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 3. 
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historical developments that led to the St Malo Declaration of 1998 and the Cologne 
European Council in the spring of the following year that are often described as the 
birth of the European Defence and Security Policy. 
 
6.1. Excursus: A look back to coordinated European defence efforts 
before St Malo and Cologne 
To understand the progress that has been made in St Malo and in Cologne in the late 
1990s it is crucial to reflect on the security and defence structures the European 
Union had been relying on before in the context of the Western European Union and 
NATO. Therefore the sub-sections below will briefly focus on the Western European 
Union and on the Petersberg Declaration that identifi d the above mentioned 
Petersberg tasks as well as on the European Security and Defence Identity. 
 
6.1.1. The Western European Union and the Petersber g Declaration 
First attempts to coordinate European defence afterSecond World War can be traced 
back to the Franco-British Defence Treaty of Dunkirk in 1947 and the Treaty of 
Brussels of 1948, also called the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, between France, the UK, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg.78 The then-called Brussels Treaty Organisation 
provided for military cooperation and adopted a plan for common defence including 
a joint command organisation as well as integrating air defences.79 In 1954, the 
Treaty was modified to include Italy and Germany and thereby established the 
Western European Union.80 
 
When the project of a European Defence Community, including the idea of a 
European army, failed in the early 1950s, only the WEU managed to create a 
European forum for the discussion of security related matters. Throughout the Cold 
War, the organisation kept a low profile, being of a rather marginal military 
significance and having a low political impact. In essence therefore, Western 
                                                
78 WEU Secretariat-General, WEU today (WEU Secretariat-General, Brussels 2000) 39. 
79 WEU Secretariat-General (n 78) 39. 
80 WEU Secretariat-General (n 78) 40. 
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European Security for the non-neutral states not belonging to the Warsaw Pact was 
provided for by NATO until the fall of the Berlin Wall.81  
 
The relaunch of a European defence concept with the beginning of the 1990s was 
inspired by three factors. Through the approaching e d of the Cold War, the 
transatlantic relationship shifted and Europe stopped being the focus of American 
security policy.82 Thus, Europe not only had to become more active to ensure its own 
security, but the US also pushed Europe to take on m re responsibilities in the 
military field, albeit within a UN or NATO framework.83 The conflicts in the former 
Yugoslavia during which Europe could not play a decisive role made Europeans 
aware that conflicts actually take place in Europe’s neighbourhood and are no longer 
confined to other continents.84 In addition, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and the 
Balkan crisis showed Europe that it had a huge security deficit.85 Although the use of 
force has never been first choice of the European Union to resolve a crisis, it has 
been acknowledged that Europe should have at its disposal some kind of ready and 
efficient forces and that Europe should move away from simply being a civilian 
power.86  
 
Inspired by some of these shortcomings, Europe started to rethink its military 
capabilities. In response to the Maastricht declarations of the WEU member states in 
1991, to develop the organisation as the defence component of the European Union 
and to strengthen the European commitment in the Atlantic Alliance, the WEU 
Council of Ministers met in Petersberg, Bonn and adopted the Petersberg 
Declaration in 1992 to define the WEU’s operational role. The Declaration set out 
three tasks for which military units of the WEU member states could be employed. 
                                                
81 T Koivula, ‘EU Battlegroup: The Big Picture’ in M Kerttunen and others (eds), EU Battlegroups: 
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82 J Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 
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84 W F Van Eekelen and S Blockmans, ‘European Crisis Management avant la Lettre’ in S Blockmans 
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These tasks entail humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks and tasks of 
combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.87  
 
The so-called Petersberg tasks might appear to put a strong emphasis on civilian 
crisis management. However, according to the WEU Secretariat General, peace-
making is generally understood as peace enforcement.88 Within the context of the 
European Union, peace-making therefore has to be interpreted as including peace-
enforcement measures.89 Peace-enforcement missions use military personnel to 
enforce a solution to a party.90  
 
6.1.2. NATO and the European Security and Defence I dentity 
In the mid 1990s, NATO decided to strengthen its European pillar through the 
creation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). The goal was for 
European states to assume greater responsibility for their own security matters as 
well as to develop a more balanced transatlantic relationship.91 The NATO Council 
in Berlin in 1996 acknowledged that the European Union should have the capacity 
for autonomous action for crisis management where NATO as a whole is not 
involved, that NATO and EU should develop more effective mutual cooperation and 
transparency based on the already existing mechanisms between the Alliance and the 
WEU, and that unnecessary duplication of defence capabilities for EU member states 
were to be avoided.92 The key concept was that for WEU-led operations separable 
but not separate NATO capabilities and assets should be used.93 
 
6.2. St Malo and the Joint Declaration on European Defence 
However, the new concept of ESDI had been overrun by the Joint Declaration on 
European Defence at the Franco-British Summit in St Malo in December 1998, the 
                                                
87 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Petersb rg Declaration, Bonn, 19th June 1992, II. 
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88 WEU Secretariat-General (n 78) 11 at FN 1. 
89 S Blockmans,  ‘An Introduction to the Role of the EU in Crisis Management’  in S Blockmans (ed), 
The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2008) 9. 
90 Blockmans (n 89) 9. 
91 NATO Office of Information and Press, NATO Handbook ( NATO Office of Information and Press, 
Brussels 2001) 97 [hereinafter NATO Handbook]. 
92 NATO Handbook (n 91) 97, 98. 
93 NATO Handbook  (n 91) 97, 98. 
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so-called St Malo Declaration.94  Together with the Cologne European Council95 it 
marked the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy. But what encouraged 
the European Union to adopt a European Security and Defence Policy entailing 
autonomous capabilities that went beyond the development of an ESDI within the 
existing NATO framework?  
 
Within Europe, defence matters have always been dominated by the UK and France, 
the two major European military actors. Traditionally, the UK has always built on a 
strong partnership with the US through the Atlantic Alliance. However, NATO’s 
difficulties during the Balkan crisis created the fear that Europe’s weak operational 
capacities could eventually jeopardise this partnership.96 France meanwhile had 
always favoured Europe as a security actor as a counterbalance to US dominance as a 
means of safeguarding French interests.97 Influenced not only by the war in the 
Balkans but also through the experience of joint military operations in that region the 
two countries reached a compromise that combined France’s desire for an 
autonomous European military capacity with the UK’s demand for conformity with 
existing NATO obligations.98 It was decided that, 
 
[t]he European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the 
international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for Union action.99 
 
To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them 
and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.100 
 
This bilateral initiative on an autonomous European Security and Defence Policy, 
overshadowed by Europe’s weaknesses during the Kosovo conflict, was accepted by 
                                                
94 Franco-British Summit, Joint Declaration on European Defense, Saint-Malo, 4 December 1998, 
available at <http://www.atlanticcommunity.org/Saint-Malo%20Declaration%20Text.html> 
[hereinafter St.Malo Declaration]. 
95 Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex III, European 
Council Declaration On Strengthening The Common European Policy On Security And Defence 
96 Koivula (n 81) 9. 
97 Koivula (n 81) 9. 
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100 St.Malo Declaration (n 94) para 2. 
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the other European member states and transformed the ESDI into the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).101 During the Kosovo conflict, the European 
member states had found it challenging to send 40-50. 00 soldiers although their 
combined troops included more than 1.5 million personnel.102 
 
6.3. European Council meetings in Cologne and Helsi nki preparing the 
EU for military crisis management missions 
At the European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999, the heads of states and 
government declared that they  
 
are convinced  that the Council should have the ability to take decisions 
on the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks 
defined in the Treaty on European Union, the ‘Petersb g tasks’. To this 
end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up 
by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to internatio l crisis without 
prejudice to actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to 
contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the 
principles of the UN Charter.103 
 
In the following years, the European Union was therefore equipped with the 
necessary military and civilian capabilities to engage in international crisis 
management. The Helsinki European Council in December of the same year 
introduced four initiatives for that purpose, including the adoption of a European 
headline goal for readily deployable military capabilities, the establishment of new 
political as well as military bodies within the Council, the agreement of principles on 
cooperation with non-European members of the Atlantic Alliance and other EU 
partners in EU-led military crisis management mission  and the Council also 
                                                
101 Koivula (n 81) 10. 
102 S Biscop, ‘The European Security Strategy: Implementing a Distinctive Approach to Security’ 
(2004) ‘Sécurité & Sratégie’, Paper No. 82, the Royal Defence College (IRSD-KHID), Brussels 
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103 Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex III, European 
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requested EU member states to improve their national a d multinational military 
capabilities to carry out Petersberg tasks.104  
 
With the Helsinki Headline Goal the European Council underlined its determination 
to develop an autonomous military capacity ‘to launch and conduct EU-led military 
operations in response to international crises’.105  This process did not entail the 
creation of a European army.106 
 
By the year 2003, the EU member states wanted to  
 
be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range 
of the Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the 
most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 
50,000 – 60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-
sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence 
capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as 
appropriate, air and naval elements.107 
 
Member states wanted to be able to deploy these forc s within sixty days and they 
intended ‘to sustain such a deployment for at least one year’.108 The Helsinki 
Headline Goal indicates that European military operations should potentially be 
capable of tackling any crisis similar to the one i Yugoslavia.109 
 
Of practical significance for the undertaking of autonomous EU-led operations in 
which NATO as a whole is not engaged is the Berlin Plus Agreement of December 
2002 between NATO and the EU which assured that the EU would have access to 
NATO’s planning capabilities; presumed availability of NATO capabilities and 
common assets such as communications units and headquarters and the availability 
                                                
104 Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 10 And 11 December 1999, Annex 1 to 
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105 Helsinki European Council (n 104) para. 27 
106 Helsinki European Council (n 104) para. 27. 
107 Helsinki European Council (n 104) Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks. 
108 Helsinki European Council (n 104) Military capabilities for Petersberg tasks. 
109 J Coelmont, ‘Europe’s Military Ambitions’ in S Biscop and F Algieri (eds), The Lisbon Treaty and 
ESDP: Transformation and Integration (June 2008) Egmont Paper 24, Egmont – The Royal Institute 
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of NATO European command options.110 The EU crisis management operation 
CONCORDIA in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was carried out by 
the EU using NATO assets and capabilities.111 
 
Despite all of these developments, the EU still lacked a clear and comprehensive 
plan of how to manage the security issues it faces in order to become a reliable self-
standing security actor on the international scene.112 Influenced by the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 and the war against Iraq in 2003 during which the EU could not speak 
with one voice, the European Security Strategy of 2003113 was intended as the 
answer not only to this problem but also as a means for providing the missing 
European culture of crisis management.114  
 
The European Security Strategy is based on three pillars. First, it identifies the global 
challenges and key threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. This is followed by 
the setting up of strategic objectives on how these thr ats can be addressed, entailing 
the creation of a secure European neighbourhood and the commitment to an 
international order based on multilateralism. The final part of the Security Strategy 
focuses on how Europe can build a more coherent foreign policy and increase the 
effectiveness of its crisis management. The adoption of the Security Strategy led to 
the broadening of possible ESDP missions, adding security sector reform as part of 
broader institution-building, joint disarmament operations and the support for third 
states in combating terrorism. The six missions are sometimes referred to as the 
Petersberg Plus Tasks. 
 
In June 2004, the Brussels European Council adopted the 2010 Headline Goal in an 
attempt to reflect not only the European Security Strategy but also to build on the 
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experience of past EU-led military operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.115 The main innovation of the 2010 Headline Goal was the commitment of 
the EU member states to ‘respond with rapid and decisiv  action applying a full 
coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered 
by the Treaty on European Union’. 116 As part of EU rapid response, the battlegroup-
concept was developed.117 Battlegroups are composed of 1,500 troops and can be 
deployed for a period of up to 120 days within ten days. They have been designed to 
‘strengthen the EU’s ability to respond to possible UN requests’.118 The European 
Council meetings in Helsinki, Feira, Nice and Laeken provided for the establishment 
of the necessary new organs.119 Among these institutions were the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC),120 the EU Military Committee (EUMC)121 and the EU 
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7. Treaty of Nice 
The Treaty of Nice which entered into force in 2003 reflects these ongoing 
developments and put more emphasis on the development of a common security and 
defence policy.124 The provision on the EU’s relationship with the WEU in old 
Article 17 (1) TEU as well as the provision dealing with the role of the WEU in the 
implementation of EU decisions focusing on defence matters were removed. From 
now on, the EU was granted with the competence to ac  in the spheres of all the 
Petersberg tasks, a decision indicating that consensus had finally been reached on a 
European Security and Defence Policy.125 The Treaty of Nice also introduced a treaty 
basis for the Political and Security Committee and ssigned it with new tasks.126  
 
Since the Cologne European Council in 1999, the European Union has gradually 
been equipped with institutions, procedures and structu es that enable it to become an 
international military actor. One of the latest innovations before the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon but outside the Treaty framework was the introduction of a 
European Defence Agency.127 The agency’s key role in developing the military 
capabilities identified in the Headline Goal 2010 has been emphasised by the 
Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities.128  
 
Part 2 
The state of affairs of the common security and def ence policy under 
the Treaty of Lisbon 
In the context of the failed process of creating a Constitution for Europe, the Laeken 
Declaration on the Future of the European Union dentified the need to enhance the 
effectiveness and coherence of European foreign policy as a key question.129 This 
awareness carried on into the mandate of the Intergov nmental Conference that was 
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assigned with the task to draw up the reform treaty in 2007.130 The Treaty of Lisbon 
responded to this request by creating new organs and by introducing new concepts. 
The next part will describe the status quo of the common security and defence policy 
as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy131 under the regime 
established by the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the European 
security and defence policy the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and for 
the first time included a whole section on this topic.132   
 
Through the Treaty of Lisbon the European Community was superseded by the 
European Union. This development in turn indicated the formal abolition of the pillar 
structure. Nevertheless, the common foreign and security policy is still subject to 
specific rules and procedures.133 The systematic context of the common security and 
defence policy as an integral part of the common foreign and security policy 
indicates that the treaty section covering the former entails some lex specialis 
provisions. These relate in particular to procedures and institutional settings. The 
CSDP still does not provide for unique security and defence instruments. Thus, the 
foreign policy tools available under the common foreign and security policy need to 
be used if the EU launches and conducts a military crisis management mission. Due 
to this structure, the main focus of the next section will be put on the common 
security and defence policy under which military crisis management missions take 
place. Differences between the former and the common foreign and security policy 
will be pointed out when necessary.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon was aimed at strengthening the Union’s common security and 
defence policy. To this end it introduced institutions, extended the definition of the 
Petersberg tasks134 and provided for the inclusion of a mutual defence clause, a 
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solidarity clause and an explicit reference to NATO. In addition, the Treaty enlarged 
the concept of enhanced cooperation. For the first time it also covers the common 
security and defence policy.  The Treaty of Lisbon also introduced the mechanism of 
permanent structured cooperation. All of this will be explained in the following but 
first, the scope of the common security and defence policy will be explained. 
 
1. The scope of the common security and defence pol icy 
The EU’s competence regarding the common security and defence policy is not 
defined by the Treaty itself and it can be difficult to determine what constitutes 
security within the meaning of the common foreign and security policy or within the 
meaning of the common security and defence policy. So far all military crisis 
management missions of the European Union have been adopted within the 
framework of the common security and defence policy. This practice indicates that at 
least all matters of a military nature irrespective of the question of how robust their 
mandate is are covered by the common security and defence policy. The question of 
the delimitation of both policy fields is not without practical significance due to 
differing procedural rules and institutional involvement. 
 
Although lacking definitions, the common security and defence policy identifies its 
specific purpose within the EU’s foreign policy structure and points out the goals that 
are to be achieved. The Treaty of Lisbon now states,  
 
[t]he common security and defence shall include the progressive framing 
of a common Union defence policy [which] will lead to a common 
defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It 
shall in that case recommend to the Member State the adoption of such a 
decision in accordance with their respective constitutional 
requirements.135 
 
In comparison to the Treaty of Nice, the Treaty language is now more affirmative. 
The wording has changed from ‘might’ to ‘will’ and replaced ‘should’ to ‘when’. 
From the Treaty of Maastricht, asking for the ‘eventual framing of a common 
defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence’, via the Treaty of 
                                                
135 Article 42 (2) LTEU. 
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Amsterdam, stating ‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy which 
might lead to a common defence should the Council so decide’ and to the Treaty of 
Nice which deleted all operational references to the WEU, the CSDP has made 
profound progress.   
 
The purpose of the common security and defence policy is to 
 
provide the Union with an operational capacity [for] missions outside the 
Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter.136  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon has extended the definition of the so called Petersberg tasks137 
with which the common security and defence policy is carried out. They  
 
shall include join disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, 
military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-
keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.138 
 
This wording indicates a broad range of military tasks, including peace 
enforcement.139 The Treaty therefore helped to provide a much clearer understanding 
of the Petersberg tasks that have been subject to differing interpretations by the 
individual member states before.140  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon also helped to clarify the nature of the common security and 
defence policy. The Treaty introduced a mutual assistance clause that provides that 
‘[i]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other 
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
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137 S Biscop and J Coelmont, ‘Permanent Strutured Cooperation: In Defence of the Obvious’ (2010) 
ISS Opinion, European Union Institute for Security S udies 
<http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Permanent_structured_cooperation.pdf> 1. 
138 Article 43(1) LTEU. 
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means in their power, in accordance with Article 51of the United Nations 
Charter’.141 Although the Treaty text speaks of mutual defence, th  ‘obligation of aid 
and assistance’ is rather a duty of mutual assistance.142 It is for each member state to 
decide how to assist – with or without military instruments.143 Therefore the mutual 
assistance clause will not alter the European Union into a military alliance.144 
 
 In addition, a solidarity clause has been introduce  outside the CSDP framework in 
Article 222 LTFEU which nonetheless has a military dimension.145 In case of a 
terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the Union and the European 
member states are called to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity. In such a case, the 
Union is asked to make all instruments at its disposal available, including military 
resources made available by the member states.146  
 
2. Objectives of the common security and defence po licy 
The Treaty of Lisbon aimed to achieve greater coherence and consistency in the 
EU’s external relations. For this purpose, it has introduced a single set of objectives 
and principles that guide external Union action, irrespective of which policy sector is 
concerned. Thus the common security and defence policy shall be guided by the 
general principles of the EU’s external action.147    
 
These general principles put a strong emphasis on fundamental rights and 
demonstrate a strong commitment to international law. They include the  
 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and 
enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: 
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and inivisibility of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the 
                                                
141 Article 42 (7) LTEU. 
142 P Koutrakos, ‘The Role of Law in Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions, Limitations 
and Perceptions’ in P Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham 2011) 238. 
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principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the 
United Nations Charter and international law.148 
 
Furthermore, the Union is asked to, 
 
(a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence 
and integrity; 
(b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of aw, human rights and 
the principles of international law; 
(c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthe international 
security, in accordance with the purposes and princi les of the United 
Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with 
the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external 
borders; 
 (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral 
cooperation and good global governance.149 
 
These references to international law, the purposes and the principles of the United 
Nations and to human rights will be discussed in chapter six below which will 
examine the legal relationship of the European Union with UN Security Council 
resolutions. 
 
3. CSDP Instruments 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced some modest changes regarding the instruments 
with which the common security and defence policy is conducted. These changes 
mainly resulted in the renaming of the instruments. For example, the terms ‘common 
positions’ and ‘joint actions’ were deleted in favour of the term ‘Council decision’ 
but the instruments as such still exist. 
 
According to Article 25 LTEU, 
 
[t]he Union shall conduct the common foreign and security policy by: 
(a) defining the general guidelines;  
(b) adopting decisions defining:  
(i) actions to be undertaken by the Union;  
(ii) positions to be taken by the Union;  
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(iii) arrangements for the implementation of the decisions referred to in 
points (i) and (ii);  
and by  
(c) strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the 
conduct of policy. 
 
Over the past few years, practice has also led to the development of decisions sui 
generis. In addition, the conclusion of international agreements should be included in 
the list of instruments at the disposal of the European Union to conduct its security 
and defence policy.150 If a military crisis management mission is carried out with the 
consent of the host state, the EU will conclude a statu  of mission agreement 
(SOMA) or a status of force agreement (SOFA) with the host state, setting out the 
legal status of the deployed troops.151   
 
In the following, the Council decision defining actions to be undertaken by the 
Union, formerly known as joint actions, as well as Council decisions defining 
positions to be taken by the Union, formerly known as common positions, will be 
briefly outlined as they are the instruments used in practice when the European 
Union conducts its crisis management operations. 
 
3.1. Council decisions defining actions to be under taken by the Union 
The Lisbon Treaty replaced the instrument of joint actions that ‘shall address specific 
situations where operational action by the Union is deemed to be required’152 with 
Council decisions where ‘the international situation requires operational action’.153 In 
practice, the instrument is merely referred to as a ‘Council Decision’ and cited in 
conjunction with Article 43 (2) LTEU.154   
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Before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, joint actions based on old Article 
14 TEU (Nice version) were used for military155 as well as civilian ESDP 
missions.156 The current Treaty on European Union, like its previous version, lacks a 
clear definition of this type of instrument but it appears that Council decisions 
defining action to be undertaken by the Union continue to be used in the same way as 
they were previously.  
 
3.2. Council decisions defining positions to be tak en by the Union 
According to Article 29 LTEU, the  
 
Council shall adopt decisions which shall define thapproach of the 
Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. 
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the 
Union positions. 
 
Although the Treaty offers the criterion that Council decisions defining positions to 
be taken by the Union shall refer to a particular mtter of a geographical or thematic 
nature,157 the TEU lacks a detailed definition of this instrument (formerly been 
known as a common position). In practice, this type of instrument is merely referred 
to as a Council decision.158  
 
3.3. Procedure for the adoption of CSDP instruments  
The procedure for the adoption of Council decisions within the context of the 
common security and defence policy differs slightly from the procedure applied 
within the common foreign and security policy. Council decisions including those 
initiating a crisis management mission of a military nature need to be adopted by the 
Council that either acts on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or in response to an initiative from a member 
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state.159 Security and defence decisions require a unanimous v te.160 The institutional 
involvement and voting requirements therefore slightly differ from the adoption of 
common foreign and security policy instruments. The latter are adopted by the 
European Council and the Council (which must act unanimously)161 unless a 
qualified majority vote is permitted according to the rare exceptions mentioned in 
Articles 31(2) and (3) LTEU. Nevertheless, decision that have military or defence 
implications always require a unanimous vote.162  
 
Member states, however, still have the possibility of abstaining from a vote in the 
Council without blocking a Council decision, according to the principle of 
constructive abstention.163 Under the condition that they make a formal declaration 
qualifying their abstention, they are not obliged to apply the decision. The Council 
decision nevertheless commits the Union as a whole and it is not without effects for 
the abstaining member states. ‘In a spirit of mutual solidarity’, they are under the 
negative obligation to ‘refrain from any action likely to conflict with or to impede 
Union action based on that decision’.164 However, if the abstaining states represent 
one third of the member states as well as one thirdof the Union’s population, the 
Council decision cannot be adopted. 
 
For the first time, the Treaty of Lisbon also enabled member states within the 
common security and defence policy to use the concept of enhanced cooperation.165 
This concept allows a group of at least nine member states to adopt CSDP acts under 
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‘Enhanced Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policies of the EU’ 
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<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13002/LAW_2009_21.pdf?sequence=1> -17; R 
Wessel, ‘Differentiation in EU Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy: Between Coherence and 
Flexibility’ in M Trybus and N White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2007) 225-248. 
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strict substantive and procedural conditions. Enhanced cooperation is only 
permissible if it furthers Union objectives, protects Union interests and reinforces the 
process of European integration.166 According to the last resort principle, the Council 
shall only authorise enhanced cooperation if the objectives of such cooperation 
cannot be attained by the Union as whole within a re sonable time.167 CSDP 
instruments adopted within the framework of enhanced cooperation are only binding 
on those member states that participate.168 
 
3.4. Implementation of CSDP instruments 
In the absence of a European army, the European Union needs capable and willing 
member states to make their military personnel avail ble for EU-led military crisis 
management missions. Although European member states are not obliged to deploy 
their troops for a European mission, the Treaty of Lisbon asks Member states ‘to 
make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation 
of the common security and defence policy’.169 They are also explicitly asked to 
improve their military capabilities.170  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon codified past practice and formally recognised two ways in 
which a group of member states can be assigned with the implementation of the 
Union’s common security and defence policy. According to the concept of ad hoc 
cooperation,171 ‘the Council may entrust the execution of a task…to a group of 
Member States in order to protect the Union’s values and serve its interests’.172 
 
In addition, the Treaty introduced the possibility of permanent structured 
cooperation173 for those ‘Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher 
criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area 
                                                
166 Article 20(1) LTEU. 
167 Article 20(2) LTEU. 
168 Article 20(4) LTEU. 
169 Article 42(3) subparagraph 1 LTEU. 
170 Article 42(3) subparagraph 2 LTEU. 
171 Article 42(5) LTEU, Article 44 LTEU. 
172 Article 42(5) LTEU. 
173 Article 42(6) LTEU, Article 46 LTEU in conjunction with the Protocol on Permanent Structured 
Cooperation. 
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with a view to the most demanding missions’.174 The Protocol on Permanent 
Structured Cooperation annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon175 sets out the conditions for 
participation and outlines the objectives that ought to be achieved. According to its 
preamble, the High Contracting Parties are determined ‘to ensure that the Union is 
capable of fully assuming its responsibilities within the international community’. 
The preamble also reveals that the strengthening of the EU’s security and defence 
policy asks member states to put more efforts into their capabilities. In addition, the 
concept is viewed as one possible means to put the EU’s call for effective 
multilateralism as expressed in its European Security Strategy into concrete forms. 
The preamble recognises ‘that the United Nations Organisation may request the 
Union’s assistance for urgent implementation of missions undertaken under Chapter 
VI and VII of the United Nations Charter’. Thus, the two objectives to be achieved 
through the concept of permanent structured cooperation re the intensification of the 
development of defence capabilities and the capacity to supply a battle group.176 
 
4. Institutions 
One aim that was to be achieved with the failed constitution and that was carried 
over to the Treaty of Lisbon was the need to make the common foreign and security 
policy more coherent, effective and if possible more democratic.177 For that purpose, 
the Treaty altered the institutional setting of thecommon foreign and security policy. 
New bodies like the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security that will 
be assisted by the European External Action Service as well a permanent President of 
the European Council have been introduced. The limited role played by the 
Commission and the European Parliament have been slightly enhanced.178 
                                                
174 Article 42(6) LTEU. For a discussion of the concept of permanent structured cooperation see for 
example S Biscop, ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation nd the Future of ESDP’ (2008) Egmont Paper 
20, Egmont-The Royal Institute for International Reations <http://aei.pitt.edu/8970/1/ep20.pdf> 1-19. 
175 Protocol (NO 10) on Permanent Structured Cooperation Established by Article 42 of The Treaty 
On European Union [ hereinafter Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation]. 
176 Article 1a) and b) Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation 
177 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Laeken Declaration On the Future Of The European 
Union, European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, Annex I,23, SN 300/1/01 
REV. 
178 The European Parliament can now hold a debate on the progress made  in the implementation of 
the common security and defence policy twice a year, Article 36 (2) LTEU. For the role of the 
European Parliament in crisis management see K Raube, ‘European Parliamentary Oversight of Crisis 
Management’ in S Blockmans (ed), The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal 
Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 181-198. 
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4.1. The High Representative and the European Exter nal Action Service 
The new position of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
led to the abolition of the position of the Secretay-General of the Council that 
exercised the function of High Representative for the common foreign and security 
policy179 and also made the position of the Commissioner for External Relations 
redundant. This office now links the Council with the Commission as she chairs the 
Foreign Affairs Council180 and serves as one of the vice presidents of the 
Commission.181 The High Representative’s task is to conduct the Union’s common 
foreign and security policy as well as its common security and defence policy.182 She 
shall contribute through her proposals towards the pr paration of the common 
foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted 
by the European Council and the Council.183 The High Representative represents the 
Union for matters relating to the common foreign and security policy, conducts 
political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf, and expresses the Union’s 
position in international organisations and at inter ational conferences.184  
 
The High Representative enjoys its strongest role within the common security and 
defence policy. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy 
initiating a crisis management mission are adopted by the Council on either its 
proposal or on the initiative of a member state.185 Council decisions that form part 
only of the common foreign and security policy do not have to be proposed by the 
High Representative. 
 
In her work, the High Representative is assisted by the European External Action 
Service.186 The European External Action Service (EEAS) is a functionally 
                                                
179 Article 18(3) TEU. 
180 Article 18(3) LTEU. 
181 Article 18(4) LTEU. 
182 Article 18(2) LTEU. 
183 Article 27(1) LTEU. 
184 Article 27(2) LTEU. 
185 Article 42(4) LTEU. 
186 Article 27(3) LTEU. 
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autonomous body that works under the authority of the High Representative.187 
Several departments and functions that were previously exercised by the General 
Secretariat of the Council and by the Commission and Commission Delegations have 
been transferred to the European External Action Service. In addition to being in 
charge of the Policy Unit and the CSDP and crisis management structures that 
contain the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the Civilian and Conduct 
Capabilities and the European Union Military Staff; the EEAS will take over the 
Directorate-General E as well as the officials of the General Secretariat of the 
Council on secondment to European Union Special Repres ntatives and CSDP 
missions.188 In relation to the departments and functions previously exercised by the 
Commission, the European External Action Service will take over the Directorate-
General for External Relations, including for example Directorate A (Crisis Platform 
and policy coordination in CFSP), Directorate B (Multilateral Relations and Human 
Rights) and Directorate D (European Neighbourhood Policy Coordination). 
Additionally, the Directorate-General for Development as well as the Commission’s 
External Service will be transferred to the EEAS. 
 
The expectations for the European External Action Service are high and Catherine 
Ashton, the first EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
has argued that European External Action Service 
 
will mark a new beginning for European foreign and security policy as 
we bring together and streamline all of the Union’s existing resources, 
staff and instruments….This combination of staff and resources will be 
more than the sum of its parts: we will be able to find synergies and 
develop new ideas, which will enhance our ability to act more creatively 
and decisively in an increasingly challenging world.189 
 
 
                                                
187 Council of the European Union, Council Decision Establishing the Organisation and Functioning 
of the European External Action Service, Brussels, 20 July 2010, 11665/1/10/REV1, para 1. 
188 A detailed list can be found in Council of the European Union, Council Decision Establishing the 
Organisation and Functioning of the European External Action Service, Brussels, 20 July 2010, 
Annex, 11665/1/10/REV1 
189 EUROPA Press Release, A new step in the setting-up of the EEAS: Transfer of staff on 1 January 




4.2. The Permanent President of the European Counci l 
According to Article 15 (6) LTEU,  
 
[t]he President of the European Council shall, at his level and in that 
capacity, ensure the external representation of the Union on issues 
concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to 
the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy. 
 
However, the High Representative, too ‘shall represent the Union for matters relating 
to the common foreign and security policy. He shall conduct political dialogue with 
third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in 
international organisations and at international conferences.’190 The TEU does not 
offer much guidance on the question of how the President and the High 
Representative should divide the task of representing the Union between each other 
in practice. 
 
4.3. The Court of Justice 
The jurisdiction granted to the Court of Justice of the European Union with respect to 
the common foreign and security policy was slightly improved by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. In general, it still has no competence to review acts by the Union institutions 
adopted in this policy field.191 The Treaty of Lisbon nevertheless codified past 
practice and the Court now formally has jurisdiction to protect the Union 
competences from being intruded on by the common foreign and security policy.192 
In addition, natural or legal persons now have the opportunity to use the annulment 
procedure under Article 263 LTFEU to have the legality of decisions providing for 
restrictive measures adopted on the basis of the common foreign and security policy 
reviewed.193 This introduction might be of importance for restrictive measures, that 
unlike economic and financial sanctions, do not combine CFSP decisions with 
instruments of secondary Union legislation that aresubject to judicial review 
anyway. 
                                                
190 Article 27(2) LTEU. 
191 Article 24(1) subparagraph 2 LTEU 3rd sentence.  
192 Article 40 LTEU, Article 275(2) LTFEU. 
193 Article 275 LTFEU. 
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Apart from these two novelties, neither the member states nor the EU institutions can 
initiate an annulment procedure in a dispute concerning their respective powers. 
Member state courts also have not been provided with the opportunity to start a 
preliminary rulings procedure with regards to the maning, scope or validity of a 
measure based on the common foreign and security policy.194 Nonetheless, chapter 
three will show that military crisis management missions under the framework of the 
common security and defence policy are guided by legal rules. It will be argued that 
European member states are constrained in the condut of their domestic foreign 
policies though Council decisions adopted within the context of CSDP missions. 
 
Part 3 
European military crisis management missions in pra ctice 
Before the impact of the instruments of the common security and defence policy that 
are adopted during the course of a military crisis management mission on the EU 
member states’ domestic foreign policies will be asses ed in chapter three, which 
will serve as an indicator of the already achieved level of European integration in 
security and defence matters, the next part will take  closer look at how a European 
military crisis management mission is conducted in practice. Following some general 
remarks, part three will conclude by providing an overview of EU-led Operation 
Atalanta. 
 
1. European military crisis management missions – s ome general 
remarks 
Before the European Union actively engages in a confli t it has to go through a 
complex decision-making process. Suggestions that an intervention may be 
appropriate may originate from member states or the High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy but they may even come from outside.195 The 
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195 A Björkdahl and M Strömvik, ‘The Decision-Making Process Behind Launching  an ESDP Crisis 




United Nations for example, called on the European Union in UNSCR 1671 (2006) 
to take all appropriate steps in its EUFOR RD Congo mission. 
 
At each stage of the decision-making process, the diff rent actors involved will 
reflect on the role the EU should assume in a particular conflict: i.e. whether the EU 
should start an independent EU-led operation on its own or in cooperation with other 
international actors, or whether the European member states should rather contribute 
their troops to missions under the auspices of the UN, NATO or an ad hoc coalition 
of states or international organisations outside a European framework.196  
 
The decision-making procedure starts with the monitori g of the situation to identify 
whether a serious international or internal conflict may arise that could create a threat 
to either international security or to the population, in particular with regards to 
serious human rights violations.197 If the assessment of a conflict situation or external 
pressure, for example through the media or non-governm ntal organisations, 
indicates that an intervention will be seriously discussed within European policy 
circles, the Political and Security Committee will initiate the drafting of a crisis 
management concept, containing guidelines of a broad and general nature of what 
type of action will be acceptable to European member states.198 At this stage the EU 
must address the framework under which the intervention should best be planned: 
e.g. should it be the EU at the forefront or should the action take place under the 
auspices of the United Nations or NATO?199 At an operational level a detailed 
discussion between senior representatives from military, police or civilian 
backgrounds within the EU, the UN and NATO will take place to assess the most 
effective arrangements concerning the recruitment and deployment of personnel that 
might be available from member states.200 Once the provisional decision has been 
reached that an EU mission would be not only appropriate but also feasible, the 
Political and Security Committee will prepare a formal proposal often including a 
selection of strategic options for military deployments and civilian modules that go 
                                                
196 Hadden (n 151) 46. 
197 Hadden (n 151) 46. 
198 Hadden (n 151) 46, 48. 
199 Hadden(n 151) 48. 
200 Hadden (n 151) 48. 
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along with it.201 After the Council has formally approved the mission, its 
implementation will be prepared.202 This stage entails the preparation of formal 
documents that set out the mandate of anybody involved in the mission and classify 
their legal status.203 In addition, the development of more detailed plans regarding 
operational questions and force generation will be set into motion.204 
 
The mandate of a mission can be divided into external a d internal aspects.205 If the 
mission will be carried out with the consent of thehost state, the EU will conclude a 
SOMA or SOFA agreement with the host state.206 This agreement will determine the 
legal status of the deployed troops and will contain their duties, privileges and 
freedoms. It is not the same as the mission mandate.207  With regards to special 
freedoms it might include, for example, provisions regarding the freedom of 
movement of EU personnel and the freedom to carry arms.208  
 
Internally, the EU will adopt a Council decision in the form of the instrument that 
has been formerly known as a joint action. The Council decision concerning 
operational action to be undertaken by the European Union is usually not very 
detailed. For example, a Council decision could set out the broader framework of the 
EU’s operational action, including the purpose of the operation209as well as limits of 
time and territory.210 In contrast to civilian crisis management missions whose 
mandates are phrased in more precise terms and are published, the details of the 
mandate of a military operation can be found in the rul s of engagement that are not 
publicly available.211 The rules of engagement will determine how robust a military 
mission is designed to be and may determine whether deadly force will be used 
                                                
201 Hadden (n 151) 48, 49. 
202 Hadden  (n 151) 49. 
203 Hadden  (n 151) 49. 
204 Hadden  (n 151) 49. 
205 Hadden (n 151) 67. 
206 Hadden (n 151) 67. 
207 Hadden (n 151) 67, 69. 
208 Hadden (n 151) 69. 
209 For example, to support the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
210 See for example, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation 
in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) during the election process [2006] OJ L 116/98.  
211 Hadden (n 151) 71. 
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merely in self-defence or for the protection of others or in general for the attainment 
of the mission’s goals.212  Rules of Engagement often contain provisions on the 
positioning of troops; when and how troops should intervene; what weapons the 
personnel is allowed to choose from; the identification of legitimate targets; and on 
the use of force in general.213 In the context of crisis management missions, the EU 
also adopts Council decisions formerly known as comm n positions to express a 
common stance on a certain topic that will guide thimplementation of the EU 
mission.  Such a Council decision could include, for example, the EU’s commitment 
to support the observance of a ceasefire agreement and herefore can be viewed as 
putting the mandate for a mission into more concrete t rms.214 
 
2. Operation Atalanta as a practical example 
In the case of Operation Atalanta, the Security Council authorised states to use all 
necessary means, including the use of military force, in Resolutions 1814 (2008), 
1816 (2008) and 1838 (2008). The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia 
(TFG) had requested that the UN Security Council take ction ‘to protect shipping 
involved with the transportation and delivery of humanitarian aid’215 and also 
expressed its willingness to work with others ‘to combat piracy and armed robbery at 
sea off the coast of Somalia’.216 Initially the authorisation ‘to use all necessary 
means’ was limited in scope and restricted the use of force to the high seas and 
airspace off the coast of Somalia, as well as within the territorial waters of 
Somalia.217 
 
In reaction to the above mentioned UN Security Council resolutions, the European 
member states agreed to conduct a crisis management operation within the 
framework of the EU’s common security and defence policy. The EU offered its 
                                                
212 Hadden (n 151) 73, 74. 
213 For a detailed description and analysis of Rules of Engagement, see Hadden (n 151) 73, from 
whom these examples are taken.  
214 See for example, Council Common Position 2003/319/CFSP concerning European Union support 
for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreem nt and the peace process in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) [2003] OJ L 115/87. 
215 UN Security Council Resolution 1814 (2008) para 11. 
216 UN Security Council Resolution 1838 (2008). 
217 UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) para 7 b, UN Security Council Resolution 1838 
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cooperation to the TFG.218 The Council adopted a joint action, the instrument that 
was renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon into a decision defining action to be undertaken 
by the Union, Article 28, 25 LTEU. Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 
November 2008 on a European Union military operation t  contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the 
Somali coast219 sets out the mandate of the mission to protect vessels of the World 
Food Programme as well as merchant vessels. Operation Atalanta shall  
 
take the necessary measures, including the use of force, to deter, prevent 
and intervene in order to bring to an end acts of piracy and armed 
robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is present.220  
 
The forces deployed were only allowed to ‘operate, up to 500 nautical miles off the 
Somali coast and neighbouring countries’.221 The mandate was supposed to terminate 
after twelve months, subject to the prolongation of the relevant UN Security Council 
Resolutions.222  
 
In response to UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008) that welcomed the 
launch of EU Operation Atalanta and that extended the mandate to ‘all necessary 
measures that are appropriate in Somalia, for the purpose of suppressing acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea’ provided that any measures ‘shall be undertaken 
consistent with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law’,223 the 
Council amended the mandate of the mission. Currently, the area of Operation 
Atalanta includes ‘the Somali coastal territory and i ternal waters, and the maritime 
areas off the coasts of Somalia and neighbouring countries’.224 
 
                                                
218 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] 
OJ L 301/33 Article 5. 
219Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218).  
220 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 2. 
221 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 1(2). 
222 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 16. 
223 UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008) para 6. 
224 Council Decision 2012/174/CFSP amending Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union 
military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and 
armed robbery off the Somali coast [2012] OJ L 89/69. 
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Apart from setting out the mission mandate, Council Jo nt Action 2008/851/CFSP 
introduced the institutional framework for the conduct of the military crisis 
management operation. It appointed the EU Operation Commander225 and designated 
the EU Operational Headquarters to be located in Northwood, UK.226  
 
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) under th responsibility of the Council 
has been assigned the task of exercising political control and strategic direction for 
the military operation. The Council authorised the PSC to take the relevant decision 
in accordance with Article 38 LTEU, including ‘the powers to amend the planning 
document, including the Operation Plan, the Chain of C mmand and the Rules of 
Engagement’ and ‘the powers to take decisions on the appointment of the EU 
Operation Commander and /or EU Force Commander’.227  The PSC is under the 
obligation to report to the Council at regular intervals.228 In turn, the PSC receives 
reports from the chairman of the EU Military Committee in respect of the conduct of 
the military operation.229  
 
With regards to military direction, the joint action provides that it is for the EU 
Military Committee to monitor the proper execution f the EU military operation 
under the responsibility of the EU Operation Commander. For that purpose, the latter 
has to provide the former with reports in regular intervals.230 Furthermore, the joint 
action touches upon the status of EU-led forces and their personnel231 which are 
negotiated in detail in a SOFA agreement, concluded by the European Union and the 
Somali Republic.232 The Operation Plan and the rules of engagement are not publicly 
available but they have been approved by the Council.233 
 
                                                
225 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 3. 
226 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 4. 
227 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 6 (1). 
228 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 6 (2). 
229 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 6 (3). 
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232 Agreement between the European Union and the Somali Republic on the status of the European 
union-led naval force in the Somali Republic in theframework of the EU military operation Atalanta 
[2009] OJ L 10/29, attached to Council Decision 2009/29/CFSP [2009] OJ L 10/27. 
233 See Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP [2008] OJ L 330/19. 
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Apart from provisions on political control, strategic direction as well as on military 
direction, the joint action furthermore provides for the authority of the Political and 
Security Committee to invite third states to participate in the operation.234  To help 
manage their military contributions, the PSC has set up a Committee of Contributors. 
The Committee provides ‘the main forum where contributing States collectively 
address questions relating to the employment of their forces in the Operation.235 
Norway and Croatia are participating in the EU’s operation Atalanta.236 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the historical development and the state 
of affairs of the European common security and defence policy under which 
European crisis management operations of a military nature are launched and 
conducted. For a long time, it has been unthinkable to imagine Europe as a military 
actor. Although attempts to coordinate European member states’ defence policies can 
be dated back to the 1950s, real progress was not made until the late 1990s. 
Gradually, the European Union has been equipped with bodies, structures and 
capabilities that enable it to become an emerging international military security 
provider. Since 2003, the CSDP is operational and military force has been used 
several times in EU-led crisis management operations. Whether or not the EU will 
engage in robust peace-enforcement operations in the future is to be seen. To 
complete the examination of the European legal framework on the use of force, the 
next chapter will analyse the legal effects produce by the instruments with which 
the European Union conducts its common security and defence policy. It will be 
examined whether and if so to what extent European member states are constrained 
in the conduct of their national foreign policies through Council decisions adopted in 
the context of EU military crisis management operations.  
                                                
234 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP (n 218) Article 10. 
235 Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanta/3/2009 on the setting up of the Committee of 
Contributors for the European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and 
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Chapter 3: The level of integration achieved in the  common security 
and defence policy: Are the member states constrain ed in the conduct 
of their national foreign policies by decisions ado pted within the 
common security and defence policy? 
 
Introduction 
Chapter two offered a historical and descriptive overview of how the European 
Union was equipped with organs, procedures and instruments to enable it to become 
an international military crisis management actor. These new structures and ever 
more detailed provisions regarding its common defence and security policy indicate 
an ongoing process of integration. However, its scale is still unclear. The purpose of 
this chapter is to assess the vertical relationship between the European Union and 
European member states in the context of European military crisis management 
missions. It will be analysed whether and if so to what extent the European member 
states are constrained in the conduct of their natio l foreign and defence policies 
through the EU’s common security and defence policy.1 This assessment will be of 
importance for the discussion in chapter six that will examine whether or not 
European member states have been functionally substituted by the European Union 
with regards to the use of force applied in the context of European military crisis 
management operations. 
 
The next section will focus on the binding nature of CSDP instruments with which 
the Union’s common security and defence policy is exercised. This will be followed 
by a look at primary CFSP law, which will highlight the principle of systematic 




                                                
1 For a detailed discussion of how the common foreign and security may constrain member states in 
the conduct of their domestic foreign policies, seeC Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External 
Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign 
Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals: Essays in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2008) 79-121. 
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1. Military crisis management missions and their le gal constraints on 
the member states’ domestic foreign policy choices – the binding 
nature of CSDP instruments 
When it starts a military crisis management operation, the European Union usually 
adopts a Council decision (formerly known as a joint action) in which it sets out the 
broader framework of its operational action, including the purpose of the operation2 
as well as limits of time and territory.3 In the context of crisis management missions, 
the EU also adopts Council decisions (formerly know as common positions) to 
express a common stance regarding a certain topic that will guide the implementation 
of the EU mission, including for example its commitent to support the observance 
of ceasefire agreements.4 It will be argued here that European member states r  
bound by both types of secondary common foreign and security instruments.5 It will 
also be held that their binding nature is reinforced by the guiding principles of 
primary CFSP law itself. 6 Thus, although they are not obliged to make their 
capabilities available for an EU-led crisis management mission, European member 
states are under an obligation to support  EU crisis management operations actively 
and they are also asked not undermine the success of a Union mission.  
 
This holds true even for the neutral and non-aligned EU member states, including 
Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden since they fully participate in 
the EU’s common security and defence policy.7 Denmark is an exception. According 
to Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European 
                                                
2 For example to support the election process in the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
3 See, for example, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in 
support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUC) during the election process [2006] OJ L 116/98.  
4 See, for example, Council Common Position 2003/319/CFSP concerning European Union support 
for the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreem nt and the peace process in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) [2003] OJ L 115/87. 
5 Crisis management missions fall within the common security and defence policy. The latter however 
forms an integral part of the common foreign and security policy and has to make use of CFSP 
instruments. 
6 For a detailed discussion of how the common foreign and security may constrain member states in 
the conduct of their domestic foreign policies, seeHillion and Wessel (n 1). 
7 J Ladzik, Federal Trust and Global Policy Institute, ‘The EU’s Member States and European 
Defence: ESDP in the Lisbon Treaty’ (2008) European Policy Brief April 2008 
<http://www.fedtrust.co.uk/content.php?cat_id=3&content_id=127>. Finland and Sweden participate 
in the Nordic Battlegroup. See Swedish Armed Forces, ‘Nordic Battlegroup’ 
<http://www.forsvarsmakten.se/en/Organisation/Nordic-Battlegroup/>.  
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Union and to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, ‘Denmark does 
not participate in the elaboration and implementation of decisions and actions of the 
Union which have defence implications. Therefore Denmark does not participate in 
their adoption’ and it also does not ‘make military capabilities available to the 
Union’.8   
 
1.1. The binding nature of Council decisions defini ng actions to be 
undertaken by the Union 
To find out whether Council decisions defining actions to be undertaken by the 
Union that were formerly known as joint actions arelegally binding, the wording of 
Article 28 LTEU, its systematic context, and its underlying rationale have to be 
analysed.9 According to Article 28(2) LTEU, Council decisions commit the member 
states to the position they adopt in the conduct of their activity. The use of the word 
‘shall’ in this article indicates its legally binding character in respect of the member 
states and the conduct of their national foreign policies. This reasoning is supported 
by the systematic relationship of Article 28(2) LTEU with paragraph 1, second 
subparagraph, and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the same Article. Paragraph 1, subparagraph 
2 states that even when there has been a substantial change of circumstances 
underlying a decision, ‘the Council shall review the principles and objectives of that 
decision and take the necessary decisions’. The Council thus adopts a new decision 
and until it does so the member states are bound by the old decision.10 It is in this 
respect that the Treaty of Nice was more supportive of the binding nature of Council 
decisions than the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 14(2) TEU (Nice version) stated that the 
                                                
8 Article 5 Protocol No 22 on the Position of Denmark [2010] OJ C 83/301. Council Decisions 
adopted within the CSDP framework usually refer in their preamble to the opt-out of Denmark. See 
for example Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to 
contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery of the 
Somali coast [2008] OJ L 301/33. Although it is notparticipating in Operation Atalanta, Denmark is 
contributing to the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia. See UN Security Council Resolution 
1846 (2008) para 6. 
9 On the binding nature of common strategies that have been abolished with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, see A Dashwood, ‘Decision-Making at the Summit’ (2000) 3 The Cambridge 
Yearbook of European Legal Studies 86. On decisions sui generis and their binding nature, see A 
Dashwood, ‘The Law and Practice of CFSP Joint Actions’ in M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU 
Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals: E says in European law (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2008) 60 and P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and 
Constitutional Foundations (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 407, 408. 
10 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 84. 
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joint action shall stand as long as the Council hasnot acted. Nonetheless, the 
wording of Article 28 LTEU is still clear enough to conclude that Article 28(1) 
subparagraph 2 LTEU does not allow the member states o invoke a radical change 
of circumstances to pursue their national foreign policies. Instead, it is for the 
Council to decide what should be done. However, paragr ph 4 allows a member 
state, in the case of imperative need arising from a change in situation and after 
failing to obtain a new Council decision, to take necessary measures as a matter of 
urgency, accompanied by the duty of immediately informing the Council. Apart from 
this provision which seems to be the only exception fr m the binding nature of an 
operational decision,11 a member state facing difficulties in implementing a Council 
decision is asked to address the Council in order for it to seek an appropriate 
solution.12 In sum, the wording of Article 28 LTEU together with its systematic 
context indicates that operational decisions are binding onthe member states in the 
conduct of their national security and defence policies.   
 
1.2. The binding nature of Council decisions defini ng positions to be 
taken by the Union 
According to Article 29 LTEU, the  
 
Council shall adopt decisions which shall define thapproach of the 
Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature. 
Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to the 
Union positions. 
 
Although the Treaty text offers the criterion that Council decisions defining positions 
to be taken by the Union13 shall refer to a particular matter of a geographical or 
thematic nature,14 the Treaty on European Union lacks a detailed definition of this 
instrument that was formerly known as a common position. The wording of the 
Lisbon Treaty in respect of Union positions is identical to the provision on common 
positions in the Nice Treaty. 
                                                
11 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 84. 
12 Article 28(5) LTEU. 
13 Council decisions defining positions to be taken by the Union will be referred to as Union positions 
in the following. 
14 Before the Treaty of Amsterdam, neither the Single European Act nor the Treaty of Maastricht 
offered even this rather vague condition. 
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When turning to the question whether Union positions are binding on the member 
states, it should be mentioned that Article 29 LTEU still falls short of offering the 
amount of information that the provisions on operational decisions do. The wording 
of Article 29 LTEU that member states ‘shall ensure that their national policies 
conform to the Union positions’ appears not to be as strict as the wording of Article 
28(2) LTEU, which stresses that operational decisions ‘shall commit the Member 
States in the provisions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity’. However, 
there is still not enough substance to conclude that t e difference in wording of 
operational decisions and Union positions should indicate as an actus contrarius 
argument that Union positions are not binding on the member states. Rather, the use 
of the term ‘conformity’ implies that the member states are under a negative as well 
as a positive obligation in respect of the conduct of their national foreign policy.15 On 
the one hand, they are under the negative obligation to refrain from adopting any 
national foreign policy measures that would hinder the effect of existing or 
anticipated Union positions. On the other hand, they ar  under the positive obligation 
to modify their national foreign policy decisions tha  run counter to Union 
positions.16 Both obligations are elements of the more general l gal requirement 
created by Union positions that member states are not supposed to undermine the 
goals and aims of a Union position thorough their action or inaction.17 Viewed from 
this perspective, it has been argued that Article 29 LTFEU would itself therefore 
incorporate a loyalty obligation for the member states in the context of the common 
foreign and security policy.18 
 
The instruments with which the European Union conducts its military crisis 
management missions within the framework of the comm n security and defence 
policy are legally binding on the member states. The following section will show that 
their binding nature is underlined and reinforced by the legal obligations created 
                                                
15 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 85. 
16 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 85. 
17 N Lavranos, Legal Interaction between Decisions of International Organizations and European 
Law (European Law Publishing, Groningen; Amsterdam 2004) 198. 
18 Lavranos (n 17) 198. 
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through primary CFSP law – in particular through the principle of systematic 
cooperation and the principle of loyal cooperation. 
 
2. Binding nature of primary EU law in the context of crisis management 
operations: the principle of systematic cooperation  and the principle of 
loyal cooperation 
The analysis of the binding nature of primary EU law will focus on the principle of 
systematic cooperation as stipulated by Article 32 LTEU and the loyalty obligation 
of Article 24 (3) LTEU.  
 
2.1. The principle of systematic cooperation 
The principle of systematic cooperation as codified in Article 32 LTEU states that 
the member states  
 
shall consult one another within the European Council and the Council 
on any matter of foreign and security policy of general interest in order to 
determine a common approach.19 
 
The wording indicates through the use of the word ‘shall’ that the member states are 
under the obligation to consult each other. One of the minor changes Article 32 
LTEU brought in contrast to the Nice Treaty provision20 is the removal of the 
explicit obligation for the member states to inform one another on any matter of 
general interest. However, as consultation between the member states is only 
possible after information has taken place, the obligation to inform seems to be 
contained in the obligation to consult each other. Thus, the scope of the principle of 
systematic cooperation has not been limited by the Treaty of Lisbon, despite the 
slight change in the wording. When analysing the obligation to consult one another, 
two questions need to be addressed, namely what is entailed in the obligation to 
consult and when are the member states obliged to consult one another. 
 
                                                
19 Article 32 LTEU. 
20 Article 16 TEU Nice version. 
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In international law, the obligation of consultation comprises the duty to avoid a 
position being taken before the matter has been discussed with the other partners.21 
Article 32 LTEU does not indicate any deviation from this concept of consultation. 
As a result, the principle of systematic cooperation as expressed in Article 32 LTEU 
entails the negative obligation for the member state  not to go public with a domestic 
position on CFSP matters of general interest before the matter has been discussed 
within the CFSP framework first.22 This interpretation of Article 32 LTEU is 
supported by the systematic relationship with Article 24(3) LTEU that entails the 
principle of loyal cooperation. This will be address d in the next section. 
 
When determining in what circumstances the member states are under the obligation 
to consult each other, it seems that matters of foreign and security policy of ‘general 
interest’ are a broad category. A ‘general interest’ supposedly goes beyond purely 
national interests. But who defines what general interest is? The wording of Article 
32 sentence 1 LTEU suggests that it is defined by the member states, which would 
therefore limit the content of the obligation.23 However, in contrast to old Article 16 
TEU (Nice version), which stated that the duty to inform and to consult exists ‘in 
order to ensure that the Union’s influence is exerted as effectively as possible by 
means of concerted and convergent action’, Article 32 LTEU now contains the 
sentence that the member states ‘shall ensure, throug  the convergence of their 
actions, that the Union is able to assert its interest and values on the international 
scene’. The new wording, probably in line with the granting of legal personality to 
the EU,24  thus speaks in favour of determining matters of foreign and security policy 
of general interest not from the perspective of the m mber states but from the 
perspective of the European Union itself. In consequence, the Lisbon Treaty stresses 
the importance of the principle of systematic cooperation. However, as the member 
states in practice can still prevent topics from being placed on the agenda of the 
Union, the impact of the new wording will be limited. In sum, when a topic of 
foreign and security policy of general interest to he Union is concerned, the member 
                                                
21 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 82. 
22 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 82. 
23 See Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 81. 
24 Article 47 LTEU. 
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states are not free to act as they please. They are und r the obligation to consult one 
another in the forum of the Union to ensure a common approach.  
 
2.2. The principle of loyal cooperation  
The principle of loyal cooperation as expressed in Article 24 (3) LTEU lays down 
that the member states  
 
shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply 
with the Union’s action in this area.  
 
The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their 
mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is 
contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness 
as a cohesive force in international relations.  
 
The principle of loyal cooperation, included in Title V on General Provisions on the 
Union’s External Action and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, is more specific than the general obligation of the member states to 
fulfil treaty obligations and the principle of sincere cooperation as expressed in 
Article 4(3) LTEU which forms part of Title I on Common Provisions.25 The 
principle of sincere cooperation states that 
 
the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each 
other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treati s. 
 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measur, general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the 
Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’ tasks 
and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives. 
 
                                                
25 W Wessels, and F Bopp, ‘The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – 
Constitutional Breakthrough or Challenges ahead? ( June 2008) CHALLENGE - The Changing 
Landscape of European Liberty and Security, Research Paper No. 10 
<http://www.ceps.eu/files/book/1677.pdf> 12.  
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Through the use of the term ‘shall’, the wording of the principle of loyal cooperation 
indicates that the member states are obliged to act loyally and to cooperate. The 
mandatory character is underlined through the requiment that the member states 
have to support the Union’s policy ‘actively’ and ‘unreservedly’.26  
 
The loyalty obligation involves both positive and negative obligations.27 The positive 
obligation asks the member states actively to work t gether to enhance and develop 
the Union’s external and security policy. The negative obligation requests the 
member states to refrain from any action which runs counter to the interests of the 
EU or which is likely to infringe its effectiveness. The Lisbon Treaty introduced an 
amendment in comparison to old Article 11(2) TEU (Nice version) stating that the 
member states ‘shall comply with the Union’s action’ in the area of external and 
security policy. However, this amendment relates to the already expressed positive as 
well as negative obligations of the member states in the context of loyal cooperation, 
without giving them a new meaning. It rather puts more emphasis on their 
importance. In sum, the loyalty obligation as expressed in the Lisbon Treaty thus 
stresses the member states’ obligation to respect th  Union’s CFSP acquis and to 
refrain from unilateral action that could undermine th  Union’s common foreign and 
security interests.  
 
The real significance of the binding nature of primary CFSP provisions becomes 
visible in conjunction with secondary CFSP law. When the member states reach a 
solution in the Council, and the Council adopts a Union decision, the principle of 
systematic cooperation and the loyalty obligation underline and enhance the member 
states’ obligation to conduct their national foreign policy in line with the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy. In other words, the member states are 
constrained in the conduct of their national policy by instruments of the common 
security and defence policy in conjunction with the principles of primary CFSP 
law.28 In this respect, the principle of loyal cooperation, containing the positive 
obligation for the member states actively to support the Union’s foreign and security 
                                                
26 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 91. 
27 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 91, 92. 
28 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 84, 85 and 96. 
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policy, as well as the negative obligation to refrain from any action that might run 
counter to the Union’s CFSP acquis, seems to be of greater significance than the 
principle of sincere cooperation that asks the member states to consult one another to 
ensure a Union decision.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the provisions of the common foreign and security policy of which 
the common security and defence policy forms an integral part, leads to the 
conclusion that European member states are constraied in the conduct of their 
national foreign policies.29 Council decisions defining actions to be undertaken by 
the Union in the context of military crisis management missions, as well as Union 
positions, are legally binding on them.30 Their binding nature is enhanced and 
reinforced by the principle of systematic cooperation and the principle of loyal 
cooperation.31 Once a Council decision has been adopted, the member states are on 
the one hand under the obligation actively to support the Union’s policy and on the 
other hand they are under the obligation to refrain from any unilateral or multilateral 
action that could undermine the respective Council decision. Hence, the member 
states are constrained in the conduct of their natio l security and defence policies by 
secondary CSDP provisions.32 
 
However, the member states are only constrained once they have voted in the 
Council and the Council has adopted a CSDP instrument. No obligation exists to 
                                                
29 Advocte General Maduro appears to share this view when he states that ‘the powers retained by the 
Member states in the field of security policy must be exercised in a manner consistent with 
Community law’, Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in Case C-402/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi v 
Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECR I-6351 
para 30. 
30 Hillion and Wessel (n 1) 84, 85; K Lenaerts and T Corthaut 301, ‘Of Birds and Hedges: The Role of 
Primacy in Invoking Norms of EU Law’ (2006) 31 European Law Review 301. 
31 For a detailed discussion of how the common foreign and security policy may constrain member 
states in the conduct of their domestic foreign policies, see Hillion and Wessel (n 1). 
32 On the binding nature of common positions and joint actions see also M Cremona, ‘Enhanced 
Cooperation and the Common Foreign and Security and Defence Policies of the EU’ (2009) EUI 
Working Paper Law2009/21 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13002/LAW_2009_21.pdf?sequence=1> 2 and  M 
Koskenniemi, ‘International Law Aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ in M 
Koskenniemi (ed), International Law Aspects of the European Union  (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague 1998) 31-35. 
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create a common policy in respect of certain issues.33 Thus, the common security and 
defence policy creates legal obligations for the memb r states but they are of a 
limited nature.34 Nonetheless, if the member states decide in the Council to start a 
military crisis management operation, they are not free to act as they please anymore 
and they are limited in their use of force outside a European mission. They would 
violate CSDP law if they would deploy soldiers outside the territory defined in a 
Council decision, if they would continue to use force once the time limit identified 
by Council decision has expired or if they would use force to pursue a purpose that 
has not been identified by the Council decision, for example by using force to get 
certain politicians out of office instead of supporting the peaceful conduct of an 
election process. The question if member states could be constrained by the Union’s 
common security and defence policy even if a CSDP decision has not been adopted 
yet will be discussed in chapter seven. 
 
Integration in the common security and defence policy is ongoing. Once, the 
European Union conducts a military crisis management operations, the member 
states are not only constrained by CSDP provisions adopted for that purpose but the 
contributing member states also stop being the onlyrelevant actors. Although the 
military personnel in EU crisis management missions are deployed by the member 
states that retain some power over their troops, the Political and Security Committee 
plays a major and decisive role in crisis management operations. As explained in the 
context of operation Atalanta in chapter two, it is for the PSC to exercise political 
control and strategic direction. With regards to military direction, it is for the EU 
Military Committee to monitor the proper execution f the EU military operation 
under the responsibility of the EU Operation Commander. The EU Operation 
Commander himself is appointed by the Political and Security Committee. The 
Military Committee is under the obligation to report to the PSC in regular intervals. 
                                                
33 Lenaerts and Corthaut (n 30) 301. 
34 On the limits of legal rules in the sphere of the Union’s common security and defence policy see 
also P Koutrakos, ‘The Role of Law in Common Security and Defence Policy: Functions, Limitations 
and Perceptions’ in P Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham 2011) 235-258. 
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A chain of command can be established with the Political and Security Committee at 
its centre.  
 
Thus, the conduct of military personnel of the membr states that is put at the 
disposal of the EU are in principle not attributable to their nation states but to the 
Union, due to a transfer of authority to the EU mission.35 Overall, it has been held 
that the command and control arrangements in crisis management operations allow 
concluding that these missions are de facto organs of the EU over which the Union 
has effective control.36  
 
This finding is not uncontested as some of the member states have appeared as the 
driving forces behind EU crisis management missions. In particular France has been 
considered to be the decisive power before the launch and during the conduct of 
operation EUFOR in Chad.37 In addition, the PSC that plays a key role in the context 
of European crisis management operations is a Council body. The member states are 
still the driving forces in the Council. 
 
Nonetheless, due to the command and control structure of EU military missions that 
even third parties contributing their military capabilities to an EU mission38 have to 
accept,39 it will be held in the following that in the context of military crisis 
management operations, the European Union appears as the relevant military actor.40 
This argument can be reinforced by the legally binding nature of the CSDP 
instruments with which military crisis management operations are launched and 
conducted as explained above.  
                                                
35 F Naert, ‘Accountability For Violations Of Human Rights Law By EU Forces’ in S Blockmans (ed),  
The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects  (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2008) 380. 
36 Naert (n 35) 379. 
37 G Gya, ‘Chad: Civilian – Military and Humanitarian I tervention’ (2007) 35 European Security 
Review, ISIS Europe < http://www.isis-europe.eu/sites/default/files/programmes-
downloads/2007_artrel_23_esr35chad-humanitarian.pdf> 2. 
38 Croatia and Norway are contributing to Operation Atalanta. 
39 Political and Security Committee Decision Atalanda/3/2009 on the setting up of the Committee of 
Contributors for the European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and 
repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast (Atalanta) [2009] OJ L 112/9. 
40 V Falco, ‘The International Legal Order of the European Union as a Complementary Framework for 
its Obligations under IHL’ (2009) 42 Israel Law Review 181, 182. 
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The conclusion that the European Union is the relevant military actor and the 
potential party to a conflict41 creates complex questions about the EU’s relationsh p 
with human rights and humanitarian law. These question  are not merely of a 
theoretical nature but are also of practical signifcance.  
 
Operation Atalanta is not conducted in a traditional post-conflict environment and is 
mandated to use force not merely in self-defence. Th  military personnel deployed in 
Operation Atalanta are confronted with heavily armed pirates and have been 
authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to ‘take the necessary measures, 
including the use of force, to deter, prevent and intervene in order to bring to an end 
acts of piracy and armed robbery which may be committed in the areas where it is 
present’.42 Thus, the EU as an international military actor is likely to act in scenarios 
in which human rights law or international humanitarian law might be applicable.43  
 
The EU is bound by European fundamental rights, even when it is acting externally, 
according to Article 6 (3) LTEU.44 The European Union is not and, for the time 
being, cannot accede to the main humanitarian law instruments. In 2005, the EU has 
adopted guidelines in which it emphasises ‘the goal of promoting compliance with 
IHL’ as one of its founding principles.45 It has been held that humanitarian law 
should be read into the obligations deriving from Article 6(3) LTEU.46 In addition it 
                                                
41 Falco (n 40) 182. 
42 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European Union military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] 
OJ L 301/33 Article 2. 
43 Operation Atalanta is not conducted in an internatio l armed conflict and therefore international 
humanitarian law is not applicable. For a detailed examination, see D Guilfoyle, ‘The Laws of War 
and the Fight against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?’ (2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 141. 
44 See for example Naert (n 35) 388;  
45 European Union Guidelines on promoting compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) 
[2005] OJ C 327/04 para 3. 
46 M Zwanenburg, ‘Toward a More Mature ESDP: Responsibility for Violations of International 
Humanitraian Law by EU Crisis Management Operations’  i  S Blockmans (ed), The European Union 
and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2008) 402. 
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has been argued that the EU as a military actor is bound by those rules of 
humanitarian law that have acquired the status of customary law over time.47 
 
The development of new crisis management tools and techniques underlines the 
importance of ensuring respect for human rights and humanitarian law in EU military 
missions. Although the EU, unlike other international actors, has not yet used 
unmanned aerial vehicles or drones the European Defenc  Agency has identified in 
its 2012 work programme the support of ‘the development of a European 
civil/military UAV agenda’ as one of its cross-cutting programmes, projects, and 
initiatives.48 Apart from surveillance tasks, drones could be used to target the boats 
or the equipment of pirates and even to target the pirates themselves. If pirates that 
are not combatants are killed instead of arrested, the EU could be responsible for 
violations of human rights law.49   
  
Chapters two and three have outlined the European lgal framework for the use of 
force in European crisis management operations of a military nature. Using a 
descriptive approach, the historic development of a common security and defence 
policy has been outlined.  This was followed by a description of the current legal 
framework established under the Treaty of Lisbon for the launch and conduct of 
European military crisis management operations. Although member states are 
reluctant to lose some of their powers in security and defence matters, chapter three 
has used an analytical approach to demonstrate that European integration in this 
highly sensitive policy field has already taken place. Once the European member 
states have agreed to the launch of a military operation within the framework of the 
common security and defence policy, they are legally bound by the instruments with 
which such operations are conducted. Following the assessment of the European 
                                                
47 V Falco, ‘Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Common Security and Defence 
Policy: Legal Framework and Perspectives for PMSC Regulation’ (2009) EUI Working Papers, AEL 
2009/25, Academy of European Law, PRIV-WAR project 
<http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/13573/AEL_2009_25.pdf;jsessionid=BE83910B9169FD
48A72A11D54CB33843?sequence=1> 4. 
48 European Defence Agency, EDA Work Programme 2012, approved by the EAD Steering Board on 
30 November 2011 
<http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/EDA_Work_Programme_2012.sflb.ashx> 16, 17. 
49 On the question whether international human rights law or international humanitarian law should be 
applicable in the context of targeted killings of individuals, see W J Fisher, ‘Targeted Killings, Norms, 
and International Law’ (2007) 45 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 711. 
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legal framework for the use of force in European crisis management missions, the 
next chapter will examine the international legal fr mework for the use of force. This 
framework has been developed primarily with states in mind. Whether or not these 
conditions created by international law constitute additional requirements that the 
European Union as an emerging international military actor needs to fulfil before it 




Chapter 4: The international legal framework for th e use of force  
 
Introduction 
The use of force was centralised with the founding of the United Nations in the 
aftermath of the Second World War. Apart from few exceptions, most of which are 
highly debated, military force is considered to be lawful only if it is authorised by the 
UN Security Council. Due to the almost universal memb rship of the United 
Nations,1 most states are bound by the UN Charter and UN Security Council 
resolutions directly. The general prohibition of the use of force, the cornerstone of 
the UN Charter, has also acquired the status of customary law. The European Union 
is a rather new military actor and has signalled its future readiness to undertake 
robust military interventions without the consent of the target state. As indicated in 
the previous chapter, the European Union’s engagement in military crisis 
management missions affects its member states, in that they are constrained in the 
conduct of their domestic foreign and defence policies through Council decisions 
adopted in the context of EU military operations. In this scenario, a question arises 
about whether the European Union as an international org nisation is bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions regarding the use of force. The EU, unlike all its 
member states, is not a member of the United Nations, a d cannot accede as the UN 
Charter only allows for the membership of individual states. The question of whether 
the EU must obtain a UN Security Council mandate before it can lawfully resort to 
the use of force and whether the EU is bound by UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding the use of force once they have been adopte  will be the topic of chapter 
six below. But before it can be tested whether the conditions set up by international 
law for the use of force that have been designed in 1945 for states and regional 
arrangements need to be applied to the European Union as well,2 the general 
international legal framework for the use of force needs to be assessed.  
 
                                                
1 With the admittance of South Sudan as a new member of the United Nations in July 2011 by the 
General Assembly, the UN currently has 193 members. 
2 The European Union is not formally a regional arrangement within the meaning of Article 53 UN 
Charter. For a detailed discussion, see part 2, section 2.1.below. 
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The first part of this chapter will describe the UN’s system of collective security and 
will discuss where UN Security Council decisions derive their legitimacy. When the 
European Union conducts a military crisis management operation on the request of 
the United Nations, it partly draws legitimacy for the use of force from the respective 
UN mandate.  The second part will briefly outline th  legal framework for the use of 
force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It will be argued that the general 
prohibition of the use of force has acquired the status of customary law and is thus 
binding on the European Union as an emerging military actor. When looking at the 
exceptions to this principle, special emphasis willbe put on the EU’s approach to the 
responsibility to protect. The third part will describe the procedure under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter which the UN Security Council must follow for the adoption of 
military sanctions. In addition, the legal effects produced by UN Security Council 
resolutions adopted for the maintenance and restoration of international peace and 
security will be analysed. The examination of the legal effects of UN Security 
Council resolutions with regards to the use of force is essential to prepare for the 
comparative method used in chapter six that will scrutinise the EU’s relationship 
with UN Security Council resolutions in more detail. Part four of the present chapter 
will examine the limits the Security Council faces when acting under Chapter VII 
UN Charter to show that once the Security Council oversteps these boundaries, its 
sanction resolutions stop being binding. If the EU were to be bound by UN Security 
Council resolutions, which will be discussed in chapter six, these limits would need 
to be applied to the Union as a military actor well. The final part of the chapter will 
briefly analyse the criticism the UN Security Council faces in the context of the fight 
against international terrorism and in particular with regards to the human rights 
concerns raised in the context of targeted sanctions against individuals as visualised 
by the European courts’ Kadi decisions.3 The more the legitimacy of UN Security 
Council decisions is questioned, the more the EU could be encouraged to develop its 
own legitimacy as a military crisis management actor. The European Security 
                                                
3 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649; Joined Cases 
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v 
Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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Strategy4 has already indicated that a key element in the EU’s ambition to become an 
international security provider is a security based on the EU’s internal values 
including human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
 
Part 1  
The system of the United Nations – founding ideas 
Understanding the theoretical foundations of the system of the United Nations and 
the key role created for the UN Security Council herein for the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security will inf uence an understanding of why 
UN Security Council decision are perceived to be legitimate and why in turn member 
states have largely renounced their sovereign powers to esort to the use of military 
force. Knowing the theoretical foundations of the United Nations is crucial for an 
understanding of why, to what extent and for whom decisions of the UN Security 
Council are binding. 
 
1. The UN as a vertical centralised system of law e nforcement 
International law in general offers two basic concepts of law enforcement, apart from 
peaceful means of settling disputes – namely the concepts of self-help and the 
creation of a central institution within an international organisation that is competent 
to settle disputes between two of its parties.5 With regards to the concept of self-help, 
a subject of international law enjoys the right within the limits of international law to 
review an act addressed against it and to decide an to implement the measures it 
considers as appropriate to end the wrongdoing against it.6 The assessment of the 
wrongdoing in question is undertaken from a subjectiv  perspective and the measures 
                                                
4 European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’  Brussels, 12 
December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf > 11[hereinafter 
European Security Strategy]. 
5K Osteneck, Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft: 
Völker- und europarechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für ein Tätigwerden der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft im Bereich von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionsregimen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Umsetzungspraxis der EG-Organe, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Band 168 (Springer 
Verlag, Berlin 2004) 6, 7. 
6 Osteneck (n 5) 7. 
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chosen are invoked within a horizontal framework betwe n two subjects of 
international law.7 
 
In contrast to this horizontal and decentralised approach, subjects of international law 
can also create an international organisation to esabli h an objective, vertical and 
centralised method of law enforcement by an independent institution.8 The members 
of this organisation agreed to the founding treaties, which set up procedures and 
substantive rules. They thereby created the competenc  for this institution to solve 
disputes through decisions that are binding on them in turn. The United Nations is 
the key example of a vertical law enforcement framework.9 Within the United 
Nations, member states are exercising their sovereign rights in respect to the use of 
military force together via the UN Security Council.10 
 
Despite the categorisation used here that refers to different systems of law 
enforcement, a violation of international law is not a necessary condition for the 
Security Council to become active under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and to adopt 
enforcement measures of an economic or military nature.11 The focus of the UN 
Charter is rather put on the maintenance of internaio l peace and security and not 
on the restoration of international law as such, although violations of international 
law are often interconnected with threats to peace, br aches of peace or acts of 
aggression.12 Maybe it would therefore be more accurate to refer to the United 
Nations as a vertical framework of peace and security enforcement, but this chapter 
will continue to use the traditional terminology. 
                                                
7 E Paasivirta and A Rosas, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasur s and Related Actions in the External 
Relations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks’ in E Canizzaro (ed), The European Union as an 
Actor in International Relations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 208. 
8 Osteneck (n 5) 8. 
9 V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Sanctions Regimes under Article 41 of the UN Charter’ in V Gowlland-
Debbas (ed), National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A comparative Study, The 
Graduate Institute of International Studies (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2004) 19;  Paasivirta 
and Rosas (n 7) 208. 
10 K Annan, Address of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the General Assembly, When Force 
Is Considered, There Is No Substitute For Legitimacy Provided, 12 September 2002, Press Release 
SG/SM/8378, GA/10045. 
11 T Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (Manchester University 
Press, Manchester 2005) 8. 
12 Gazzini (n 11) 8. 
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The benefits of a vertical and centralised system of law enforcement lie in the 
perceived objective approach to the solution of a dispute based on the norms and 
values all members have agreed to in the founding treaty of the international 
organisation. Transferring this reasoning to the United Nations, the UN Security 
Council is perceived to base its resolutions within Chapter VII on ‘Action with 
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression’ 
solely on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. As these are values and 
interests common to all UN member states, decisions of the UN Security Council are 
expected to be impartial and free from domestic policy considerations. The wide 
acceptance of the purposes and principles of the United Nations is mirrored in its 
almost universal membership and has inspired the scool of thought that considers 
the UN Charter as the constitution of the international community.13 
 
1.1. The UN as a system of collective security  
The notion of the United Nations as a centralised system of law enforcement with the 
Security Council as its main decision-making body is linked to the design of the 
United Nations as a system of collective security. One characteristic of a system of 
collective security is the goal to limit the sovereignty of its members with regards to 
the use force institutionally.14 Therefore elements of a system of collective security 
can only marginally be combined with a system of sel -h lp. The Covenant of the 
League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations, is such an example. The 
Covenant largely kept a system of self-help and did not create a monopoly for the use 
of force for the community itself.15 Under the Covenant, the member states were in 
                                                
13 See, for example, B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of The International 
Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 529-619. For a critical discussion on 
the UN Charter as a constitution, see G Arangio-Ruiz, ‘The ‘Federal Aanalogy’ and UN Charter 
Interpretation: A Crucial Issue’ (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 1-28. Whether an 
international community as such exists and where it originates from is debated. See for example B 
Cronin, ‘The Two Faces of the United Nations: The Tension between Intergovernmentalism and 
Transnationalism’ (2002) 8 Global Governance 60-64. 
14 D Fidler, ‘Caught Between Traditions: The Security Council in Philosophical Conundrum’ (1996) 
17 Michigan Journal of International Law 425. 
15 H Kelsen, ‘Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense under the Charter of the United 
Nations’ (1948) The American Journal Of International Law, 787. Fidler on the other hand qualifies 
the League of Nations as a system of collective security comparable to the one of the United Nations. 
See Fidler (n 14) 425, 426. 
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the position to decide not only if the Covenant hadbeen violated but also to choose 
what measures should be imposed in response. 16 The member states could resort to 
force unilaterally whenever the Council either could not come to an agreement or 
merely remained inactive.17 
 
The system of collective security of the United Nations is based on two pillars. The 
first pillar is made up of the prohibition of the threat to use force or the use of force 
according to Article 2(4) UN Charter. The second pillar centres around the conferral 
of the  
primary responsibility for the maintenance of interational 
peace and security [from the member states to the UN Security 
Council that] in carrying out its duties under this responsibility 
[…] acts on their behalf .18 
 
By assigning the UN Security Council with the main responsibility to maintain 
international peace and security, the member states l rgely renounced their sovereign 
powers under international law to use force unilaterally in favour of the former’s 
competence to adopt collective sanction decisions that are legally binding on them in 
turn.19 
 
2. Legitimacy of UN Security Council resolutions  
A functioning system of collective security can only be maintained if its member 
states experience their individual interests as served through the protection of the 
purposes and principles to which all the members of the international organisation 
have agreed and thus respect their circumscribed powers to resort to military force.20  
 
Legitimacy can be studied from a substantive perspective or from a procedural 
perspective. A procedural focus on legitimacy asks whether the rule in question has 
originated from the right process of decision-making. In the context of the United 
                                                
16 Kelsen (n 15) 787. 
17 Gazzini (n 11) 22. 
18 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Place of Law in Collective Security’ (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of 
International Law, 456; The specific powers granted to the UN Security Council to obtain its mandate 
are laid down in chapter VII of the UN Charter which will be discussed in more detail later on. 
19 Article 48(2) UN Charter, Article 25 UN Charter; Koskenniemi (n 18) 456.  
20 D Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collectiv Security: The Delegation by the 
UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 5, 6. 
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Nations, this perspective would address issues of the permanent members of the UN 
Security Council and their right to veto.21 Legitimacy in the present chapter however 
is largely used to describe the substantive quality of a rule which it derives from the 
perception of its addressees that the rule is based on some higher norms and values 
they all have agreed on and that they are therefore prepared to follow even in the 
absence of strong enforcement mechanisms.  
 
The legitimacy of UN Security Council resolutions is based on the assumption that 
UN Security Council decisions are founded on commonly agreed values and 
therefore do not represent the biased preferences of some member states. Interlinked 
with this idea is the twofold notion of the collective nature of UN Security Council 
decisions.22 Decisions of the UN Security Council are supposed to be based on the 
values shared by the UN member states and are thus presumed to represent the 
collective will of all UN members. By adopting sanction resolutions, the UN 
Security Council is envisaged to put the content of the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations into concrete forms in the specific case.23 The actors that are 
implementing the UN Security Council’s sanction decisions therefore carry with 
them the assumption that they are acting on behalf of common interests and not out 
of purely national interests.  Therefore, it has been held that the UN Security 
Council’s decisions are adopted in the name of the international community of states 
and are binding on them in turn.24 In consequence, even the target of a UN sanction 
regime is expected to accept the measures imposed against it, and for example, could 
not lawfully exercise its right to self-defence nor c uld it claim a breach of the peace 
and ask for collective UN action in return. If UN Security Council decisions are 
however to be considered to be based on the political will of some, the UN Security 
Council will stop being a centre of authority within the international system and the 
legitimacy of its decisions will be weakened.25  
                                                
21 See, for example, T Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the Inter ational System’ (1988) 82 The American 
Journal of International Law, 706; D Caron, ‘The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the 
Security Council’ (1993) 87 The American Journal of International Law, 562, 565. 
22 I Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’ (2002) 8 Global 
Governance, 48. 
23 Sarooshi (n 20) 6. 
24 Caron (n 21) 552.  
25 Hurd (n 22) 48. 
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It will be suggested here that a key source for the legitimacy of decisions of the UN 
Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security is the fact 
that its sanction resolutions are experienced to be in line with the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter. Within these commonly agreed values, human rights 
play a special role. The reading of the purposes of the United Nations reveals that the 
respect and promotion of human rights is one of the ov rall goals of the UN and 
considered to be a pre-requisite for the achievement of universal peace.26 This 
interpretation is supported by the founding history f the United Nations as well as 
by the wording of the preamble that recognises the det rmination of the peoples of 
the United Nations ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small.’ 
 
The present chapter will use the terminology of human rights and will not take part in 
the discussion about whether the United Nations is founded on international 
community interests that need to be promoted through its decisions in turn. 27 In 
general, the discussion surrounding international community interest is linked to the 
debate of whether or not an international community as such exists and if answering 
this question in the affirmative who is a member of this community.28 What 
constitutes an international community interest is al o unclear, but it has been 
proposed that that it would at least include the protection and promotion of human 
rights, the protection of the environment and peace.29 International community 
interests are generally perceived to go beyond the interests of individual states.30 
They have been used not only to legitimise the use of force authorised by the UN 
Security Council but also to justify unilateral military action, for example in the 
                                                
26 Article 1 UN Charter. 
27 For a discussion on international community interest see for example, B Fassbender, ‘The United 
Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 529-619; N Krisch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, 
and the Security Council’ (1999) 3 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 59-103. 
28 Krisch (n 27) 59. 
29 Krisch (n 27) 59. 
30 Krisch (n 27) 59; B Simma and A L Paulus, ‘The ‘International Community’: Facing the Challenge 
of Globalization’ (1998) 9 European Journal of Inter ational Law 268. 
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cases of Kosovo and Iraq.31 Both cases will be discussed below under the topic f 
humanitarian interventions.  
 
The purposes and principles of the UN Charter, most importantly human rights, will 
play an important role throughout the discussion in th s chapter. It will be argued that 
human rights will limit the UN Security Council’s discretion when acting under 
Chapter VII. This discussion will be of relevance for the analysis in chapter six that 
will assess whether and if so to what extent the EU is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions with regards to the use of force. In addition, the recent practice of the UN 
Security Council to adopt targeted sanctions against i dividuals reveals serious 
human rights concerns that not only challenge the authority of the UN Security 
Council but that might also weaken the system of colle tive security of the United 
Nations.  
 
Part 2   
Chapter VII of the UN Charter: the international le gal framework for the 
multilateral use of force 
To assess the legal framework for the multilateral use of force as set up by Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, this section will start with some remarks on the prohibition of 
the unilateral use of force in general. This will be followed by a discussion of some 
of the exceptions that are either recognised by the UN Charter itself or that are 
discussed in the political and scholarly debate. Special emphasis will be put on the 
authorisation technique used by the UN Security Council and the right to 
humanitarian intervention or the concept of the Respon ibility to Protect, a concept 




                                                
31 Krisch (n 27) 60. 
32 Council of the European Union, ‘I/A’ Item Note, Brussels, 9 June 2009EU, Annex,  Priorities for 
the 64rd [sic]General Assembly of the United Nations, 10809/90,  para 8 [hereinafter P iorities for the 
64th General Assembly of the United Nations]. 
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1. The prohibition of the unilateral use of force a nd the erga omnes 
character of Article 2 (4) UN Charter – implication s for the EU as an 
emerging international military actor 
As indicated above, one of the pillars of the system of collective security of the 
United Nations is the general prohibition of the unilateral use of force in favour of 
collective measures. The main provision entailing the negative duty to abstain from 
the unilateral use of force is Article 2(4) UN Charter which provides that, 
 
[a]ll members shall refrain in their international re ations from the threat 
to or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations. 
 
The system of collective security and its counterpart, the prohibition of the unilateral 
use of force, are further underlined by the seventh recital of the UN Charter preamble 
that asks the peoples of the United Nations not to make use of armed force ‘save in 
the common interests’. 
 
The prohibition of the use of force has been consolidated in international law through 
subsequent declarations and treaties, for example the 1966 Non-Intervention 
Declaration, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and the NATO Treaty (1949).33 In 1986, the International 
Court of Justice classified the prohibition of the use of force in its Nicaragua 
judgment as a principle of customary international law as both necessary conditions, 
namely state practice and opinion iuris, would be met.34  
 
                                                
33 For a detailed analysis see N Schrijver, ‘Challenges to the Prohibition to the Use of Force: Does the 
Straitjacket of Article 2(4) UN Charter Begin to Call Too Much?’ in N Blokker and N Schrijver (eds), 
The Security Council and the Use of Force: Theory and Reality – A Need for Change? (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2005) 34, 35. 
34International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p14, para 
184, 189, 190 [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
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Whether the prohibition of the use of force also enjoys the status of jus cogens is 
debated.35 The concept of jus cogens refers to peremptory norms of international law 
from which no derogation is permitted and has been d veloped in the context of 
treaties through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969.36  In general, 
three conditions have to be met for a norm to qualify s jus cogens – it has to be a 
norm that is recognised by a large majority of states that also accept its nature as 
unconditional and it must be a norm from which no derogation is allowed.37 The 
main characteristics of a jus cogens norm are that it is aimed at protecting the interest 
of the community of states and therefore cannot be complied with partially. 
Presuming that Article  2(4) UN Charter would form part of jus cogens, a state 
violating the prohibition to use force would violate this norm not only with regards to 
the state it is using military force against but also with regards to all other states.38 
 
The International Court of Justice has left the question whether the prohibition of the 
use of force is part of jus cogens undecided in Nicaragua. However, it cited the 
opinion of the International Law Commission that ‘the law of the Charter concerning 
the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a 
rule in international law having the character of jus cogens’,39 a quote that is 
generally used to support the jus cogens character of Article 2(4) UN Charter.40  
 
In consequence of the customary law nature of the prohibition of the use of force, the 
European Union as an international organisation that enjoys international legal 
personality is bound by it despite not being a membr of the United Nations.41  
Therefore, the European Union can only legally undertak  a robust military crisis 
                                                
35 Schrijver (n 33) 41.  Arguing in favour of a jus cogens character of Article 2(4) UN Charter: M A 
Weisburd, ‘The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, as illustrated by the War in Bosnia-
Herzegovina’ (1995) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 41; V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘The Limits 
of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance’ 
(2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 377; whereas Schrijver appears to be more negative, 
in particular in light of recent developments of international law, for example the increased reference 
to the responsibility to protect (n 33) 42, 43. 
36 Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
37 Schrijver (n 33) 42. 
38 Gazzini (n 11) 20, 21. 
39 Nicaragua (n 34) para 190. 
40 Schrijver (n 33) 41. 
41 An analysis of the EU’s relationship with international law will follow in chapter six. 
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management operation without the consent of the host state if it can base its action on 
one of the recognised exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force. If the EU 
would violate the general prohibition of the use of force, it would violate jus cogens 
in respect of all other states.  
 
2. Exceptions to the prohibition of the use of forc e 
The prohibition of the use of force is not without exceptions. Some of these are 
explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter whereas others have developed through 
practice over time. Most of the latter are highly disputed. These exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force will be assessed in the following section. They do not 
contradict the statement just made that the ‘law of the Charter concerning the 
prohibition of the use of force’ or the ‘regime’ established by Article 2(4) UN 
Charter enjoys the status of jus cogens.42 The prohibition of the use of force as laid 
down in the UN Charter is ‘constrained in scope’43 and already contains the Charter 
based exceptions, such as the right to self-defence or UN Security Council 
authorisations to use force.44 The controversial development of the right to 
humanitarian intervention outside the UN Charter to pr tect peoples from genocide, 
for example, also cannot counter the jus cogens quality of the prohibition of the use 
of force. In general, a peremptory norm can be modified ‘by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character’.45 The prohibition of genocide 




                                                
42 C Kahgan, ‘Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to Self-Defense’ (1996-1997) 3 ILSA Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 781, 782; See also O car Schachter who refers to ‘the rules on 
force as jus cogens’, O Schachter, ‘In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force’ (1986) 53 
The University of Chicago Law Review 126, who refers to ‘the rules on force as jus cogens’. 
43 See M Byers, ‘Conceptualising the Relationship betwe n Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules’ 
(1997) 66 Nordic Journal of International Law 217, n 20. 
44 See Article 2(4) in conjunction with Article 2(7) and Articles 42, 43, 51 of Chapter VII UN Charter. 
45 Article 53 VCLT. See also N D White, ‘The EU as a Regional Security Actor within the 
International Legal Order’ in M Trybus and N D White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2007) 342 who argues that ‘[t]he Council’s power is part of the Charter rules 
governing the use of force, as is the right of self-d fence belonging to individual states, and both are 
part of the peremptory norm as well’. 
46 Byers (n 43) 219.  
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2.1. UN Charter related exceptions to the prohibiti on to the use of force 
Despite the creation of the United Nations as a centralised system of vertical law 
enforcement with the UN Security Council as its key decision-maker, the member 
states retained their right to resort to collective or individual self-defence as a 
principle of customary international law, as recognised by Article 51 UN Charter.47 
 
In addition, the UN Charter explicitly provides the UN Security Council with the 
competence to authorise regional arrangements or agencies to use force.48  The 
European Union is not formally a regional agency within the meaning of Article 53 
UN Charter.49 The UN Charter does not provide a definition for regional 
arrangements or regional agencies. In practice, regional organisations such as the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have declared 
themselves to be organisations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter.50 So far, the European Union has not issued such a proclamation.51 If it 
claims to be regional agency within the meaning of Article 53 UN Charter,52 the EU 
would need to be authorised by the UN Security Council to use military enforcement 
measures.  
 
                                                
47 Another Charter based exception to the general prohibition of the use of force is Article 107 UN 
Charter. Article 107 UN Charter allows for military enforcement action against former enemy states. 
This exception to the general prohibition to the usof force is obsolete with Germany and Japan now 
being members of the United Nations. On the topic of Article 107 UN Charter see Schrijver (n 33) 36. 
48 Article 53(1) UN Charter. 
49 J Cloos, ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management – Putting Effective Multilateralism into 
Practice’ in J Wouters, F Hoffmeister and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and the European Union: 
An Ever Stronger Partnership (T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006) 265. For a critical discussion, 
see White (n 45) 332-335. 
50 J Wouters and T Ruys, ‘UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’ in J Wouters, F Hoffmeister 
and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership 
(T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006), 256; G Ress and  J Bröhmer in B Simma (ed), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) Article 53 para 8. 
51 A survey produced by the project team of the UNU-CRIS Project on Regional Security and Global 
Governance also enumerates the European Union as an ‘other intergovernmental’ organization 
‘outside chapter VIII’. See United Nations University (UNU-CRIS), ‘Capacity Survey: Regional and 
other Intergovernmental Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security’ (2008) 
<https://biblio.ugent.be/input/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=938841&fileOId=938848> 
17.  
52 It has been suggested that a regional organisational entity qualifies a regional agency and not just as 
a regional arrangement if it enjoys a certain degre of a formal structure. See United Nations 
University (UNU-CRIS) (n 51) 16. The European Union enjoys a legal personality and has been 
attributed with organisational crisis management structures. It could therefore fulfill the conditions of 
an agency within the meaning of Article 53 UN Charter. 
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According to Article 53 (1) UN Charter, the UN Security Council can utilise regional 
agencies ‘for enforcement action under its authority’ if it considers enforcement to be 
necessary. In this case it has been held that a regional agency acts as a UN subsidiary 
organ.53 Or if it considers military enforcement measures to be a necessary crisis 
management tool, the EU would have to obtain authorisation by the UN Security 
Council.54 Thus, if the EU would be a regional organisation within the meaning of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter,55 the European Union would be able to decide 
autonomously only in the context of the peaceful settlement of disputes under 
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, in matters of collective self-defence and in the context 
of consensual peace-keeping missions but not in the adoption of military sanctions.56 
In addition, the EU would be obliged to inform the UN Security Council of its 
activities in the context of the maintenance of inter ational peace and security.57 
Another consequence of the qualification of the EU as a regional agency would be 
the EU’s responsibility to achieve the peaceful settlement of local disputes before 
they should be referred to the UN Security Council.58 Overall, the relationship 
between the United Nations and regional organisations n the context of Chapter VIII 
has been described as a ‘dual bottom-up, top-down relationship’.59  
 
Although the European Union has not formally proclaimed itself to be one, it is 
worth investigating whether the EU Treaties or political statements made on behalf 
of the EU indicate that the EU already considers itself to be a regional agency. As 
demonstrated in chapters two and three, the EU has gradually acquired competence 
in foreign policy and security matters and a process of European integration is slowly 
ongoing. Capabilities and structures have been created that enable the EU to become 
                                                
53 G Ress and J  Bröhmer in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd 
edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002)  Article 53 para 1. 
54 Ress and Bröhmer (n 53) Article 53 para 1. 
55 It has been suggested that a regional organisational entity qualifies a regional agency and not just as 
a regional arrangement if it enjoys a certain degre of a formal structure. See United Nations 
University (UNU-CRIS) (n 51) 16. The European Union enjoys a legal personality and has been 
attributed with organisational crisis management structures. It could therefore fulfill the conditions of 
an agency within the meaning of Article 53 UN Charter. 
56 White (n 45) 338, 344. 
57 Article 54 UN Charter. 
58 Article 52(2) UN Charter. See also Article 33(1) UN Charter. 
59 B Ki-Moon, Report of the Secretary General, The Role of Regional and Subregional Arrangements 
in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 28 June 2011, A/65/877 – S/211/393 para 5. 
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an international military crisis management actor. As one of its common foreign and 
security policy objectives, the EU identifies the promotion of ‘multilateral solutions 
to common problems, in particular in the framework f the United Nations’.60 In 
addition, the EU’ shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of 
international relations, in order to preserve peace, pr vent conflicts and strengthen 
international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter’.61 Political statements such as the European Security Strategy 
emphasises its commitment to effective multilateralism with the United Nations at 
the centre.62 Nonetheless, these obligations are not strong and precise enough to read 
into them the desire of the European Union to be covered by Chapter VIII of the UN 
Charter.63 
 
In practice, whenever the EU has been requested by the UN to act, no reference has 
been made to Chapter VIII UN Charter either. Instead the European member states 
and the European Union itself as an international organisation have been authorised 
by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII to use military sanctions. UN 
Security Council resolution 1671 (2006) for example welcomed ‘the intention of the 
European Union to deploy a force to support MONUC during the electoral period in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ and decided 
 
that Eufor R.D.Congo is authorized to take all necessary measures, 
within its means and capabilities, to carry out thefollowing tasks, in 
accordance with the agreement to be reached between the European 
Union and the United Nations: 
(a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces 
serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing 
capabilities, 
(b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence in the areas of its deployment, ad without prejudice to 
the responsibility of the Government of the Democrati  Republic of the 
Congo, 
                                                
60 Article 21(1) LTEU. 
61 Article 21(2) (c) LTEU. 
62 The European Security Strategy states that ‘The United Nations Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United 
Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority’. 
European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’ Brussels, 12 
December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> 9. 
63 See White (n 45) 334 who has analysed the provision of the failed Constitution in this regard. 
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(c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, 
(d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as 
well as the protection of the installations of Eufor R.D.Congo, 
(e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract 
individuals in danger.64 
 
EUFOR R.D. Congo was conducted as an autonomous EU-led military operation65 
under the auspices of the EU’s common security and defence policy.66  
 
The authorisation technique that has been increasingly used after the end of the Cold 
War was not anticipated by the drafters of the UN Charter, who originally designed 
the Security Council to undertake military enforcement measures directly under 
Chapter VII through military forces made available to it by the member states on a 
permanent standby basis through formal agreements, concluded on the basis of 
Article 43 UN Charter. The initial idea was that naional troops would remain subject 
to domestic regulations and would answer to their rspective national commanders 
who in turn would take orders from a UN Force Commander who would be under the 
command of the Military Staff Committee through which the Security Council would 
exercise its overall command and control.67   
 
According to the former Secretary General in An Agenda for Peace,  
 
[t]he ready availability of armed forces on call could serve, in itself, as a 
means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor 
would know that the Council had at its disposal a means of response.68 
 
                                                
64 UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) para 8. 
65 Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP on the European Union military operation in support of the 
United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democrati  Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the 
election process [2006] OJ L 116/98. 
66 Another example is operation Tchad/RCA. See UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) para 
6. 
67 Sarooshi (n 20) 142. During the drafting of the UNCharter three models of how military forces 
should be made available for the maintenance of international peace and security were discussed. For 
a detailed discussion on this topic see L M Goodrich and E Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: 
Commentary and Documents (2nd edn Stevens & Sons Limited, London 1949) 281, 282. 
68 UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, 17 June 1992, A/47/277 - S/24111, para 43. [hereinafter Agenda 
For Peace]. 
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However, until today, no Article 43 UN Charter agreement has been concluded and 
one of the consequences of the lack of Article 43 agreements is that the UN Security 
Council cannot oblige its member states to contribute troops to implement military 
sanctions.69  To fill this void and to provide the UN Security Council with capable 
and willing actors to restore international peace and security, the UN Security 
Council developed the practice of delegating its Chapter VII powers to states. 70 A 
standard wording used by the UN Security Council to grant states the right to use 
force is that it ‘authorises states to use all necessary means’. 
 
In the absence of an explicit competence of the UN Security Council to delegate its 
Chapter VII powers, the legal foundations of the UNSecurity Council’s competence 
to authorise states to use military measures is disputed. Thoughts are divided 
between those that argue that the Security Council’s ompetence to delegate its 
Chapter VII powers can be deduced from the wording a d systematic context of UN 
Charter provisions,71 whereas others refer to an implied power72 to authorise the use 
of force. A third stream argues in favour of a general competence to delegate as a 
general principle of the law of international organis tions.73 The UN Security 




                                                
69 Sarooshi (n 20) 142. 
70 According to Sarooshi, a delegation of power is broader than an authorisation to carry out a 
particular objective. The former entails ‘the transfer of a power of discretionary decision making.’ 
Even when the Security Council uses the terminology of authorisation, it might in substance delegate 
some of its discretionary powers to the member state . Sarooshi (n 20) 11-13. In the following, the 
terms ‘authorisation’ and ‘delegation’ will be used interchangeably to refer to a delegation of power in 
substance.  
71 The school of thought that finds the Security Council’s power to delegate military enforcement 
measures based on UN Charter provisions is divided into two major streams. Some refer to Article 51 
UN Charter whereas the majority bases the Security Council’s competence to authorise the use of 
force on Article 42 UN Charter either individually or in conjunction with a variety of Charter 
provisions, including Article 48 (1), Article 106 or Article 53 UN Charter. 
72 N Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to 
Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing’’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law, 547-554, 567. 
73 For a detailed discussion of the different views see Sarooshi (n 20) and E De Wet, The Chapter VII 
Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004). 
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2.2. Exceptions to the prohibition of the unilatera l use of force without a 
UN Charter basis   
During the Cold War, the permanent members of the UN Security Council could 
hardly come to agreement and the Security Council was largely unable to adopt 
collective enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.74  
 
In 1950 in response to these shortcomings, the General Assembly adopted the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution which provides that  
 
if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of permanent 
members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be 
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of ggression, the General 
Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations75 for Members for collective measures, 
including in the case of a breach of a peace or act of aggression the use of 
armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace 
and security. 
 
Unlike UN Security Council resolutions, recommendations of the General Assembly 
are not binding on UN member states.76  
 
Also partly linked to the inability of the UN Security Council to adopt enforcement 
measures when faced with a crisis of a humanitarian nature is the highly disputed 
development of a right to individual or unilateral humanitarian intervention. 
Humanitarian interventions refer to the  
 
forcible deployment of military forces into a country without the consent 
of the local government to prevent the commission of severe and 
widespread human rights atrocities against the civilian population.77 
 
                                                
74 T M Franck, ‘Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States’ 
(1970) 64 The American Journal of International Law 810. 
75 Emphasis added. 
76 The Uniting for Peace Resolution has only been imple ented during Chinese aggression against 
Korea in 1951. See C Tomuschat, ‘Uniting for Peace’ (2008) United Nations Audiovisual Library of 
International Law <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/pdf/ha/ufp/ufp_e.pdf> 3. 
77 S D Murphy, ‘The Security Council, Legitimacy, and the Concept of Collective Security after the 
Cold War’ (1994) 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 229.  
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Unilateral humanitarian interventions have to be distinguished from collective 
humanitarian interventions. The latter are authorised by the UN Security Council and 
are controversially discussed in terms of whether human rights violations can be 
qualified as a threat to the peace according to Article 39 UN Charter and thus open 
the gateway to collective enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter.78 Military operations that have been discussed in terms of collective 
humanitarian interventions include the US-led operation in Somalia in 1992/1993, 
authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 794 (1992);79 the French military 
operation in Rwanda in 1994 authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 929 
(1994)80 and the NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 authorised by UN Security 
Council Resolution 816 (1993).81   
 
The focus here will be on unilateral and therefore unauthorised humanitarian 
interventions as a possible exception to the general prohibition of the use of force to 
avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. The most prominent case of a unilateral 
humanitarian intervention is the NATO campaign in Kosovo in 1999 that will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter seven below.  
 
The controversy behind the right to use force for humanitarian purposes without 
authorisation by the UN Security Council is centred on the balance between the 
principle of non-intervention which is derived from Article 2(7) and Article 2(4) UN 
Charter and the importance of the protection of human rights. 82 The principle of non-
intervention relates to respect for the sovereignty of the individual member states and 
entails the duty not to interfere with their internal affairs. Human rights are 
recognised as values of international law and as forming an important element of the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Those who speak in favour of a right to 
                                                
78 Murphy (n 77) 229, 230; I Österdahl, ‘By All Means, Intervene! – The Security Council and the 
Use of Force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in Iraq (to protect the Kurds), in Bosnia, Somalia, 
Rwanda and Haiti’ (1997) 66 Nordic Journal of Interational Law 270, 271. 
On the topic of collective humanitarian interventio see also F R Tesón, ‘Collective Humanitarian 
Intervention’ (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 323-371. 
79 Tesón (n 78) 352. 
80 Tesón (n 78) 365. 
81 Tesón (n 78) 367, 368. 
82 C Greenwood, ‘International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo’(2000) 49 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 929. 
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humanitarian intervention argue that such an intervention would not go against the 
teological meaning of Article 2(4) UN Charter and the general prohibition of the use 
of force which would be aimed at protecting the territo ial integrity of a state. The 
aim of humanitarian interventions would not however b  to interfere with a state’s 
territory or political independence but to save peopl  from gross human rights 
violations.83 
 
In addition, it is often held that unilateral action would undermine the system of 
collective security as it would either replace a previous decision of the UN Security 
Council in respect of the maintenance of international peace or security or have the 
potential of pre-empting it.84   
  
In practical terms, the use of force for humanitarian reasons that is not authorised by 
the UN Security Council opens up the possibility of p litical abuse. This is not only 
because the claim to intervene for humanitarian reasons is predominantly open to 
powerful states85 but also because there seems to be no agreement as to what 
conditions have to be met for a ‘rightful’ humanitarian intervention.86 So far it has 
been predominantly argued in favour of the illegality of humanitarian interventions87 
although some support the possibility of the slow emergence of a new doctrine of 
international law.88 It has been held by many that the use of force not authorised by 
                                                
83N Rodley, and B Cali, ‘Kosovo Revisited: Humanitarian Intervention on the Fault Lines of 
International Law’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 281. 
84 W M Reisman, ‘Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The 
Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 4. 
85 I Brownlie and C J Apperley, ‘Kosovo Crisis Inquiry: Memorandum on the International Law 
Aspects’ (2000) 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 905. 
86 Cassese for example suggests that the conditions for a lawful humanitarian intervention would 
include ‘gross and egregious breaches of human rights nvolving the loss of life of hundreds or 
thousands of innocent people, and amounting to crimes against humanity’, the inability of the UN 
Security Council to adopt coercive action due to a veto or a lack of majority, the exhaustion of 
appropriate peaceful means, and the willingness of a group of states as opposed to a ‘single 
hegemonic Power’ to get involved with the support of the non-objection of the majority of the UN 
member states and the use of force solely for the purpose of ending human rights violations. A 
Cassese, ‘Ex inuiria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 27. Greenwood only asks for either an existing or immediate threat of ‘the most 
serious humanitarian emergency involving large scale loss of life’ and the ‘necessity of a military 
intervention’ to either end or prevent the loss of life. See Greenwood (n 82) 931.   
87 Brownlie and  Apperley (n 85) 891. 
88 Cassese (n 86) 29, 30. 
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the UN Security Council to stop grave human rights violations should remain a 
narrow exception.89 
 
Over the years the terminology and the emphasis of the legal and political discussion 
around the so-called ‘right to humanitarian intervention’ has changed in favour of the 
concept  of the ‘responsibility to protect’. In the aftermath of NATO’s military 
intervention in Kosovo without a UN Security Council Resolution authorising the 
use of force to stop a humanitarian catastrophe, th Canadian Government 
established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that 
issued its report on ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in December 2001. The 
Commission changed the emphasis of the discussion behi d the right to humanitarian 
intervention from an understanding of ‘sovereignty as control to sovereignty as 
responsibility in both internal functions and external duties’.90 Therefore, states 
would have the primary responsibility to ensure the protection of their population 
from gross human rights violations. If states fail to fulfil this obligation, the 
responsibility to protect resides with the international community.91  
 
The concept of the responsibility to protect is comprised of three elements – the 
responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. 
The responsibility to react might ask for military intervention. The Commission 
argues that the decision to determine whether a force should be used for human 
protection purposes should rest with the UN Security Council.92 However, if the 
Security Council fails to act, it is possible to seek support from two thirds of the 
General Assembly to invoke the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The Security Council 
would then have the primary but not the sole responibility for the maintenance of 
peace and security.93 In case this possibility also fails, the Commission emphasises 
that unilateral military interventions by an ad hoc coalition of states without a prior 
                                                
89 K Naumann, ‘NATO, Kosovo and Military Intervention’ (2002) 8 Global Governance 14; B 
Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 22. 
90 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility 
to Protect’ (2001) <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf> para 2.14 [hereinafter 
Responsibility to Protect]. 
91 Responsibility to Protect (n 90)  Synopsis, xi. 
92 Responsibility to Protect (n 90) 6.28. 
93 Responsibility to Protect (n 90) 6.29, 6.30, 6.7. 
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obtained Security Council mandate would not be widely accepted.94 But it 
nevertheless indicates that unilateral action still might be necessary in extreme 
scenarios.95  
 
The possibility of the collective use of military force as a last resort to react to 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity was recognised 
by the United Nations but the question of the right to unilateral humanitarian 
intervention was not addressed.96 The European Union supported the new concept97 
and accepted the responsibility to protect as part of the EU’s international 
responsibility. The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: 
Providing Security in a Changing World of 2008 states that  
 
[s]overeign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions and hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.98 
 
Like the UN, the European Union seems to be reluctant to acknowledge openly the 
concept of unilateral military interventions as part of the concept of the responsibility 
to protect in favour of UN authorised collective action to stop humanitarian 
catastrophes. For example, the ‘EU Priorities for the 64th General Assembly of the 
United Nations’ highlight the EU’s support for the implementation of the 
responsibility to protect within the United Nations.99 However, the EU’s support of 
                                                
94 Responsibility to Protect ( n 90)  6.36. 
95 Responsibility to Protect (n 90), 6.40. 
96 Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel o  Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More 
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ (2004) <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf> paras 
199-203; General Assembly Resolution 60/1, ‘2005 World Summit Outcome’, 24 October 2005, paras 
138-140. 
97 M Vincent and J Wouters, ‘The Responsibility to Prtect: Where does the EU Stand?’ (2008) Policy 
Brief, Madariaga Report, Madariaga – College of Europe Foundation 
<http://www.madariaga.org/images/madariagareports/2008-jul-1%20-
%20r2p%20where%20does%20the%20eu%20stand.pdf> 5. 
98 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, J Solana, ‘Report on the Implementation of the 
European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World’ Brussels, 11 December 2008, 
S407/08, 2. 
99 Priorities for the 64th General Assembly of the United Nations (  32) para 8. 
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NATO’s action in Kosovo100 nevertheless indicates that the EU might consider 
unilateral humanitarian intervention to be legitimate in scenarios of extreme need.  
 
As long no agreed definition on the conditions for a rightful unilateral humanitarian 
intervention exists and as long as there is no wide acceptance of the concept, 
humanitarian interventions might be legitimate but they will lack legality. The 
European Union could help to foster the concept of humanitarian intervention by 
issuing and following clear guidelines. By doing so, the European Union could serve 
as an example to other international actors and could support the development of a 
rule of customary law. 
 
For the European Union as an emerging military actor, the above findings indicate 
that the EU is bound by the general principle of the prohibition of the use of force. 
From the perspective of international law, the EU can only legally resort to military 
sanctions if it can base its actions on one of the exceptions to the use of force. In 
practice, the EU would thus have to seek the authorisation of the Security Council. 
When authorisation cannot be obtained, the EU can utilise the emergency procedure 
as established by the Uniting for Peace resolution. Nevertheless, when a Security 
Council mandate cannot be obtained the actor also might be less likely to get the 
approval of two thirds of the General Assembly. Although the use of force based on 
a General Assembly recommendation might give the EU’s operation legitimacy, it 
would still leave it questionable in legal terms. The same has to be said of unilateral 
European humanitarian interventions.  
 
Part 3 
Procedure for the adoption of UN Security Council s anctions and the 
legal effects they produce 
If the Security Council wants to adopt military enforcement measures to maintain or 
restore international peace and security it has to foll w the procedure set up by 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter which deals with ‘Action with Respect to Threats to 
the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of  Aggression’. The first section will 
                                                
100 N Krisch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council’ 
(1999) 3 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 83.
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briefly outline the two-step procedure established by the UN Charter before the legal 
effects of UN Security Council enforcement decision will be examined. The 
following section will then focus on questions about whether and if so under what 
circumstances UN Security Council resolutions stop being binding on UN member 
states. It will be argued in chapter six that the European Union is bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions. The limit of this bind g nature is of course reached 
when UN Security Council decisions stop being binding in general. 
 
1. Two-step procedure for the adoption of military sanctions 
In a first step the UN Security Council has to determine either a threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace or act of aggression if it consider  the collective use of force to 
be necessary to maintaining or restoring internatiol peace and security. The 
determination of an Article 39 UN Charter situation lies within the discretion of the 
Security Council as indicated by the phrase ‘determination’ as well as by its 
systematic context with Articles 40 and 42 UN Charter.101 These provisions allow the 
Security Council to choose from a variety of measure . It would not be consistent if 
the Security Council’s flexibility in respect of the choice of measures would be 
weakened by a strict reading of the conditions for actions under Article 39 UN 
Charter.102 The conditions that have to be met by Article 39 UN Charter are not 
described in much detail but the practice of the Security Council has led to the 
development of some minimum conditions before an enforcement action can be 
taken. The Security Council is supposed to apply the same standard in similar cases, 
as the determination of an Article 39 UN Charter situat on is a pre-requisite for 
Chapter VII enforcement measures and should not be based on purely political 
considerations.103  
 
Following the determination of threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression, the UN Security Council has discretion whether or not to adopt in a 
                                                
101 J Frowein and N Krisch in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd 
edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) Article 39 para 4. 
102 Frowein and Krisch (n 101) Article 39 para 4. 
103 Frowein and Krisch (n 101) Article 39 para 26. 
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second step a resolution with regards to military sanctions according to Article 42 
UN Charter. This article provides that, 
 
[s]hould the Security Council consider that measure provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may 
take such action by air, sea, or land forces as maybe necessary to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may 
include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of the United Nations. 
 
 
2.  Legal effects of UN Security Council sanctions 
Although UN Security Council resolutions are binding on UN member states 
according to Article 48(2) UN Charter,104 their legal effects differ depending on 
whether they are of an economic or military nature. Although for the purpose of the 
present chapter an analysis of the legal effects produced by UN Security Council 
sanctions of a military nature would be sufficient, the binding effect of the former 
will be addressed first to create awareness about their similarities and differences. An 
understanding of this issue will be of importance for chapter six, which will discuss 
whether the analysis of the legal relationship betwe n the European Union and UN 
Security Council resolutions with regards to economic sanctions can be helpful for 
understanding the relationship between the European Union and UN Security 
Council resolutions with regards to the use of force by using a comparative method. 
 
2.1. Excursus: Legal effects produced by UN Securit y Council 
economic sanctions 
Economic sanction decisions by the UN Security Council produce two effects. On 
the one hand they create not merely a right but an international law obligation for UN 
member states to implement them.105 According to Article 48(2) UN Charter 
decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security ‘shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and 
                                                
104 Article 48 UN Charter is lex specialis to Article 25 UN Charter.  
105 V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Sanctions Regimes under Article 41 of the UN Charter’ in V Gowlland-
Debbas (ed), National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative Study, The 
Graduate Institute of International Studies (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2004) 19. 
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through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are 
members’. Otherwise, economic sanction regimes would be deprived of their 
effectiveness. On the other hand, economic sanctions also serve as entitlements. The 
target has to accept the economic measures adopted and implemented against it as it 
agreed to the vertical system of law enforcement of the United Nations through its 
membership in the organisation.106 Hence, UN Security Council resolutions legalise 
actions by member states against the target that could not otherwise be justified 
under general international law.107 
 
2.2. The binding nature of military sanctions – som e general remarks 
The legal effects produced by UN Security Council resolutions authorising the use of 
force differ slightly from the effects produced by economic sanctions. Like the latter, 
they are binding on UN member states. However, the binding nature differs in 
strength, depending on the role played by the respective UN member state in the 
actual exercise of the use of force on behalf of the UN Security Council.108 Member 
states do not have to accept a Security Council reso ution authorising the use of force 
in the sense that they have to deploy land, air or naval forces.109 Nonetheless, if a UN 
member state accepts a UN mandate and agrees on sendi g its armed forces, it is 
bound by the UN Security Council resolution in its entirety. The UN member state 
has to respect the conditions set or the use of force by the resolution, including for 
example geographical or time-limits.  
 
2.2.1. A duty of assistance and cooperation and the  duty not to 
undermine the success of a military operation 
UN Security Council resolutions are also binding on those member states that decide 
not to participate in a mission by sending troops. UN member states are legally 
                                                
106 Osteneck (n 5) 36. 
107 Osteneck (n 5) 36; see also Gazzini (n 11) 15 who refers to the permissive effect of mandatory UN 
Security Council economic sanctions. 
108 This assumption will be explained in more detail in the following section. 
109 T D Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the UN Security Council to 
Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’ (1995) XXVI Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 60. 
 143 
obliged to offer other forms of cooperation and assistance apart from providing 
forces.110  
 
In addition to the positive obligation to provide assistance to add value to an UN 
authorised operation, all UN member states are under the negative obligation not to 
undermine the effectiveness of a UN authorised military operation through their 
action or inaction. This negative obligation result from a loyalty obligation that is 
inherent in the vertical centralised system of law enforcement of the United Nations 
to which the UN members have agreed. The negative obligation to abstain from 
anything that would undermine the effectiveness of the use of force authorised by the 
Security Council can ask UN member states to become active and to introduce travel 
bans for example. But it can also ask member states o refrain from doing something, 
for example to abstain from selling weapons and other military equipment to the 
target. Usually an economic sanction regime would be in place when the UN 
Security Council resorts to the use of force but this does not necessarily have to be 
the case.  
 
The duty of UN member states not to hinder a UN operation through active or 
passive cooperation with the target has a treaty basis in Article 2(5) UN Charter, 
which provides that, 
 
[a]ll Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any 
action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain 
from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is 
taking preventive or enforcement action. 
 
The negative obligation not to undermine the effectiv ness of UN military operations 
either through action or inaction as well as the positive obligation to assist the United 
Nations with its operations are also interconnected with the UN Charter’s system of 
collective security and the general prohibition of the unilateral use of force.111 
                                                
110 Gill (n 109) 60. 
111 A Verdross, ‘Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in International Law’ (1966) 60 The American 
Journal Of International Law 60. Verdross speaks in favour of three interconnected rules with regards 
to the use of force – namely the prohibition of the unilateral use of force, the settlement of disputes by 
peaceful means and the obligation to assist the United Nations in enforcement action. Gill also argues 
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Member states, in favour of creating the main respon ibility for the UN Security 
Council to restore and maintain international peace nd security, have largely 
renounced their individual sovereign powers to use military enforcement action. A 
side effect of this loss of power is the duty to enable the UN Security Council to 
fulfil the function for which it has been created for. 
 
2.2.2. Military UN Security Council sanctions as an  entitlement to use 
force 
Military sanctions do not merely create legal obligat ons of differing natures for UN 
member states. Like economic sanctions, military Security Council sanctions also 
function as an entitlement. UN member states have lrge y renounced their power to 
use force unilaterally in favour of creating the primary responsibility of the Security 
Council to maintain and restore international peace nd security in the system of 
centralised vertical law enforcement of the United Nations. The authorisation of 
member states by the Security Council to resort to military force is one of the view 
exceptions to the general prohibition of the use of force. The authorisation of the use 
of force therefore fulfils two functions. It grants to UN member states the right to use 
force in a particular case. It also prevents the target from claiming that the military 
measures deployed against it would be in violation of the principle of non-
intervention as stipulated in Article 2(4) UN Charter.112 
 
To summarise briefly, both economic and military sanctions provide entitlements for 
the sender state to use economic or military measurs that the target has to accept. 
Both types of sanction resolutions are binding on the UN member states although 
their binding nature differs. The general finding that UN Security Council resolutions 
serve as an entitlement to resort to enforcement measur s and that they are binding 
on the member states of the United Nations is not without exceptions. It will be 
argued in the following that decisions by the UN Security Council that are either 
illegal or ultra vires do not produce the above described legal effects.  
 
                                                                                                                                
that UN members are obliged under chapter VII to ‘pr vide some degree of cooperation with 
collective enforcement measures short of actual military participation’, Gill (n 109) 83. 
112 See Gazzini (n 11) 21. 
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3. When do UN Security Council resolutions stop bei ng binding? – Ultra 
vires and illegal UN Security Council decisions 
The UN Charter indicates that if the UN Security Council oversteps its limits, its 
decisions become unlawful113 and they cease to be binding on UN member states. 
The member states have agreed only to ‛accept and carry out decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter’.114 However, the question 
of whether acts by the UN Security Council can be unlawful and, if so, whether they 
stop being binding is controversial. The substantive l mits the UN Security Council 
faces when adopting enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
will be discussed below in part four. This section will first take a closer look at the 
debate surrounding the effects of illegal UN Security Council decisions.115  
 
Two types of illegal decisions of international organisations can be identified.116 Like 
states, international organisations can breach interna ional law.117 And if 
international organisations exceed their competences, they act ultra vires.118 
Therefore if the UN Security Council oversteps the powers granted to it by the 
founding treaty and does not act in accordance withthe purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter as expressed in Article 24(2) UN Charter, its acts stop being intra 
vires. It is also not within the competence of any interational actor to violate the 
norms of jus cogens. If it does this, the Security Council’s decisions must be 
classified as ultra vires.119 The next section will focus on the legal effects produced 
by ultra vires acts of the UN Security Council. The legal limits faced by the Security 
Council are either linked to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter or to 
international law in the form of jus cogens. Therefore if the Security Council 
oversteps its boundaries it does not merely act illegally but also ultra vires. 
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With regards to ultra vires acts of the UN Security Council, several questions need to 
be clarified. First, who is competent to challenge th validity of Security Council 
decisions? The member states of the United Nations seem to have the right to 
challenge UN Security Council decisions since they created or agreed to the 
founding treaty of the United Nations. They created he United Nations to fulfil 
certain objectives and purposes and therefore they have the right to check if its 
decisions reflect them.120 Second, it has to be decided whether ult a vires acts are 
void ab initio or just voidable. If they are void ab initio they do not produce legally 
binding effects and there would be no need to determine their invalidity. The UN 
member states could simply refuse to comply with UN Security Council 
resolutions.121 If ultra vires acts would however be merely voidable, they would 
produce legally binding effects until the time of their invalidation.122 The 
International Court of Justice held in the Certain Expenses case123 that acts of the 
United Nations carry with them the presumption of being intra vires.124 If the latter is 
the case, a follow up question must be addressed – namely who is competent to 
determine the invalidity of UN Security Council acts. The UN Charter does not 
contain a provision on who is competent to judge the UN Security Council. To fill 
this gap, some who argue that ul ra vires acts of the UN Security Council are not 
void but voidable hold the view that ultra vires acts that are ‘manifestly ultra vires’ 
would not produce legal effects.125 What constitutes a manifestly ultra vires act is not 
however entirely clear. It has been suggested that this qualification would apply to all 
decisions of an international organisation that violate its objectives and purposes.126 
If that reasoning were to be transferred to the United Nations, manifestly ultra vires 
acts could not be distinguished from ordinary ultra vires acts. The UN Security 
Council oversteps its competences when it is acting contrary to the purposes and 
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principles of the UN Charter.127 If the UN Security Council violates the norms of jus
cogens it is also hard to imagine not qualifying this breach of international law as a 
‘manifestly’ ultra vires act. 
 
In the absence of a body that is competent to review acts of the UN Security Council, 
UN member states have no guarantee against illegal UN Security Council decisions. 
Therefore member states need to have as a right of last resort the opportunity not 
only to challenge the lawfulness of UN Security Council decisions but also to refuse 
compliance.128 States that refuse compliance with UN Security Council resolutions 
are asked to make their position known. States that are also members of the UN 
Security Council are requested to vote against the proposed Security Council 
resolution based on legal and not just purely political reasons.129  
 
In sum, if it oversteps substantive limits, the UN Security Council’s sanction 
decisions are void and not legally binding. The next part will look in more detail at 
the substantive limits the Security Council faces when acting under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter with a particular emphasis on military sanctions. 
 
Part 4 
The Security Council and the use of force – limits to its discretion under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
When they agreed to the system of the United Nations and assigned the UN Security 
Council with the main responsibility for the mainteance of international peace and 
security, states did not give the Security Council unlimited powers.130 As outlined 
above, if the UN Security Council oversteps these boundaries, its sanction decisions 
are ultra vires and they lose their binding force. In consequence, UN member states 
are not obliged to assist the United Nations in the above defined manner during the 
course of a military operation and they are not requir d to abstain from any action 
that could undermine the success of a planned military operation. UN Security 
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Council resolutions also lose their function of being an entitlement to use force and 
the target of military sanctions could rightfully exercise its right of self-defence 
against actions that can be qualified as an act of aggression. 
 
Furthermore, if states start to question seriously whether it violates the limits of its 
ideological foundations, namely to act on behalf of shared values and norms, the UN 
Security Council would find it more difficult to find capable and willing entities that 
help it to fulfil its mandate by implementing its resolutions. They would have lost the 
notion of being legitimate. 
 
The following part will examine the limits the UN Security Council faces under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter when adopting military sanction resolutions. It will be 
argued here that the UN Security Council is bound by the purposes and principles of 
the UN Charter and by general international law of which the norms of jus cogens 
and the principle of proportionality will be of interest. Human rights and 
humanitarian law play central roles when assessing the legal limits of the UN 
Security Council to impose military sanctions. Both sets of norms are included in the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter; some of them have acquired the status of 
jus cogens over time and their exercise is unavoidably linked with questions of 
proportionality.  
 
The Security Council enjoys discretion in both step of the Chapter VII UN Charter 
procedure for the adoption of military sanctions. The UN Security Council enjoys 
discretion in deciding whether a crisis is grave enough to constitute a threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression according to Article 39 UN Charter. 
Once it has paved the way for enforcement measures in general, it enjoys discretion 
whether and if so what kind of coercive measures should be adopted according to 
Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter.131  
 
Regarding the question of whether the Security Council’s discretion is limited, three 
schools of thought can be identified. Some argue that e Security Council’s 
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discretion about when and how to intervene is completely unbound by law.132 Others 
claim that the Security Council is absolutely free in determining an Article 39 UN 
Charter situation, but that it is limited by general international law and constitutional 
requirements in its choice of action, once the obstacle of Article 39 UN Charter has 
been overcome.133 Finally, others hold the view that the Security Council is limited 
in its decision as to when to act but not how to act.134  
 
1. Limits to the Security Council’s discretion in d etermining a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression : Article 39 UN 
Charter 
The Security Council is neither under the duty to determine whether a crisis is 
covered by the terms of Article 39 UN Charter nor is its use of this provision limited 
to those situations in which it is also willing and able to take effective enforcement 
measures.135 No final legal conclusions can be drawn from these findings about the 
question of whether the Security Council’s discretion is limited under this provision. 
The political nature of the qualification of a situa ion as a threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace and act of aggression does not mean that once the Security Council 
decides to make this determination, it is unbound by law.136  
 
The wording of Article 39 UN Charter and its systematic context within Chapter VII 
speaks in favour of a limited discretion.137 Article 39 UN Charter distinguishes 
between three different situations that require enforcement action to restore or 
maintain international peace and security – namely a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or act of aggression, and therefore requires the Security Council to qualify 
the situation along these terms. Although the terms used are vague, they nevertheless 
indicate different impacts on international peace and security and they have been 
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further developed by recent practice.138 The systematic context of Article 39 UN 
Charter within Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that allows for the adoption of binding 
Security Council enforcement decisions once its gatew y has been passed, supports 
the view that the Security Council is not unbound by law.139 If the Security Council 
is free to decide that the coercive measures mentioned in Chapter VII are applicable, 
the boundaries between Chapter VI of the UN Charter that focuses on non-binding 
Security Council decisions in relation to the pacific settlements of disputes and 
Chapter VII become irrelevant.140 
 
2. Limits to the Security Council’s discretion to a dopt enforcement 
measures under Article 42 UN Charter 
Once it has overcome the obstacle of Article 39 UN Charter and decided that there is 
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the Security Council 
has discretion about whether and if so what kind of military or non-military 
enforcement measure should be adopted for the mainten ce of international peace 
and security. Nevertheless the Security Council’s dscretion to do so under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter is not without substantive limits. In the following it will be 
argued that the Security Council is bound by the constitutional limits created by the 
UN Charter, namely by the principles and purposes of the United Nations. In 
addition, the Security Council is also subject to some rules of general international 
law, including in particular to the norms of jus cogens and the principle of 
proportionality. It is not proposed here that the Security Council has to correspond to 
international law in its entirety.141  
 
2.1. Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter 
In general, the legality of a law enforcement measure depends on the framework in 
which it is adopted. Measures of vertical law enforcement have to comply with the 
founding treaties of the international organisation n question.142 Transferring this 
reasoning to the system of the United Nations indicates that the Security Council is 
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faced with constitutional limits stemming from the UN Charter itself when it is 
adopting enforcement measures. The second paragraph of Article 24 UN Charter 
puts this general concept into concrete form by asking the Security Council to ‛act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ when it exercises 
its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 
under Chapter VII.  
 
The claim made by some that the purposes and princiles of the UN Charter could 
not serve as limits to the Security Council’s discretion as they would be too openly 
phrased143 and as Article 24(2) UN Charter would only be infri ged when the 
Security Council impinges upon the collectivity of all charter purposes and principles 
is not convincing.144 The collective reference to the purposes and princi les in 
Article 24 UN Charter can be explained by their more detailed enumeration in 
Chapter I of the UN Charter.145 It will be argued here that the UN Security Council is 
legally bound to respect the core of some human rights and the core of humanitarian 
law when it adopts military enforcement measures and that this obligation is re-
enforced by the principle of good faith that is addressed not only to UN member 
states but also to the United Nations as an international organisation. 
 
2.1.1. Human rights as one of the purposes of the U N Charter 
The promotion and encouragement of human rights is mentioned in Article 1(3) UN 
Charter as constituting one of the purposes of the UN Charter. The reading of Article 
1(3) UN Charter in conjunction with Article 24(2) UN Charter therefore provides for 
the constitutional basis for the Security Council’s duty to respect human rights when 
adopting military or non-military enforcement actions.146 The view that the Security 
Council is bound by human rights in general is furthe more supported by Article 
55(c) of Chapter IX on ‘International Economic and Social Co-operation’ that 
requires the Security Council ‘to promote universal respect for, and observance of, 
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human rights and fundamental freedoms for all withou  distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion’. 
 
Furthermore it would be at odds with the founding ideas of the United Nations if the 
Security Council violated human rights. The United Nations was founded with the 
view of stopping the two world wars of the twentieth century from happening again. 
The peoples of the United Nations declared themselve  in the preamble of the UN 
Charter to be determined  
 
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small.147 
 
The development of human rights law since the entry i o force of the UN Charter in 
1945 also strongly suggests a duty not to touch on the core of human rights.148 In its 
advisory opinion in the Namibia case of June 1971,149 the International Court of 
Justice, cited a statement by the Secretary-General providing that the only limits the 
Security Council faces when maintaining international peace and security through 
the powers granted to it by Chapter VII of the UN Charter would be ‘the fundamental 
principles and purposes found in Chapter 1 of the Carter’.150 
 
The UN Security Council is bound by the purposes of the UN Charter and therefore 
must respect human rights when adopting sanction decisions. However, it only has to 
respect the core of human rights.151 The negative side effect of the member states’ 
duty to implement UN sanction resolutions is that some of the rights states in general 
enjoy under international law will be restricted, suspended or even infringed upon.152 
A trade embargo, for example, not only has a negative impact on the target state and 
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its population but can also be costly on those state  that have established trade 
relations with the target.153   
 
2.1.2. Humanitarian law 
The purposes and principles of the UN Charter limiting he UN Security Council also 
include the core of humanitarian law.154 Although it is not a member of the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions and its official statement is that it is not bound by them, the 
United Nations’ actual practice suggests otherwise –namely  that it is bound by the 
basic norms of humanitarian law.155 
 
According to the Legal Opinions of the Secretariat of the United Nations on the 
Question of the Possible Accession of Intergovernmental Organizations to the 
Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims,156 the United Nations with 
regards to peace-keeping operations ‘is not substantively in a position to become a 
party to the 1949 Conventions’157 although the ‘International Committee of the Red 
Cross has been of the opinion that the United Nations should formally undertake by 
accession to apply the Convention each time Forces of the United Nations are 
engaged in operations’.158 The substantive limits refer to obligations that in he view 
of the UN Secretariat  
 
can only be discharged by the exercise of juridical and administrative 
powers which the Organization does not possess, such as the authority to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction over members of the Forces, or 
administrative competence relating to territorial sovereignty. Thus the 
United Nations is unable to fulfil obligations whic for their execution 
require the exercise of powers granted to the Organization, and therefore 
cannot accede to the Conventions.159  
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However, today’s practice reveals that through the exchange of letters, the United 
Nations binds troop-contributing governments to make sure that their contingents 
respect the Conventions and also requests that these forces ‛respect the humanitarian 
principles and spirit of the Conventions’.160 Therefore, the official statement dating 
from 1972 rather has to ‘be understood as meaning that the UN is not bound by these 
norms in exactly the same manner as states and that the Security Council may 
authorise some limitation of the norms of international humanitarian law if the 
circumstances so require’ but that its is nevertheless bound by the core of 
humanitarian law.161  
 
2.1.3. Good faith 
The assumption that the Security Council is bound by the core of human rights and 
humanitarian law when adopting enforcement measures is reinforced by its 
obligation to act in good faith, which forms another principle on which the United 
Nations is based.162 The wording of the first sentence of Article 2 UN Charter, in 
conjunction with its second paragraph, shows that te United Nations itself and 
therefore the Security Council ‘shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by 
them in accordance with the present Charter’163 and that it is not only for UN 
member states to act accordingly.164  
 
The principle of good faith is supposed to prevent the Security Council from acting 
contrary to the legitimate expectations it has created through previous actions.165  By 
identifying the promotion and the encouragement of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as one of the purposes of the UN Charter,166 by creating the 
idea of a certain human rights standard protected by the United Nations through 
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human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well 
as the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and statements by the 
Secretary General with regards to humanitarian law, the Security Council has 
therefore created the expectation to observe the cor  of human rights and 
humanitarian law itself.167 The principle of good faith thus reinforces the limits the 
UN Security Council faces. 
 
2.2 International law and the norms of jus cogens 
But it is not only the literal, teleological and historical interpretations of the UN 
Charter that speak in favour of limiting the Security Council’s discretion to use 
enforcement measures by human rights considerations r considerations of 
humanitarian law as one of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. The 
Security Council is also bound by general international law and in particular by the 
norms of jus cogens when it exercises its Chapter VII powers. There are two sources 
for this claim.  
 
First, as an international organisation, the United Nations is bound by customary 
international law, albeit not by all of its rules. According to the principle of 
functionality, international organisations are bound by general international law as a 
corollary of their international legal personality; hey have to obey those rules that 
are related to their functions.168 Based on this concept, it has been argued that the 
United Nations is bound by humanitarian law during peace-keeping operations.169 
Generalising the concept of functionality it could therefore be concluded that the UN 
Security Council is bound by human rights and humanitarian law when authorising 
the use of force according to Article 42 UN Charter. 
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Second, the UN Charter itself calls for respect of international law. According to 
Article 1(1) UN Charter,  
 
[t]he purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain international peace 
and security, and to that end: to take effective colle tive measures for the 
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of 
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of inter ational disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. 
 
The contrary claim put forward by some that the wording of Article 1(1) UN Charter 
would merely suggest that the Security Council is bound by the principles of justice 
and international law when it is engaged in settling disputes by peaceful means 
according to Chapter VI of the UN Charter but not when it is undertaking collective 
security measures to prevent and to remove threats to maintain international peace 
and security is not convincing.170  
 
2.2.1. Jus cogens 
When examining in more detail by which human rights and by which norms of 
humanitarian law the UN Security Council is bound as p rt of general international 
law, it will be argued here that its discretion to act under Article 42 UN Charter is 
limited by the concept of jus cogens.171 The concept of jus cogens is comprised of 
the peremptory norms of international law and has been developed in the context of 
treaties. According to Article 53 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT),  
 
[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a 
peremptory norm of general international law. For the purpose of the 
present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States 
as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character.   
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The concept of jus cogens is applicable to the UN Charter because both prerequisites 
are met. First, the Charter qualifies as a treaty. The fact that the UN Charter 
represents the constitution of the United Nations as an international organisation 
with legal personality that is distinct from its meber states cannot justify another 
classification.172 Otherwise, the member states that are individually bound by the 
norms of jus cogens themselves173 would be able to avoid their obligations by the 
establishment of an international organisation.174   
 
Second, the UN Charter is not immune from the influence of the Vienna Convention 
although the latter was agreed after the UN Charter came into force. The conferral of 
powers from the member states to the Security Council cannot be viewed as a static 
process but as an ongoing development, indicating that the powers conferred on the 
Security Council are circumscribed by the ongoing development of jus cogens.175 
Nevertheless, the finding that the Security Council is bound by jus cogens is not of 
much value in the light of the vagueness of the concept of jus cogens. No agreement 
exists as to what is covered by erga omnes norms. Most scholars recognise the 
limited nature of this concept and only consider noms such as the prohibition of 
genocide, torture, racial discrimination, the prohibition against slavery as well as the 
prohibition of the use of force as included.176 
 
2.3. Proportionality 
The Security Council is not only obliged to respect the core of basic human rights 
and the core of humanitarian law when it exercises its discretion under Article 42 UN 
Charter: it also must respect the principle of propo tionality with its sanction 
decisions. The general principle of proportionality contains three elements. First, the 
chosen measure must be suitable for achieving the desired aim. Second, the chosen 
measure must be the least destructive measure albeit being immediately effective in 
achieving its aim. Finally, the negative effects of the chosen measure must be 
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outweighed by its benefits. The first two elements can be referred to as the 
requirement of necessity whereas the last element might be qualified as the principle 
of proportionality. Hence, the requirement of necessity asks whether an incident 
warrants the use of military measures and the requiment of proportionality in a 
strict sense determines the legitimate amount of force that can be used to achieve a 
certain aim.177 The principle of proportionality does not demand that the Security 
Council make use of all non-binding and non-military enforcement measures first 
before military measures can be implemented. It is po sible to resort to the use of 
force immediately if economic measures, for example, cannot restore peace and 
security.  
 
Article 42 UN Charter itself requires that military measures are proportionate and 
necessary.178 According to this provision, the Security Council has to determine, 
first, that non-military measures under Article 41 UN Charter ‘would be inadequate 
or have proved to be inadequate’ and, second, that the Security Council ‛may take 
such action by air, sea or land forces as may be nec ssary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security’. In consequence, the principle of proportionality in 
conjunction with the core of basic human rights andhumanitarian law constrains the 
Security Council’s discretion when it wants to resort to military enforcement 
measures according to Article 42 UN Charter.179 
 
In sum, the Security Council’s discretion under Article 42 UN Charter to authorise 
the use of force is limited by jus cogens and the principles and purposes of the UN 
Charter. One of the most important limitations on the Security Council’s discretion to 
resort to military enforcement measures is created by the core of basic human rights. 
On the one hand, the core of the basic human rights s partly covered by the concept 
of jus cogens, although no agreement exists as to the exact content of this concept. 
On the other hand, the United Nations is based on respect and promotion of human 
rights. The concept of good faith enhances the boundaries for the Security Council 
created through the United Nations’ own policy of human rights protection and 
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humanitarian law. Additionally, the principle of proportionality underlines the 
importance of human rights considerations when the Security Council is faced with 
the decision to resort to non-binding measures, non-military measures or military 
enforcement measures to fulfil its mandate to resto international peace and 
security. If the UN Security Council oversteps its boundaries and violates the core of 
basic human rights or the core of humanitarian law,its sanction resolutions lose their 
legally binding force as pointed out above. 
 
Part 5 
The practical significance of the discussion of whe ther or not the UN 
Security Council is limited in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers – 
The Kadi case 
The discussion about the limits the UN Security Council is under when acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter is not without practical significance as demonstrated 
by the Kadi case,180 discussed in chapter one above.  In Kadi, the European courts 
had to decide whether they were competent to review a Community instrument that 
was implementing UN sanction resolutions in the light of European fundamental 
rights. Related to this problem was the sub-question about whether UN Security 
Council resolutions can infringe human rights and if so what kind of human rights 
standard should be applied. 
 
The Court of First Instance181 refused to review the contested Community instrument 
in the light of European fundamental rights and claimed that it would otherwise 
indirectly challenge the lawfulness of the UN Security Council resolution the 
Community regulation was implementing. In a second step, it nevertheless upgraded 
European fundamental rights to norms of jus cogens and found itself competent to 
use this new found standard of peremptory norms directly to scrutinise UN Security 
Council decisions. Although the Court cautiously prefe red the term ‘indirect review’ 
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it nevertheless directly judged their lawfulness.182 Its questioning of whether a UN 
Security Council resolution is compatible with jus cogens is far more aggressive than 
the review of the contested Community instrument in light of European fundamental 
rights which the Court tried to avoid.183 
 
With its decision, the Court of First Instance sent a strong signal to the international 
community. By judging the UN Security Council, it could encourage other courts, 
national or regional ones, to scrutinise UN Security Council decisions legally in light 
of their own human rights standards. By doing so, they would not only reduce the 
effectiveness of UN Security Council sanction decision  but they would also 
undermine the authority of the UN Security Council to maintain and restore 
international peace and security. If the central role of the UN Security Council and its 
decisions, which are supposed to represent the collctive will of the international 
community, are questioned, the system of vertical centralised law enforcement of the 
United Nations will be challenged to its core.  
 
A UN Security Council that is viewed as a violator of human rights instead of their 
promoter cannot transfer the legitimacy that is inherent in the idea of the United 
Nations with its resolutions. After all, its resolutions are designed to put shared 
values into concrete forms on a case by case basis. If decisions by the UN Security 
Council are perceived to be illegitimate, a vicious circle will start. The Security 
Council will not find capable and willing actors toimplement its decisions. If its 
actions are deemed to be ineffective, it cannot fulfil its mandate to maintain and 
restore international peace and security, which in tur  will weaken its credibility 
even further. Encouraged by this trend, increasingly more actors will challenge the 
authority of the UN Security Council to act on their behalf and the unity of the 
international system will be in serious danger.184 
 
                                                
182 R A Wessel, ‘Editorial: The UN, the EU and Jus Cogens’ (2006) 3 International Organizations 
Law Review 3; Eeckhout (n 176) 116. 
183 C Eckes, ‘Judicial Review of European Anti-Terrorism Measures – The Yusuf and Kadi Judgments 
of the Court of First Instance’ (2008) 14 European L w Journal 88. 
184 Wessel (n 182) 6. 
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In contrast to the Court of First Instance, the European Court of Justice185 stressed 
that it would not review decisions by the UN Security Council, but merely the 
legislative acts adopted within its own legal order in the light of its own standards of 
human rights, according to its mandate as the guardian of EU law. Nevertheless, by 
doing so, the Court also could not avoid signalling to others that the UN Security 
Council resolution that has been implemented in the Community legal order might be 
in line with an international human rights standard – which is not going to be 
assessed by the European Court – but that this regulation nevertheless does not 
satisfy a European standard of fundamental rights protection.  From a European 
perspective that highlights the autonomy of the European legal order, this finding 
appears to be acceptable. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of decisions of the UN Security 
Council is questioned. This might encourage the EU even more to develop its own 
legitimacy as an international military actor, based on its own values, including 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law as already indicated in its European 
Security Strategy. This could also lead the EU to act outside the framework of the 
United Nations when it launches and conducts military crisis management 
operations, for example by referring to the concept of the responsibility to protect.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to set out the interna ional legal framework for the 
use of force that has been primarily developed with states as international actors in 
mind. The system of the United Nations is centred on the general prohibition of the 
use of force which has acquired the status of customary law over time. As such it is 
also binding on the European Union as an internatiol legal person that is engaged 
in military crisis management operations. Therefore, th  European Union needs to 
justify military sanctions on one of the accepted exceptions to the principle of non-
intervention. Accepted exceptions include the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council to use force. Although the European Union seems to be open-minded 
towards the concept of the responsibility to protect, it is not clear whether it should 
embark on unilateral action. 
 
                                                
185 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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It has been argued that UN Security Council resolutions of a military nature provide 
an entitlement to use force. At the same time and similarly to economic UN Security 
Council sanctions, military resolutions also create legal obligations. Although UN 
member states are not obliged to send their troops, they are under a positive duty to 
provide assistance and cooperation and they are undr the negative duty not to 
undermine the success of military operations. This negative obligation results from a 
loyalty obligation that is inherent in the vertical centralised system of law 
enforcement of the United Nations. The negative obligation to abstain from anything 
that might undermine the effectiveness of the use of force authorised by the Security 
Council means that UN member states can be asked to bec me active and, for 
example, to introduce travel bans. But the Security Council can also ask member 
states to stop doing something, for example, to abstain from selling weapons and 
other military equipment to the target. Usually economic sanction regimes are in 
place before the UN Security Council resorts to the us  of force, but this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. UN Security Council resolutions lose these 
characteristics and stop being binding if they violate the core of human rights and the 
core of humanitarian law. Whether or not the European Union is bound by existing 
UN Security Council resolutions of a military nature in the same way as UN member 
states will be the topic of chapter six.  
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Chapter 5: The European Union and economic sanction s 
 
Introduction 
Although it is an emerging international military actor, the European Union has a 
rather long tradition of imposing economic sanctions by implementing either UN or 
autonomous sanction regimes. Like the use of force, economic sanctions are 
incorporated into the EU’s comprehensive concept of crisis management and they 
pose similar questions regarding the member states’ remaining competences in this 
highly sensitive foreign policy field. The purpose of the present chapter is to examine 
the legal questions that surround the use of economic sanctions within the European 
legal order. This will allow for the comparative method that will be used in chapter 
six. This subsequent chapter will argue that the analysis of the legal relationship 
between the EU and UN Security Council resolutions about economic sanctions can 
help with understanding the relationship between the EU and the UN Security 
Council with regards to the use of force due to the similarities they share.  
 
The first part of this chapter will outline both the European legal framework for 
adopting economic sanctions and the autonomous and no -autonomous sanction 
practice of the European Union. The following part will then assess the gradual 
developments that led to a European competence for the adoption and imposition of 
economic sanctions. This will serve as an example for European integration in the 
external policy sphere. Part three will look at theongoing debate about the nature of 
the European competence for the imposition of economic sanctions. This debate 
demonstrates the fear of European member states that they might lose their 
sovereignty in foreign affairs in favour of European integration.  
 
Part 1 
European economic sanctions – practice and legal fr amework 
The European Union has a long tradition of using sanctions or restrictive measures, a 
terminology it prefers, as a foreign policy tool.1 European sanctions can be grouped 
                                                
1 J Kreutz, ‘Hard Measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union 1981 – 2004’ 
(2005) Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) paper 45 
<http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications/papers/paper45/paper45.pdf> 5. 
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into the eight types of measures that include ‘arms embargoes, trade sanctions, 
financial sanctions, flight bans, restriction of admission, diplomatic sanctions, 
boycotts of sport and cultural events as well as the suspension of co-operation with a 
third country’.2  Economic sanctions represent a sub-category of restrictive measures 
that includes trade sanctions, financial sanctions, flight bans as well as the 
suspension of financial help.  
 
In the following only those economic sanctions that are adopted on the basis of 
Article 215 LTFEU, after a decision within the common foreign and security policy 
has been obtained, will be discussed.  These measures concern trade sanctions, 
financial sanctions, and flight bans. The European Union has so far made use of 
Article 215 LTFEU to impose embargoes on certain goods, to ban provision of 
certain services and certain investments, to restrict funds to and from the targeted 
country, to restrict the establishment of branches and subsidies of and cooperation 
with banks of the target country, to restrict issuance of and trade in certain bonds, to 
freeze funds and economic resources, and to restrict access to EU airports for certain 
cargo flights.3 
 
Arms embargoes and restriction of admission will not be addressed in the following 
analysis. Although they are adopted on the basis of decisions within the common 
foreign and security policy, arms embargoes are imple ented by the member states 
on the basis of Article 346 (1)(b) LTFEU and not by the Union itself based on 
Article 215 LTFEU.4 Article 346 LTFEU allows member states to ‘take such 
measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its 
security which are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and 
war material’. 
 
                                                
2 Kreutz (n 1) 5, 6. 
3 See for example Council Regulation (EU) No 961/2010  
on restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 [2010] OJ L 281/1. 
An updated list on EU sanctions in force by the European Commission can be found at 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf> 
4 E Paasivirta and A Rosas, ‘Sanctions, Countermeasur s and Related Actions in the External 
Relations of the EU: A Search for Legal Frameworks’ in E Canizzaro (ed), The European Union as an 
Actor in International Relations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 217. 
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Restrictions of admission, including travel and visa bans are also implemented at 
member state level but for practical reasons. Although member states jointly decide 
about the refusal to grant individuals access to their territory, the decision is 
implemented by the respective national immigration authorities.5 
 
The next section will briefly introduce the EU’s autonomous and non-autonomous 
sanction practices. This will be followed by a description of the European legal and 
political framework for their adoption. Special emphasis will be put on the legal 
procedure for the adoption of economic sanctions and the legal effects they produce 
as well as on the policy framework in which they are adopted. Finally, the 
constitutional limits for the adoption of economic sanctions will be discussed, paying 
special attention to the European courts’ case law. 
 
1. Autonomous and non-autonomous European economic sanctions  
When imposing economic sanctions against third state  or entities, the European 
Union adopts eitherautonomous or non-autonomous sanctions. The latter category 
refers to European economic sanctions that are adopte  in implementation of a 
multilateral sanction regime set up by the UN Security Council through UN Security 
Council resolutions.6 Economic UN sanction resolutions are binding on the EU 
member states as signatories of the UN Charter. Whether UN Security Council 
resolutions are also binding on the European Union will be discussed in chapter six 
below. 
 
Autonomous sanctions adopted by the European Union represent unilateral sanctions 
in the sense that the EU as an international organisation with international legal 
personality bases its sanction decision solely on its Treaties and the constitutional 
foundations incorporated therein.  
 
                                                
5 Kreutz  (n 1) 6, 7. 
6 When adopting economic sanction resolutions, the UN Security Council has to follow a two-step 
procedure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. First, t has to decide whether there is a threat to the 
peace, breach or act of aggression within the meaning of Article 39 UN Charter in order to be 
empowered in a second step to decide which measure should be employed not involving the use of 
armed force within the meaning of Article 41 UN Charter.   
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1.1. Non-autonomous sanctions 
The implementation of economic UN Security Council sanction resolutions by the 
European Union can be seen as one of its contributions to effective multilateralism. 
According to the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)7 
the EU is  
 
committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way to 
maintain and to restore international peace and security in accordance 
with the principles of the UN Charter and of our common foreign and 
security policy. In this context, the Council will work continuously to 
support the UN and to fulfil our obligations under the UN Charter. 
 
 
The EU seeks to intensify its efforts with the UN to coordinate its action on sanctions 
and to ‘ensure full, effective and timely implementation by the European Union of 
measures agreed by the UN Security Council’.8 
 
When implementing UN sanction resolutions, the European Union assists the UN 
Security Council in fulfilling its primary responsibilities – the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security. By doing so, the Union also makes 
the values on which UN sanction decisions are based it  own. The practice of the UN 
Security Council reveals that its economic sanctions are intended to promote and to 
protect human rights and that sanctions are directed primarily against gross human 
rights violations.9 When the EU implements UN sanction regimes it thereby draws 
from the perceived legitimacy of UN Security Council decisions as outlined in 
chapter four above.  
 
1.2. Autonomous European economic sanctions 
Apart from implementing UN sanction regimes, the EU has also established an 
autonomous sanctions practice over time. Although this is debated, the EU is entitled 
under public international law to adopt and implement unilateral economic 
                                                
7 Council of the European Union, ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’ 
Brussels, 7 June 2004, Annex 1, 10198/1/04 REV 1, para 1[hereinafter Basic Principles on the Use of 
Restrictive Measures]. 
8 Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (n 7) para 2. 
9 B-S Baek, ‘Economic Sanctions against Human Rights Violations’ (2008) Cornell Law School Inter-
University Graduate Student Conference Papers <http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lps_clacp/11> 42. 
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sanctions.10 The UN Security Council does not have a monopoly on adopting 
economic coercive measures. The prohibition of the use of force according to Article 
2(4) UN Charter does not entail the use of economic coercive measures.11 At the San 
Francisco Conference in 1945, Brazil’s proposal to insert ‘economic coercion’ into 
this paragraph was rejected.12  However, only a few international actors are 
politically and economically strong enough to use this liberty and to impose 
economic sanctions against other actors.13  The European Union and the United 
States are among them.14 The following section will refer to European economic 
sanctions in general and will only distinguish betwen autonomous and non-
autonomous sanctions if necessary. 
 
2. European framework for the adoption of economic sanctions – legal 
and policy considerations 
The next section will outline the legal framework and the policy considerations that 
guide the EU’s economic sanction practice. It will be argued that the EU faces 
constitutional limits when it decides to adopt restictive measures. These are created 
by its own standard of fundamental rights as indicated by decisions of the European 




                                                
10 For a detailed analysis, see K Osteneck, Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die 
Europäische Gemeinschaft: Völker- und europarechtlie Rahmenbedingungen für ein Tätigwerden 
der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Bereich von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionsregimen unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Umsetzungspraxis der EG-Organe, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches 
öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht 
Band 168 (Springer Verlag, Berlin; Heidelberg; New York 2004) chapter 2. 
11 T Weiss, and others, The United Nations and Changing World Politics (5th edn Westview Press, 
Boulder, Colorado 2007) 12. 
12 P J Kuijper, ‘Community Sanctions against Argentina: Lawfulness under Community and 
International Law’ in D O`Keeffe and H G Schermers (eds), Essays in European Law and Integration, 
to Mark the Silver Jubilee of the Europa Institute, L iden 1957-1982 (Kluwer-Deventer, Antwerp 
1982) 152, footnote 38.  
13 Baek  (n 9) 24. 
14 Baek (n 9) 61. 
15 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications and others, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953 [hereinafter Bosphorus]. 
16 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649 [hereinafter Kadi]. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351 [hereinafter Kadi (Grand Chamber)]. 
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2.1. European Economic sanctions – legal framework  
Within the European legal order, economic sanctions are adopted by decisions made 
within the framework of the common foreign and security policy and a related 
legislative measure based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
This two-step procedure visualises the underlying tension behind economic 
sanctions, combining trade measures with foreign policy considerations. In the 
context of the European Union they therefore link the common foreign and security 
policy that is still subject to specific rules and procedure despite the de-pillarisation 
of the European Union through the Treaty of Lisbon t  the the Union’s remaining 
policy sectors.17  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon amended the legal basis for the imposition of economic 
sanctions that was first introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht.18 Article 215 LTFEU 
now reads as follows.  
 
1. Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, 
in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or 
more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a 
joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the 
necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof. 
 
2. Where a decision adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of 
the Treaty on European Union so provides, the Council may adopt 
restrictive measures under the procedure referred to in paragraph 1 
against natural or legal persons or groups or non-State entities. 
 
3. The acts referred to in this Article shall include necessary provisions 
on legal safeguards. 
 
 
According to this two-step procedure, the member state  in the Council adopt a 
decision under Title V, ‘General Provision on the Union’s External Action and 
Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy’. This CFSP 
                                                
17 Article 24(1) LTEU. 
18 Article 228 a EC (Maastricht version) was renumbered as Article 301 EC with the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
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decision usually takes the form of a unanimously adopted19 Council Decision based 
on Article 29 LTEU, an instrument that was formerly known as a common position.20   
 
The details about how this political decision that creates legally binding effects 
should be implemented are determined in a second step by the Council which acts by 
a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission.21 The instrument of an 
EU regulation is usually chosen. Past practice reveals that both steps in the procedure 
for the adoption of economic sanctions are not always carried out in the order 
anticipated by the Treaty regime. The Commission has issued proposals for a 
Council regulation directly after economic UN Security Council resolutions have 
been adopted but before a legal decision could have been passed in the common 
foreign and security policy framework.22 This approach has sometimes been chosen 
to allow the Council to adopt the CFSP instrument and the regulation at the same 
time but has always been carried out under the conditi  that the Commission has 
received sufficient information on the draft UN Security Council resolution before it 
                                                
19 Article 31 LTFEU. 
20 To provide an example of non-autonomous European sanctions targeted against individuals, 
Council Regulation (EU) No 667/2010 concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Eritrea 
[2010] OJ L 195/15, based on Article 215 (1) and (2) LTFEU is implementing Council Decision  
2010/127/CFSP of 1 March 2010 concerning restrictive measures against Eritrea based on Article 29 
LTEU, which in turn is implementing UN Security Council resolutions setting up amongst other 
things targeted restrictive measures against individuals and entities as well as an arms embargo. The 
Council Decision asks for the freezing of funds andeconomic resources owned or controlled directly 
or indirectly by persons or entities included in the annex to the Council decision, which is not 
published in the Official Journal. The Regulation is much more detailed with regards to the freezing of 
funds and the information that should be included in the annex listing persons, entities and bodies 
provided by the Security Council or the UN Sanctions Committee. This information should contain 
for example the grounds for listing and, where avail ble, the necessary information to identify the 
targets concerned. Furthermore, the Regulation is addressing the difficult human rights implications of 
targeted sanctions against individuals and asks the Regulation to be applied in accordance with human 
rights standards, and why there is a need to implement UN Security Council sanction resolutions 
within the EU legal order. It also briefly focuses on the obligation of its member states whose 
obligations under the UN Charter should be respected while implementing the Regulation that is 
binding on them from the perspective of European law.
21 The European Parliament needs to be informed. 
22 Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive 
Measures (sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Comm n Foreign and Security Policy’, Brussels, 2 
December 2005, 15114/05, para 36 [hereinafter Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of 
Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the EU Comm n Foreign and Security Policy]. 
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is adopted to allow scrutiny of the terms and conditions under which it should be 
implemented by the Council regulation and the respectiv  CFSP instrument.23  
 
Economic sanctions are binding on the EU member states. Both the Council Decision 
adopted within the framework of the common foreign and security policy setting out 
the general sanction theme and the Council Regulation based on Article 215 LTFEU 
entailing the details are binding on the member state . The binding nature of Council 
decisions based on Article 29 LTEU was discussed in chapter three above.   
 
The Council regulation implementing the CFSP decision does not refer to Article 
288 LTFEU, the general legal basis for Union regulations, but provides that ‘[t]his 
Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States.’24 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon introduced some procedural andsubstantive changes in the 
context of economic sanctions. It significantly altered the involvement of the 
institutions in comparison with the former Nice Treaty version.25 The new 
involvement of the European Parliament,26 although rather weak, can be seen as an 
attempt to confer greater legitimacy on EU sanctions regulations. The Commission 
lost its monopoly of initiative and now shares it wh the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Since the High Representative not 
only presides over the Foreign Affairs Council27 but is also one of the Vice-
Presidents of the Commission,28 the institutional balance appears to have drifted in 
favour of the intergovernmental institutions. 
                                                
23 Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (n 22) para 36. 
24 See for example Council Regulation (EU) No 667/2010 concerning certain restrictive measures in 
respect of Eritrea [2010] OJ L 195/15. 
25 Article 301 EC (Nice version) reads as follows: ‘Where it is provided, in a common position or in a 
joint action adopted according to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union relating to the 
common foreign and security policy, for an action by the Community to interrupt or to reduce, in part 
or completely, economic relations with one or more third countries, the Council shall take the 
necessary urgent measures. The Council shall act by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission.’ 
26 The European Parliament shall be informed, Article 215(1) LTFEU. 
27 Article 27 TEU. 
28 Article 17(4) TEU. 
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The insertion of an explicit legal basis for the adoption of targeted sanctions against 
individuals with which the European Union addresses new developments in 
international sanction practice is one of the most prominent substantive changes. 
Article 215(2) LTFEU thereby solves the dispute as to whether the European Union 
has always been competent to adopt restrictive measur s targeted against 
individuals.29  
 
Another novelty introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is the fact that economic and 
financial sanctions are now covered by the same provision - Article 215 LTFEU. 
Financial sanctions were previously subject to a separate legal basis as part of capital 
movement. Former Article 60 EC largely referred to the procedural requirements for 
the imposition of economic sanctions under former Article 301 EC. The change may 
not seem to have importance at first. However, the Lisbon Treaty also introduced a 
new provision for the freezing of funds, financial assets or economic gains belonging 
to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups or non-State entities related 
to the fight against terrorism whose procedural andinstitutional requirements differ 
profoundly from Article 215 LTFEU. Article 75 LTFEU does not ask for a prior 
                                                
29 The competence of the European Union to implement targeted UN Security Council sanctions 
against individuals into the Community legal order was one of several problems discussed in Kadi. In 
Kadi, the Community regulation freezing the applicant’s funds and financial assets had been based on 
Article 301 EC, Article 60 EC, as well as on Article 301EC, 60EC in conjunction with Article 308 EC 
respectively. The Court of First Instance held thatArticles 60 and 301 EC on their own, as well as 
Article 308 EC independently would not constitute a sufficient legal basis for the adoption of a 
Community regulation imposing financial sanctions against individuals in the fight against 
international terrorism, when no link to a state could be established. However, the CFI held that the 
combined effect of Articles 301 EC, 60 EC and 308 EC would entitle the Community to adopt the 
contested regulation. See Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] 
ECR II-3649 paras 97-98, 135.  
The European Court of Justice held that Articles 301 EC and 60 EC would not provide for any express 
or implied power to impose sanctions against individuals not linked to the governing regime of a third 
country. However, Article 308 EC could additionally be use to fill this void. Article 308 EC could 
only be used if the action envisaged is designed to attain a Community objective but not a CFSP 
objective. The Court held that the conditions of the combined legal basis would have been met. See 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351 paras 198-201, 216, 235-236. 
Advocate General Maduro on the contrary argued that Articles 301 EC and 60 EC would constitute a 
sufficient legal basis for the adoption of targeted sanctions against individuals as the only requirement 
that would have to be fulfilled under these provision  would be the interruption or reduction of 
economic relations with third countries. Hence, they would not be restricted to the interruption or 
reduction of economic relations with governing regimes. See Opinion of Advocate General Maduro in 
Case C-402/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351 para 12. 
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decision within the common foreign and security policy and does not involve a role 
for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
According to Article 75 LTFEU,  
 
[w]here necessary to achieve the objectives set out in Article 67, as 
regards preventing and combating terrorism and related ctivities, the 
European Parliament and the Council, acting by means of regulations in 
accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall define a 
framework for administrative measures with regard to capital movements 
and payments, such as the freezing of funds, financal assets or economic 
gains belonging to, or owned or held by, natural or legal persons, groups 
or non-State entities.  
 
The Council, on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt measures 
to implement the framework referred to in the first paragraph.   
 
The acts referred to in this Article shall include n cessary provisions on 
legal safeguards. 
 
In consequence, it seems difficult to decide on which legal basis the freezing of 
funds can be adopted. On the one hand, Article 75 LTFEU, as part of Title V, ‘Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice’, explicitly refers to the fight against international 
terrorism and could be viewed as a lex specialis provision in relation to Article 215 
LTFEU. On the other hand, the main reason behind the inclusion of Article 215(2) 
LTFEU was to create an explicit legal basis for targeted sanctions against individuals 
who cannot be linked to a state. The freezing of funds and assets held by natural or 
legal persons, groups or non-State entities has so far been used predominantly 
against persons and entities suspected of supporting terrorism. If all of these cases 
are covered by Article 75 LTEU instead, Article 215(2) LTFEU would be deprived 
of its practical significance. One way of resolving the uncertain boundary between 
Article 215 LTFEU and Article 75 LTFEU would be to use the former for sanctions 
against individuals involved in external activities that take place outside the territory 
of the European Union whereas the latter could be used to sanction internal terrorist 
activities.30 
 
                                                
30 M Cremona, ‘EC Competence, ‘Smart Sanctions’, and the Kadi Case’ (2009) 28 Yearbook of 
European Law 591. 
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2.2. EU policy framework for the effective use of e conomic sanctions 
In addition to these legally binding norms, the European Union has started to develop 
a policy framework based on its extensive experience i  the design, implementation, 
enforcement, and monitoring of economic sanctions t improve their effectiveness.31  
In reaction to the before mentioned Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures (Sanctions) as requested by the Council to be developed by the Secretary 
General/ High Representative in association with the Commission and had been 
prepared by the Political and Security Committee in June 2004,32 the 
Relex/Sanctions formation of the Council of the European Union adopted EU Best 
Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures in 2005.33  
 
The Best Practices are to be considered non-exhaustive recommendations 
of a general nature for effective implementation of restrictive measures in 
accordance with applicable Community/Union law and ational 
legislation. They are not legally binding and should not be read as 
recommending any action which would be incompatible with applicable 
Community/Union or national law, including those con erning data 
protection.34 
 
The EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures 
include provisions on targeted sanctions and the claim of mistaken identity in 
relation to autonomous and non-autonomous EU measurs. They elaborate on the 
‘freezing of funds’ and the ‘freezing of economic resources’; and they provide for 




                                                
31 Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive 
Measures (sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Comm n Foreign and Security Policy’, Brussels, 3 
December 2003, 15579/03 [hereinafter Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive 
Measures (sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Comm n Foreign and Security Policy of 2003]. 
32 Council of the European Union, ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’ 
Brussels, 7 June 2004, Annex 1, 10198/1/04 REV 1 [hereinafter Basic Principles on the Use of 
Restrictive Measures]. 
33 Council of the European Union, ‘EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive 
Measures’, Brussels, 29 November 2005, 15115/05 [Hereinafter EU Best Practices for the effective 
implementation of restrictive measures]. 
34 EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures (n 33) para 5. 
35 EU Best Practices for the Effective Implementation of Restrictive Measures (n 33). 
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2.3. Constitutional limits for the imposition of ec onomic sanctions  
The EU Best Practices’ reference to humanitarian exemptions suggests tha the EU is 
not unlimited when adopting economic sanctions. Thefollowing section will take a 
closer look at the constitutional limits for the imposition of economic sanctions. 
Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the 
Framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy36 is a political document 
without any binding legal force that indicates some of the constitutional limits for the 
imposition of autonomous or non-autonomous economic sanctions. These limits 
include the principles of international law, human rights, and the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
These guidelines provide that,  
 
[t]he introduction and implementation of restrictive measures must 
always be in accordance with international law. They must respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular due process and 
the right to an effective remedy. The measures must always be 
proportionate to their objective. 
 
…[T]he restrictive measures should, in particular, be drafted in light of 
the obligation under Article 6 (2) TEU37 for the EU to respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Co vention on 
Human Rights and as they result from the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States, as general principles of Community 
law…. 
 
When deciding on restrictive measures it is important o consider which 
measure or package of measures is most appropriate.38 
 
In the following the limits to the adoption and imposition of economic sanctions 
created for by the EU’s own standard of human rights protection will be examined. 
In the case law of the European Court of Justice, the question about whether there are 
constitutional limits to the imposition of economic sanctions occurred in the context 
of non-autonomous sanctions. The Court had to face the difficult task of assessing 
                                                
36 Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (n 22). 
37 Article 6(3) LTEU. 
38 Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (n 22) paras 9-13. 
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whether it would be competent to review Community instruments that implemented 
UN Security Council resolutions in the light of human rights. It also had to choose 
which human rights standard to apply – a European st dard or an international 
standard.  
 
2.3.1. European human rights as constitutional limi ts for the adoption 
and imposition of economic sanctions 
The core legal limits created by the European legal order on the imposition of 
economic sanctions were addressed by the European courts in Bosphorus39 and more 
recently in Kadi,40 which has been influential for several other cases in the light of 
targeted sanctions against individuals in the fight against international terrorism.41 
 
2.3.1.1. Bosphorus and human rights  
In Bosphorus,42 the ECJ had to interpret Council Regulation No 990/ 3 of 26 April 
1993 concerning trade between the European Economic Community and the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia as part of a preliminary refe nce procedure initiated by the 
Supreme Court of Ireland.  Regulation 990/93 was adopted by the Council to give 
effect to the decision of the Community and the memb r states, meeting within the 
framework of political cooperation to implement in the EEC certain aspects of the 
sanctions imposed by the UN Security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
including Resolution 820 (1993). Bosphorus Airways, a Turkish company, had 
leased two aircraft owned by the Yugoslav national airline JAT. The contract was 
qualified as a ‘dry lease’ and therefore included only the leasing of the aircraft but 
not of the cabin or flight crew since the latter were provided by Bosphorus 
Airways.43 According to Article 8(1) of Regulation No 990/93  
 
[a]ll vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in which a 
majority of controlling interest is held by a person r undertaking in or 
                                                
39 Bosphorus (n 15). 
40 Kadi and Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 16). 
41 See for example, Case T-253/02 Chafiq Ayadi v Council [2006] ECR II-2139 [hereinafter Ayadi]; 
Case T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council [2006] ECR II-4665 
[hereinafter OMPI]. 
42Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications and others, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953 [hereinafter Bosphorus]. 
43 Bosphorus (n 15) para 2. 
 176 
operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) shall be impounded by the competent authorities of the 
Member States. 
 
The Supreme Court of Ireland asked the Court to examine whether this provision 
would have  
 
to be construed as applying to an aircraft which is owned by an 
undertaking the majority or controlling interest in which is held by an 
undertaking in the Federal republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) where such aircraft has been leased …to an undertaking the 
majority or controlling interest in which is not held by a person or 
undertaking in or operating from …the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.44 
 
In the first part of the judgment, the Court had to assess how to interpret a 
Community instrument that is supposed to implement certain aspects of a UN 
Security Council resolution.45 In a second step it was asked to address the claimput 
forward by Bosphorus Airways that the interpretation of Article 8 of Regulation No 
990/93 ‘as meaning that an aircraft whose day-to-day operation and control are 
carried out under a lease by a person or undertaking not based in or operating from 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia must nevertheless be impounded because it 
belongs to an undertaking based in that republic, would infringe Bosphorus’ 
fundamental rights, in particular its right to peacful enjoyment of its property and its 
freedom to pursue a commercial activity’.46 Both rights had been characterised as 
fundamental rights by the ECJ in previous cases.47 
 
The ECJ concluded that the fundamental rights invoked by Bosphorus Airways were 
not absolute. These might lead to restrictions thatwere justified by objectives that 
were of general interest to the Community, such as putting an end to the state of war 
in the region and to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian 
international law.48 The Court spent little time assessing a possible infringement of 
                                                
44 Bosphorus (n 15) para 6. 
45 This question will be discussed in more detail in chapter six. 
46 Bosphorus (n 15) para 19. 
47 P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 445. 
48 Bosphorus (n 15) para 21, 26. 
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fundamental rights through the Council regulation that implemented UN Security 
Council sanctions, and thereby also avoided a clear statement about the relationship 
between EU law and UN Security Council resolutions a d on whether a UN Security 
Council decision could violate a European standard of human rights protection.  
 
Advocate General Jacobs came to the same conclusion a  the Court but put more 
emphasis on the possible infringement of fundamental rights. He did not appear to 
try to avoid this controversial issue.49 He started his assessment of the relationship 
between fundamental rights and sanction regulations by recalling the important role 
played by human rights within the Community legal order. He highlighted that 
 
[i]t is well established that respect for fundamental rights forms part of 
the general principles of Community law, and that in ensuring respect for 
such rights the court takes account of the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and of international agreements, notably he Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms50 [and 
that the] [r]espect for fundamental rights is thus a condition of the 
lawfulness of Community acts – in this case, the Regulation.51 
 
Advocate General Jacobs acknowledged that the embargo measures adopted by the 
UN Security Council that were implemented by the Community restricted Bosphorus 
Airways’ property rights but that these measures were motivated by the public 
interest to stop the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, he also drew 
attention to the need to find a balance between the aim of restoring international 
peace and security and the restriction of human rights and thereby indicated that the 
UN Security Council’s discretion to adopt economic sanctions was indeed limited by 
human rights concerns and that it might be necessary for the European Court of 




                                                
49 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v 
Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications ad others, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953 
[hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus]. 
50 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 49) para 51. 
51 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 49) para 53. 
52 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 49) paras 63-65. 
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He held that, 
 
[t]he international community took the view that, in order to stop that 
war, it was necessary to put pressure on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) because of the role played by that 
Republic in the Bosnian conflict. Accordingly, the Security Council 
decided to adopt, and subsequently strengthen, economic sanctions, 
which were implemented by the Community.53  
 
That does not of course mean that in such circumstances any type of 
interference with the right to property should be tolerated. If it were 
demonstrated that such interference was wholly unreasonable in the light 
of the aims which the competent authorities sought to achieve, then it 
would be necessary for this Court to intervene. In that regard it may be 
necessary to consider whether, in the light of any information which may 
have subsequently come to light and after further consideration of the 
circumstances, the competent authorities were justified n maintaining a 
measure taken as a matter of urgency.54 
 
Bosphorus demonstrated that there is the possibility of a clear egal conflict between 
Community law and UN law needs to be addressed. The Court could have evaluated 
the UN resolution that was implemented in the Community legal order on the basis 
of two different standards. It could have chosen the standard of protection of human 
rights in the international law sphere or the respectiv  standard in the Community 
law sphere.55 That the respective standards differ can be highlighted by the reference 
to the right of property.56 It has been argued that Article 1 of the first Protoc l to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms is much broader than Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, as the sanctity of property is not stated in the 1966 Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.57  Although the Court could avoid answering questions about the 
relationship between the European legal order and the international legal order in the 
1990s, mainly due to the nature of the preliminary rulings procedure that focuses 
only on the interpretation of the regulation concered, both the Court’s and Advocate 
                                                
53 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 49) para 64. 
54 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 49) para 65. 
55 I Canor, ‘‘Can Two Walk Together, Except They Be Agreed?’ The Relationship between 
International Law and European Law: The Incorporatin of United Nations Sanctions against 
Yugoslavia into European Community Law through the Perspective of the European Court of Justice’ 
(1998) 35 Common Market Law Review, 161, footnote 84. 
56 Canor (n 55) 161, footnote 84. 
57 Canor (n 55) 161, footnote 84. 
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General Jacobs’ assessments indicate that the claimed violations of human rights 
concern the validity of the Community sanctions regulation.58 The European courts 
had to face these problems in more concrete terms in 2001 when Mr Kadi challenged 
the lawfulness of a Community regulation that implemented UN targeted sanctions 
against individuals.  
 
2.3.1.2. Kadi and European fundamental rights 
The facts of the Kadi case were presented in chapter one above and it will be 
sufficient to recall at this point that Mr Kadi was put on a sanction list drawn up by 
the Sanction Committee. The Sanction Committee is a sub-organ of the UN Security 
Council. In consequence of his inclusion on the list, states were asked by a UN 
Security Council resolution to freeze Mr Kadi’s funds and financial resources. The 
European Union implemented the UN Security Council sanction decision in the 
Community legal order through the adoption of a Community regulation. 
Community regulations are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable in all 
the member states.59 Mr Kadi challenged the lawfulness of the Community 
regulation implementing UN Security Council resolutions by alleging three breaches 
of his European fundamental rights, namely the right to a fair hearing, the right to 
respect for property, and the right to effective judicial review. 
 
The Court of First Instance60 refused to review the contested Community instrument 
in the light of European fundamental rights. When Mr Kadi appealed against the 
decision of the Court of First Instance, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Justice emphasised that fundamental rights constituted an integral part of the general 
principles of law and that respect for human rights would be a condition for the 
lawfulness of Community acts.61  The conclusion the Court drew from these 
observations is that  
 
                                                
58 P Eeckhout, ‘EC law and UN Security Council Resoluti ns – In Search of the Right Fit’ in A 
Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice of EU External Relations: Salient Features of a 
Changing Landscape (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 121. 
59 Article 288 LTFEU. 
60 Kadi (n 16). 
61 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 16) paras 283, 284. 
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the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the 
effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, which 
include the principle that all Community acts must respect fundamental 
rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is 
for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaties.62 
 
It held that there was no Treaty provision that could ‘be understood to authorise any 
derogation from the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) EU63 as a foundation of the 
Union’.64  
 
Thus, the ECJ demonstrated that sanctions within the EU legal order must respect the 
EU’s own standard of human rights protection. Put differently, European 
fundamental rights represent constitutional limits for the adoption and 
implementation of sanctions within the European legal order: European economic 
sanctions that violate these standards are unlawful. 
 
Part 2 
The development of a role for the European Union in  the adoption 
and imposition of economic sanctions – an example o f European 
integration in external relations 
The next part will outline the gradual development of a European competence 
for the adoption of economic sanctions as an example of European integration 
in the external policy sphere. This development highlights the reluctance of 
the European member states to give away aspects of their sovereignty in the 
highly sensitive field of foreign policy. At the same time it demonstrates that 
the European Union has acquired over time external competences that states 
had been unwilling to give away at first, in unique ways.65 By now, the 
gradual creation of a European competence for the adoption and imposition 
                                                
62 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 16) para 285. 
63 Article 6 LTEU. 
64 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 16) paras 301-303. 
65 C Timmermanns, ‘Opening Remarks – Evolution of Mixity since the Leiden 1982 Conference’ in C 
Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and its Member States in the 
World (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) 3. 
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of economic sanctions can almost be regarded as settled. I  has been heavily 
influenced by European developments and in particular by some 
groundbreaking judgments of the European Court of Justice, in which the 
Court not only defined the broad scope and exclusive nature of the common 
commercial policy but also extensively interpreted he European Economic 
Community’s competence to conclude international agreements. 
 
The development of a European competence for the adoption of economic sanctions 
can serve as an indicator for the rather new development of the EU as an 
international military actor. The use of force lies ven more at the heart of state 
sovereignty than the use of economic sanctions that combine trade measures with 
foreign policy considerations. However, even within the common foreign and 
security policy as well as within the common security and defence policy, a process 
of European integration is already ongoing as demonstrated in chapter three above. 
The analysis of the instruments of the common security and defence policy in the 
context of military crisis management operations in chapter three showed that the 
member states are already bound by CSDP decisions and th t they are constrained in 
the conduct of their domestic foreign policies. To prepare for the comparative 
method used in chapter six, which argues that the legal relationship between the EU 
and UN Security Council resolutions with regards to economic sanctions can be 
helpful for understanding the relationship between the EU and UN Security Council 
resolutions with regards to military sanctions, the aim of this section is to show how 
EU member states are largely constrained in the unilateral use of economic sanctions 
outside a European framework. Thus, they are similarly constrained in their choice of 
domestic foreign policy tools in the context of economic sanctions as they are within 
the common security and defence policy. 
 
Today, the European Union is competent to adopt autonomous and non-autonomous 
economic sanctions.66 The special nature of economic restrictive measures, which 
combine trade measures with foreign policy considerations, is responsible for their 
special position within the European legal order. Economic sanctions are adopted by 
                                                
66 Article 215 LTFEU.  
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decisions made in the framework of the common foreign and security policy and a 
related legislative measure based on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. This two-step procedure visualises the underlying tension behind economic 
sanctions that link the common foreign and security policy, which is still subject to 
specific rules and procedures despite the de-pillarisation of the European Union 
through the Treaty of Lisbon, with the rest of EU policy sectors.67 The hybrid nature 
of economic sanctions also influenced the gradual creation of a European 
competence for their adoption, which will be develop d in the following section. 
 
1. The Rhodesia doctrine 
At the beginning of European involvement in the adoption and imposition of 
economic sanctions, the European member states referred to Article 224 EEC to 
implement UN Security Council sanctions through the adoption of unilateral national 
measures. Between 1965 and 1979, the UN Security Council adopted a 
comprehensive sanctions regime against Rhodesia. The European Economic 
Community made no efforts to implement the corresponding UN Security Council 
resolutions and inserted the country into a list of states with which trade was 
liberalised.68 However, faced with the tension between their obligations under 
international law to implement economic UN Security Council resolutions on the one 
hand and their obligations towards the European Economic Community on the other 
hand, the member states opted to act outside the EEC and implemented economic 
sanctions against Rhodesia through purely national measures under domestic rules.69 
The legal basis for this practice was claimed to be the third ground of Article 224 
EEC,70 which asked member states to 
 
consult one another for the purpose of enacting in common the necessary 
provisions to prevent the functioning of the Common Market from being 
affected by measures which a Member State may be called upon to take 
in case of serious internal disturbances affecting public order, in case of 
                                                
67 Article 24 (1) LTEU. 
68 D Bethlehem, ‘The European Union’ in V Gowlland-Debbas (ed), National Implementation of 
United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative Study, The Graduate Institute of International Studies 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2004) 128. 
69 P Koutrakos, Trade, Foreign Policy and Defence in EU Constitutional Law: The Legal Regulation 
of Sanctions, Exports of Dual-use Goods and Armaments (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 58. 
70 Renumbered as Article 297 of the EC Treaty. 
 183 
war or of serious international tension constituting a threat of war or in 
order to carry out undertakings into which it has entered for the purpose 
of maintaining peace and international security. 
 
At the time, it was commonly agreed that the ‘accepted obligations’ mentioned in 
Article 224 EEC could be interpreted as referring to the economic or military 
sanction decisions71 of the UN Security Council,72 which were binding on the 
member states.73  The member states argued against any legal role for the European 
Economic Community.74 This practice, which later became known as the ‛Rhodesia 
doctrine’, was accepted not only by the member states but also by the European 
institutions. The Commission and the Council held that sanctions by the UN Security 
Council remained outside the Community legal order.75  
 
2. Sanctions against the Soviet Union, Argentina an d Iraq- the birth of a 
European role in the context of economic sanctions 
During the late 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the inability of the UN 
Security Council to adopt economic sanction resoluti ns in times of international 
crisis slowly forced European member states to rethink their purely national 
approach on economic sanctions under Article 224 EEC. So far, this provision had 
been interpreted as referring to UN Security Council decisions.76  
 
When the Soviet Union declared martial law in Poland, the European Economic 
Community played a role in the context of economic sanctions for the first time. The 
member states reluctantly decided to utilise Article 113 EEC as the legal basis for 
sanctions against the Soviet Union.77 At the time of the implementation of the 
economic sanctions against the Soviet Union based on a Community regulation 
                                                
71 Articles 41 and 42 UN Charter. 
72 S Bohr, ‘Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community’ (1993) 4 
EJIL 265. 
73 Bohr (n 72) 265; Koutrakos (n 69) 59. 
74 Koutrakos (n 69) 58. 
75 Koutrakos (n 69) 59, FN 52; P J Kuijper, ‘Sanctions Against Rhodesia: The EEC and the 
Implementation of General International Legal Rules’ (1975) 12 Common Market Law Review 239. 
76 Although the wording of Article 224 EEC is open enough to allow the inclusion of autonomous 
economic sanctions, without a corresponding UN Security Council resolution. 
77 E Denza, The Intergovernmental Pillars of the European Union (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2002) 42; Koutrakos (n 69) 60. 
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under Article 113 EEC, Council Regulation 596/82,78 the European member states 
appeared to be unable to assess the legal consequenc s of the new pattern.79 In clear 
contrast to the past practice that had excluded the Community from the adoption and 
imposition of sanctions, by emphasising their foreign policy aspects that would 
outweigh their effects on Community trade and the common commercial policy, it 
was suddenly argued that the interests of the Community would demand the 
reduction of imports from the Soviet Union.80 Hence, a highly political decision to 
adopt sanctions could not prevent them from falling within the scope of the European 
Economic Community anymore.81  
 
In the following years, Article 113 EEC continued to be used as the Treaty basis for 
the adoption of economic sanctions and the sanction practice continued to develop 
gradually. Like the sanctions against Argentina before, the comprehensive sanctions 
adopted against Iraq in 1990 on the basis of Article 113 EEC expressly referred to 
the political framework that led to their adoption.82 This time, however, the Council 
regulation based on Article 113 EEC did not refer to political consultations among 
the member states under the auspices of Article 224 EEC but instead made reference 
to decisions taken in the framework of European Politica  Cooperation. Therefore, 
the sanctions against Iraq introduced the two-step procedure behind the adoption of 
economic and financial sanctions, a practice that was codified through the Treaty of 
Maastricht. The Treaty of Maastricht for the first time included a separate legal basis 
for the adoption of economic sanctions outside the provision on the common 






                                                
78 Council Regulation (EEC) No 596/82 amending the import arrangements for certain products 
originating in the USSR [1982] OJ L 72/15. 
79 Koutrakos (n 69) 60. 
80 Koutrakos (n 69) 60. 
81 Koutrakos (n 69) 60. 
82 Koutrakos (n 69) 61. 
83 Article 301 EC. 
 185 
Part 3 
The nature of the EU’s competence to adopt economic  sanctions - an 
ongoing debate  
One problem the Treaty of Lisbon failed to solve is the nature of the EU’s 
competence to impose sanctions.84 Article 215 LTFEU is not mentioned in the 
competence catalogue of the European Union to be of ither exclusive or shared 
competence or as forming part of a policy in which the member states have to 
coordinate their national policies with Union policies.85 In Kadi, the Court of First 
Instance avoided answering this question by stating that  
 
Article 228a of the EC Treaty (now Article 301)86 was added to the 
Treaty by the Treaty on European Union in order to pr vide a specific 
basis for economic sanctions that the Community, which as exclusive 
competence in the sphere of the common commercial policy, may need 
to impose in respect of third countries for political reasons defined by its 
Member States in connection with the CFSP, most comm nly pursuant to 
a resolution of the Security Council requiring the adoption of such 
sanctions.87 
 
Therefore, the nature of the EU’s competence to adopt economic sanctions and, 
depending on this assessment, the remaining powers of the member states to use this 
foreign policy tool unilaterally is still open. The answer to the question whether or 
not the European member states are constrained in the conduct of their domestic 
foreign policies in the field of economic sanctions is of importance for the 
comparative method used in chapter six. 
 
The next section will offer an overview of the development of the legal debate 
surrounding the nature of the EU’s competence to adopt economic sanctions, which 
is still ongoing. This will be followed by an analysis of the remaining competence of 
EU member states to adopt economic sanctions unilatera ly outside the framework of 
Article 215 LTFEU - either collectively or individually.  
                                                
84 In favour of an exclusive Union competence:  K Lena rts and E De Smitjer, ‘The United Nations 
and the European Union: Living Apart Together’ in K Wellens (ed), International Law: Theory And 
Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1998) 449.  
85 Articles 2 – 6 TFEU. 
86 Today’s Article 215 LTFEU. 
87 Kadi (n 16) para 202. 
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1. EU competence for the adoption of economic sanct ions 
Before the inclusion of an explicit legal basis for the adoption of economic sanctions 
in the Treaty of Maastricht, economic sanctions were adopted by the European 
Economic Community on the basis of Article 113 EEC which formed part of the 
provisions on the common commercial policy. The practice of placing economic 
sanctions within the common commercial policy entailed serious questions about the 
member states’ remaining competence for the adoption of unilateral economic 
measures.88 The European Court of Justice had developed throug its case law that 
the competence of the European Community regarding matters of common 
commercial policy was exclusive in nature and that ‘the exercise of concurrent 
powers by the Member States and the Community in this matter is impossible’.89 
This conclusion was difficult to accept from a member state’s perspective.  
Economic sanctions represent traditional foreign policy instruments that are at the 
heart of state sovereignty.  If they would form part of the common commercial 
policy, member states would have lost their competence to impose restrictive 
measures to the Community. On this background, it has been argued by some that the 
practice of the adoption of European economic sanctio s based on a provision of the 
common commercial policy does not mean that economic sanctions form part of the 
common commercial policy in substance.90  
 
The difficulty in answering the question about whether economic sanctions could be 
regarded as forming part of the common commercial policy was not so much the 
effects they produce on international trade but rather whether it matters that they are 
driven forward by foreign and security considerations and not by actual trade 
concerns. Hence, it has been argued that economic san tions, if covered by the 
common commercial policy at all, could only be found at the outer limits of this 
                                                
88 In 1994, after imposing unilateral measures against the Republic of Macedonia prohibiting trade, 
based on old Article 224 EC, Greece still argued that e sanctions imposed on Southern Rhodesia, 
South Africa and Argentina would indicate that membr states would be the competent actors with 
regards to sanctions as opposed to the Community. See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Case C-
120/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-1513  para 20. 
89 Opinion 1/75 [1975] ECR 1359. 
90 Koutrakos (n 69) 66. 
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policy area.91 The case law of the European Court of Justice neverthel ss has since 
confirmed the wide interpretation of the common commercial policy including 
measures motivated by foreign policy considerations.92 In respect of dual use goods 
the ECJ had to decide in Werner93 ‘whether the common commercial policy solely 
concerns measures which pursue commercial objectives, or whether it also covers 
commercial measures having foreign policy and security objectives’.94 Germany had 
declined to issue a licence to export dual use goods t  Libya.95 In line with its 
reasoning in Opinion 1/78,96 the Court opted for a wide interpretation of the scope of 
the common commercial policy and argued that not only the specific subject matter 
of the common commercial policy in respect of trade with third countries but also the 
concept of the common commercial policy as established by the Treaty itself and in 
particular by 113 EEC, 
 
requires that a Member State should not be able to r strict its scope by 
freely deciding, in the light of its own foreign policy or security 
requirements, whether a measure is covered by Article 113.97  
 
Thus, a measure whose effect is to prevent or restrict the export of certain products 
cannot be treated as falling outside the scope of the common commercial policy 
solely because it is motivated by foreign policy and security objectives. In 
consequence, economic sanctions should have been considered to form part of the 
common commercial policy. 
 
Even after Werner, some commentators still challenged whether the Community was 
in fact competent to adopt restrictive economic measures or whether its lack of 
competence would have been made visual through the established two-step 
procedure in practice. According to them, the missing Community competence to 
                                                
91 Osteneck (n 10) 140, 142, 143. 
92 Osteneck (n 10) 143, 144. 
93 Case C-70/94 Fritz Werner Industrie-Ausrüstungen GmbH v Federal Republic of Germany [1995] 
ECR I-3189 [hereinafter Werner]. 
94 Werner (n 93) para. 7. 
95 Dual use goods are goods that are capable of beingused for military purposes. 
96 Opinion 1 /78 [1979] ECR 2894. 
97 Werner (n 93) para 11. 
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adopt economic sanctions had to be substituted by a prior decision of the member 
states within the framework of European Political Cooperation.98  
 
Today, economic sanctions are still based on decisions made within the framework 
of the common foreign and security policy and legal decisions adopted under the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Therefore, the problems 
surrounding the nature of the EU’s competence with regards to economic sanctions 
are ongoing. It may also not be appropriate to approach the EU’s competence 
regarding economic sanctions in classical terms of hared or exclusive competence. 
Economic sanctions have a hybrid nature - they combine trade with foreign policy 
considerations. They also hold a special position within the European legal order 
since they build bridges between the common foreign and security policy and the rest 
of the Union policy sectors.  It seems strange to talk of an exclusive European 
competence that is triggered by a prior decision within the CFSP since the common 
foreign and security policy is characterised by a different institutional setting. It also 
seems strange to assume an exclusive competence that still llows for unilateral 
national measures by the European member states basd on Article 347 LTFEU - 
albeit in very limited circumstances. 
 
To discover the remaining competence of the member states for the adoption of 
economic sanctions, it is therefore more useful to consider when member states can 
actually have recourse to Article 347 LTFEU, former Article 224 EEC, to adopt 
unilateral sanctions either collectively or individually. 
 
Article 347 LTFEU and Article 348 LTFEU particularly 
 
recognise that the autonomy left to Member States in the field of foreign 
policy is in stark contrast to the integration achieved in the field of 
economic and commercial policy. Those articles attempt to define the 
outer limits of the autonomy left to Member States in the field of foreign 
policy, bearing in mind that that autonomy may affect the functioning of 
the common market (Article 347 LTFEU)99 and may distort the 
                                                
98 For a detailed discussion see Osteneck (n 10) 149, 150. 
99 Treaty provision updated by the author. 
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conditions of competition in the common market (Article 348 
LTFEU)100. 
 
2. What is left for the member states in the sphere  of the adoption of 
economic sanctions? – Legal constraints on the memb er states’ foreign 
policy choices and Article 347 LTFEU  
To examine to what extent European member states are constrained in the adoption 
of economic sanctions through the European Union, the next sub-section will 
examine the nature of Article 347 LTFEU. This will be followed by an analysis of 
when member states can rightfully justify domestic sanctions collectively or 
individually based on this provision. 
 
2.1. The nature of Article 347 LTFEU 
An examination of Article 347 LTFEU demonstrates the struggles underlying the 
growing EU competence in external relations that goes hand in hand with a loss of 
power of the member states. Depending on the view one takes with respect to 
European integration in the foreign policy sphere, Article 347 LTFEU is interpreted 
narrowly or broadly. The former interpreters perceive this provision as an 
exceptional clause.101 The latter argue for the creation of a domaine reservé102 for the 
member states that allows them to protect their sovereignty and thus their individual 
domestic foreign and security interests.103 
 
The wording of Article 347 LTFEU suggests that it does not fit in with other Treaty 
provisions allowing a member state to deviate from Union law for reasons of public 
security, such as Article 36 LTFEU. 104 It is generally said that these provisions need 
to be interpreted narrowly.105 Article 347 LTFEU allows for derogation from the 
rules of the common market in general whereas Article 36 LTFEU provides for the 
                                                
100 Treaty provision updated by the author. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Case C-120/94 
Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-1513  para 66, referring to Articles 224 and 225 EC, the 
predecessors of Articles 347 and 348 LTFEU. 
101 See for example, Osteneck (n 10) 147. 
102 See for example, Kuijper (n 75) 239. 
103 Osteneck (n 10) 147. 
104 P Koutrakos, ‘Is Article 297 EC A ‘Reserve of Sovereignty?’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law 
Review 1340. 
105 Koutrakos (n 104), 1340. 
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derogation from a singular aspect of the common market.106  Furthermore, Article 
347 LTFEU does not put an emphasis on the ‘measures which a Member State may 
be called upon to take’ but rather on the duty to consult one another.107 Hence, the 
wording of Article 347 LTFEU appears to indicate that it does not create a right for 
the member states to deviate from the Treaty but, rathe , it recognises the existing 
power of the member states to deal with matters of foreign and security policy, as 
sovereign subjects of international law.108 Therefore, Article 347 LTFEU appears to 
be of a different quality than ‘regular’ Treaty excptions, for example Article 36 
LTFEU.   
 
Nonetheless, this preliminary conclusion does not all w the assumption that Article 
347 LTFEU constitutes a domain reservé for the member states. A domaine reservé 
or a reserve of sovereignty allows member states to adopt any measures they regard 
as appropriate in areas related to the core of their sovereignty without any limitations 
and irrespective of the procedures established by the EU Treaties and scrutiny of the 
European Court of Justice.109 However, if this extremely broad interpretation holds 
true, Article 347 LTFEU would be transformed into an all-encompassing clause, able 
to justify any measure not in line with EU law so long as it is linked to politically 
sensitive areas, for example the armed forces.110  
 
The character of Article 347 LTFEU rather has to be found in the middle. The fact 
that Article 347 LTFEU permits derogations from therules of the common market in 
general in three extreme and highly sensitive politica  scenarios, namely in the event 
of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war, or to carry out 
obligations it has accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international 
security, suggests that Article 347 represents a ‘wholly exceptional clause’, a phrase 
used by the European Court of Justice in Johnston111 and Commission v Greece.112 
                                                
106 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece [1996] ECR I-1513 
para 46. 
107 Koutrakos (n 104) 1340. 
108 Koutrakos (n 104) 1340. 
109 Koutrakos  (n 104) 1342. 
110 Koutrakos (n 104) 1343. 
111 Case 222/84 Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 
1651 para 27 [hereinafter Johnston]. 
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The extraordinary substantive nature of Article 347 LTFEU is emphasised by the 
introduction of the extraordinary procedure in Article 348 (2) LTFEU,113  according 
to which  
 
[b]y way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 258 and 
259, the Commission or any Member State may bring the matter directly 
before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member State is 
making improper use of the powers provided for in Articles 346 and 347. 
The Court of Justice shall give its ruling in camera. 
 
Therefore Article 347 LTFEU is of a wholly exceptional nature and the member 
states are limited in invoking this provision.114 Its wording together with its ratio – 
namely the prevention of the disruption of the common market through national 
measures as far as possible suggests, that it represents a safeguard clause in the 
situation of domestic emergencies or war.115 Its function is to limit the member 
states’ obligation under EU law to implement EU acts in a specific case and not to 
provide them with carte blanche.116  
 
2.2. The rightful use of Article 347 LTFEU to justi fy national economic 
sanctions 
The view one takes with regard to the interpretation of Article 347 LTFEU also 
influences the answer to the question to what extent he member states are 
constrained in the conduct of their foreign policy n respect of the adoption and 
implementation of economic sanctions. The next sub-section will explore when the 
member states can make use of Article 347 LTFEU. First, it will be assessed whether 
the member states can use Article 347 as the legal basis for collective sanctions 
                                                                                                                                
112 Case C-120/94 Commission v Hellenic Republic [1994] ECR I-3037 [hereinafter Commission v 
Greece] 
113 Article 348 LTFEU reads as follows: ‘If measures taken in the circumstances referred to in Articles 
346 and 347 have the effect of distorting the conditions of competition in the internal market, the 
Commission shall, together with the State concerned, examine how these measures can be adjusted to 
the rules laid down in the Treaties. 
By way of derogation from the procedure laid down in Articles 258 and 259, the Commission or any 
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another 
Member State is making improper use of the powers provided for in Articles 346 and 347. The Court 
of Justice shall give its ruling in camera.’ 
114 Koutrakos (n 104) 1343. 
115 Kuijper (n 75) 235. 
116 Osteneck (n 10) 147. 
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either after consultations within the common foreign and security policy have taken 
place or if no decision within the CFSP has been reach d. This will be followed by 
an examination of whether this provision can serve as the legal basis for individual 
sanctions by one member state or a group of member states. 
 
2.2.1. Collective member state sanctions based on A rticle 347 LTFEU 
following a consultation within the common foreign and security policy 
According to Article 215 LTFEU, the European Union can adopt economic 
sanctions if the conditions of a two-step procedure are fulfilled, as explained above. 
Hence, a Union instrument is supposed to follow a decision within the common 
foreign and security policy. However, can EU member states adopt economic 
sanctions collectively on the basis of Article 347 LTFEU even if a political decision 
within the CFSP has been reached? 
 
The wording of Article 215 LTFEU suggests that when a CFSP decision has been 
reached, member states should use a Union instrument to implement economic 
sanctions. If the member states could rely on Article 347 LTFEU in this case, Article 
215 LTFEU would be deprived of its practical significance. If the member states 
could make use of Article 347 LTFEU, although a CFSP decision has been adopted, 
they could otherwise control whether they are subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of 
the ECJ in respect of Article 215 LTFEU or if they are subject to the extraordinary 
procedures under Article 348 LTFEU.  The historic development of European 
sanctions outlined above shows that, after the practice of the Rhodesia doctrine was 
abolished, the predecessors of Article 347 LTFEU have not been used as the legal 
foundation for the adoption of economic sanctions. Hence, the usage of Article 347 
LTFEU for collective sanctions once a CFSP decision has been reached would not 
only ignore the lex specialis nature of Article 215 LTFEU but it would also disregard 
the acquis politique against recourse to this provision.117 National member state 
measures based on Article 347 LTFEU would represent an improper use of this 
                                                
117 Koutrakos (n 69) 82. 
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provision within the meaning of Article 348 LTFEU and would amount to a venire 
contra factum proprium.118  
 
2.2.1.1. Change of facts 
There is only one exception to this rule. As already mentioned above, Article 215 
LTFEU explicitly links the competence of the European Union to impose economic 
sanctions to a prior decision within the common foreign and security policy. In 
consequence, only changes in circumstances that were essential for the conclusion of 
the respective CFSP decision could enable member states to adopt national measures 
based on Article 347 LTFEU. It has been suggested that thereby the member states’ 
original competence to impose economic sanctions would revive.119  
 
2.2.1.2. EU institutions do not act 
A related question is whether member states can utilise Article 347 LTFEU if a 
decision within the common foreign and security policy has been reached but the 
Union institution either does not act or adopts measures that do not correspond to the 
adopted CFSP decision.120 If the institutions were bound by a decision within the 
common foreign and security policy in the sense that t ey would have to utilise the 
second step of the two step procedure of Article 215 LTFEU and if they would have 
to adopt economic sanctions, there would be no practical need for the member states 
to resort to national measures under Article 347 LTFEU.  
 
It has been argued that the wording of Article 215 LTFEU indicates an obligation for 
Union institutions to implement the CFSP decision as they ‘shall adopt the necessary 
measures’.121 Some who claim that CFSP decisions cannot bind institutions in the 
context of economic sanctions are of the opinion that a loyalty obligation would ask 
the institutions to respect the decision within theframework of the common foreign 
and security policy. Therefore, the institutions would have to implement a CFSP 
decision either way.122   
                                                
118 Osteneck (n 10) 197. 
119 Osteneck (n 10) 197. 
120 Osteneck (n 10) 198. 
121 Article 215(1) LTFEU. 
122 Bohr (n 72) 268. 
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The European courts also seem to disagree on the matt r. The Court of First Instance 
tends to favour the latter solution, albeit without explicitly referring to a loyalty 
obligation. In OMPI, the Court followed the arguments brought forward by the 
Council, which had argued  
 
that, as the Community institution which adopted Regulation No 
2580/2001 and the decisions implementing that regulation, it did not 
consider itself to be bound by the common positions adopted as part of 
the CFSP by the Council in its capacity as the institution composed of the 
representatives of the Member States, although it did consider it 
appropriate to ensure that its actions were consistent with the CFSP and 
the EC Treaty.123 
 
[T]he Community does not act under powers circumscribed by the will of 
the Union or that of its Member States when, as in the present case, the 
Council adopts economic sanctions measures on the basis of Articles 60 
EC, 301 EC and 308 EC. That point of view is, moreover, the only one 
compatible with the actual wording of Article 301 EC, according to 
which the Council is to decide on the matter ‘by a qu lified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission’, and that of Article 60(1) EC, according 
to which the Council ‘may take’, following the same procedure, the 
urgent measures necessary for an act under the CFSP.124 
 
In Kadi, on the contrary, the European Court of Justice acknowledged that from the 
perspective of European law, the Community was bound to take the necessary 
Community measures when a decision within the common foreign and security 
policy was reached to adopt economic or financial sanctions to allow the two step 
procedure for the adoption of economic sanctions in the EU legal order.125 
  
Both of these views must be rejected. If Union institutions are obliged to implement 
economic sanction CFSP Council decisions126 during the second stage of the 
adoption process, the Commission is downgraded to play the role of an agent to the 
Council and its right of joint initiative is neglect d.127  Therefore, if the two-step 
procedure of Article 215 LTFEU does not work because the Commission refuses to 
                                                
123 OMPI (n 41) para 105. 
124 OMPI (n 41) para 106. 
125 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 16) para 295, 296. 
126 Article 29 LTEU. 
127 Osteneck (n 10) 152, 153. 
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propose a sanction regulation, member states can resort to Article 347 LTFEU. 
Admittedly, this scenario is rather unlikely, especially since the Treaty of Lisbon 
introduced a joint right of initiative that is shared by the Commission and the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The High 
Representative chairs the Foreign and Affairs Council and also acts as one of the 
vice presidents of the Commission. 
 
However, even if member states make use of Article 347 LTFEU to justify national 
measures, they are not free to act as they please. The member states are only entitled 
to adopt unilateral sanctions after prior consultations amongst the member states 
have failed and, in this event, they do not have the power to adopt any other national 
measures that they might prefer in order to implement UN sanctions.128 According to 
Article 348 LTFEU, the Commission can examine how this national action can be 
adjusted a priori to the rules of the internal market. If a member state either fails to 
consult or refuses to adjust its national measures to avoid a distortion of the internal 
market, the Commission or a member state can bring the matter directly before the 
Court of Justice ex posterior.129 
 
2.2.2. Individual member state action based on Arti cle 347 LTFEU 
Member states are allowed to invoke Article 347 LTFEU to justify individual 
sanctions under strict conditions. On the one hand, this is possible if a member state 
takes the initiative to impose sanctions130 and no discussion within the common 
foreign and security has yet taken place. On the otr hand, member states may rely 
on Article 347 LTFEU if they wish to deviate individually from restrictive measures 
adopted on the basis of Article 215 LTFEU.131 However, it has been argued that pure 
political convenience is not sufficient to allow meber states to resort to Article 347 
LTFEU since Article 215 LTFEU would then be deprived of its practical 
                                                
128 K Lenaerts and E De Smitjer, ‘The United Nations ad the European Union: Living Apart 
Together’ in K Wellens (ed), Interntional Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1998) 451. 
129 Lenaerts and De Smitjer (n 128) 451. 
130 Koutrakos (n 69) 86. 
131 Koutrakos (n 69) 86. 
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significance.132 Nonetheless, even if member states can lawfully make use of Article 
347 LTFEU, they are circumscribed in their remaining powers a priori and ex 
posterior in the above described manner.133 
 
Conclusion 
The European Union has acquired a crucial role in the adoption of economic 
sanctions over time. The special nature of economic sanctions, which combine trade 
measures with foreign policy considerations, and their unique constitutional setting 
within the EU legal order, linking the intergovernmental common foreign and 
security policy with the supranational EU policy sector, indicate that the traditional 
competence categories of the supranational EU policies are not appropriate for 
describing the distribution of powers between the EU and the member states in the 
sphere of economic sanctions. Instead, it is more helpful to analyse the substance of 
the EU’s competence with regards to economic sanctio s and to question to what 
extent the member states are constrained in the condu t of their national foreign 
policies through EU sanction decisions to determine wh ther the EU has taken over 
the place previously exercised by the EU member states.  
 
The member states are largely constrained in their domestic policies through EU 
sanctions. There is hardly any room for unilateral economic measures and if the 
member states can make use of Article 347 LTFEU in case the procedure of Article 
215 LTFEU does not work, they are not free to act as they please. They are limited a 
priori  and ex posterior. Therefore the European Union has largely taken over the 
powers previously exercised by its member states in the sphere of economic 
sanctions, independently of how one should label the nature of the EU’s competence 
in this hybrid policy field.  
 
The gradual development of a European competence for the imposition of economic 
sanctions despite the member states’ reluctance to accept a European role in this 
highly sensitive policy field serves as an example of the unique forms of European 
integration in the external sphere and offers a glimpse of what may still lie ahead for 
                                                
132 Koutrakos (n 69) 86. 
133 Lenaerts and De Smitjer (n 128) 451. 
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the European Union with regards to military crisis management. The European 
member states are largely constrained in the conduct of their national foreign policies 
through the EU’s power to adopt economic sanctions. Similar to the constraints they 
face in the light of Council decisions authorising the use of force in crisis 
management missions, the member states are therefore also limited in their domestic 
foreign policy choices. Building on these findings, the next chapter will use a 
comparative method to analyse the EU’s relationship with UN Security Council 
resolutions regarding economic sanctions in order to examine the EU’s relationship 




Chapter 6: The EU’s relationship with UN Security C ouncil resolutions 
authorising the use of force 
 
Introduction 
 The European Union has developed military capabilities and has undertaken military 
crisis management operations all over the world within a short period of time. All of 
its military operations have been carried out with the consent of the host states so far 
and they have often been accompanied by UN Security Council resolutions. If 
necessary, the European Union has the legal capacity and the political ambitions to 
undertake robust future military interventions without the consent of host states. The 
common security and defence policy that is used to pursue the so-called Petersberg 
tasks allows for peace-enforcement missions against targets.  
 
If the European Union considers undertaking military peace-enforcement operations 
in the future, two sets of problems need to be addressed. A question arises about 
whether the European Union needs to obtain UN Security Council mandates before it 
can legally use military sanctions since, unlike its individual member states, the 
European Union is not a member of the United Nations. This question was addressed 
in chapter four above where it was concluded that due to the customary law nature of 
the prohibition of the use of force, the European Union needs to obtain UN Security 
Council mandates before it can lawfully engage in mlitary sanctions. 
 
The second question that needs to be addressed is how an existing UN Security 
Council resolution authorising the use of force affects the European Union as an 
emerging international military actor. Chapter four has argued that UN member 
states are legally bound by the UN Security Council with regards to the use of force 
in two ways. Not only are they required to obtain a UN Security Council mandate 
before resorting to the use of force but, when the UN Security Council authorises the 
use of force, they are also under an obligation to support the military operation. If 
they decide to accept a UN Security Council mandate and choose to deploy troops, 
UN member states have to follow the wording of the resolution and to respect, for 
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example, limits of time, territory and means of action. If they choose not to take part 
activelyin an operation, UN member states are nonethel ss under a loyalty obligation 
not to undermine the effectiveness of the operation. This obligation involves negative 
as well positive obligations. The loyalty obligation may ask member states to refrain 
from certain actions, for example, refraining from selling weapons to a target 
country.  It may also ask them to be active, for example, by adopting an economic 
sanction regime. The increasing role played by the European Union in the 
international security arena, and its political willingness to engage in robust military 
interventions as expressed in the European Security Strategy of 2003,1 therefore 
creates the need to address the question about whether the European Union is bound 
by UN Security Council resolutions in the sense described above.  
 
This chapter will be structured as follows. Parts one and two will assess whether the 
European Union is bound by UN Security Council resoluti ns from the perspective 
of international law or from the perspective of theEuropean legal order. Part three 
then goes on to examine what can be learned from the EU’s relationship with UN 
Security Council resolutions respecting economic sanctions to understand its 
relationship with them in respect of the use of force by using a comparative method. 
The last part of the chapter will discuss whether te are constitutional limits on the 
European Union to engage in the use of force. 
 
Part 1 
The EU’s relationship with UN Security Council reso lutions viewed from 
the perspective of international law 
The Treaty of Lisbon formally recognised the international legal personality of the 
European Union.2 Therefore the European Union can be the subject of legal 
obligations and of legal rights3 even in the framework of the common security and 
                                                
1 European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’  Brussels, 12 
December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf > [hereinafter 
European Security Strategy]. 
2 Article 47 LTEU. 
3 E Paasivirta, ‘The European Union: From an Aggregat  of States to a Legal Person?’ (1997) 2 
Hofstra Law & Policy Symposium 40. 
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defence policy, and it has the potential to be the addressee of binding UN Security 
Council resolutions.  
 
The European Union is not a signatory of the UN Charter. For the time being, the EU 
cannot join the UN since membership is only open to states. In consequence,  the EU 
is not obliged, unlike its member states, to fulfil UN Security Council resolutions 
passed under Chapter VII, according to Articles 25 and 48 UN Charter. It is also not 
convincing to argue that the EU would be bound by mandatory UN Security Council 
resolutions and obligations of assistance according to Article 25 and 2 (5) UN 
Charter without being a signatory of the United Nations, based on a controversial 
interpretation of Article 2 (6) UN Charter.4  
 
According to this provision, the  
 
[o]rganization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the 
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be 
necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
Those who interpret Article 2 (6) UN Charter as creating obligations for non-UN 
member states have supported their view with the sanctions practice of the UN 
Security Council. It has been held that 
 
[t]he Charter establishes a true legal obligation of Members to behave in 
a certain way only if it attaches to the contrary behaviour a certain 
sanction. If the Charta attaches a sanction to certain behaviour of non-
                                                
4 Whether UN Security Council resolutions can be binding for UN members and non-UN member 
states alike based on a controversial interpretation of Article 2(6) UN Charter is disputed. See S Bohr, 
‘Sanctions by the United Nations Security Council and the European Community’ (1993) 4 European 
Journal of International Law 262 and FN 56; V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Sanctions Regimes under Article 
41 of the UN Charter’ in V Gowlland-Debbas (ed), National Implementation of United Nations 
Sanctions: A Comparative Study, The Graduate Institute of International Studies (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2004) 19, 20; T D Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the 
UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’ (1995) 
XXVI Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 74; N Lavranos, ‘UN Sanctions and Judicial 
Review’ (2997) 76 Nordic Journal of International Law 10; B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations 
Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law 593-594. 
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Members, it establishes a true obligation of non-Memb rs to observe the 
contrary behaviour.5  
 
Sometimes this view is additionally supported with the disputed nature of the UN 
Charter as the constitution of the international community.6 Despite the wording of 
Article 2 (6) UN Charter that only mentions non-member states, it has been held that 
its meaning would also be applicable to international organisations such as the 
European Union without offering any additional arguments.7  
 
However, it is more convincing to interpret Article 2 (6) UN Charter as having no 
binding effect on non-UN members. Otherwise, this provision creates obligations for 
third parties without their consent and would be in violation of the pacta tertiis non 
nocent principle.8 Instead, the purpose of this provision that is addressed to United 
Nations is to make UN members and non- UN members aware that threats to 
international peace and security fall within the competence of the United Nations.9 If 
non-UN member states do not comply with the principles mentioned in Article 2 UN 
Charter, they do not violate Article 2(6) UN Charter but they can be subject to action 
by UN member states.10 
 
Although the practice of the UN Security Council reveals that some resolutions 
address international organisations, as well as UN and non-UN member states alike, 
                                                
5 H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems: With 
Supplement (published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, The Lawbook 
Exchange LTD., Clark 2008) 107. 
6 B Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community” (1998) 
36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 593. 
7 See K Lenaerts and E De Smitjer (who do not share this view) for references. K Lenaerts and E De 
Smitjer, ‘The United Nations and the European Union: Living Apart Together’ in K Wellens (ed), 
International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
The Hague 1998) at n 54; P Gilsdorf, ‘Les Réserves de Sécurité du Traité CEE, à la Lumière du Traté 
sur l’union Européenne’ (1994) 374 Revue du Marché et de l’Union Européenne 21, n 24 who states 
that ‘Or, on ne voit pas pourquoi cet effet contraignant ne s’appliquerait pas aussi aux organisations 
internationales telles que la CEE dans leur domaine de competence respectives’. 
8 Graf Vitzthum in B Simma (ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2002) Article 2(6) para 1. 
9 Graf Vitzthum (n 8) Article 2(6) para 23. 
10 Graf Vitzthum (n 8) Article 2(6) para 23. 
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for example, UNSC Resolution 687 (1991)11 and Resolution 748 (1992),12 no 
consistent practice can be established as other resolutions refer to ‘all states’, thus 
including non-member states but excluding international organisations, such as 
Resolution 661 (1990).13 
 
In Resolution 1671(2006) the UN Security Council refe red to the European Union 
and authorised the European Union force (Eufor R.D.Congo) to act under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter.    
 
…Eufor R.D.Congo is authorized to take all necessary measures, within 
its means and capabilities, to carry out the following tasks, in accordance 
with the agreement to be reached between the European Union and the 
United Nations: 
(a) to support MONUC to stabilize a situation, in case MONUC faces 
serious difficulties in fulfilling its mandate within its existing 
capabilities, 
(b) to contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence in the areas of its deployment, ad without prejudice to 
the responsibility of the Government of the Democrati  Republic of the 
Congo, 
(c) to contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa, 
(d) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel as 
well as the protection of the installations of Eufor R.D.Congo, 
(e) to execute operations of limited character in order to extract 
individuals in danger.14 
 
However, this is one of few resolutions addressed to the European Union so far.15 At 
this time, it is hard to say whether this represent the establishment of a new rule or 
                                                
11  UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) on Iraq-Kuwait para 25: ‘Calls upon all States and 
international organizations to act strictly in accordance with  paragraph 24, notwithstanding the 
existence of any contracts, agreements, licenses or any other arrangements’. 
12 UN Security Council Resolution 748 (1992) on Libyan Arab Jamahiriya para 7: ‘Calls upon all 
States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act 
strictly in accordance with the provisions of the pr sent resolution, notwithstanding the existence of 
any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by an international agreement or any contract entered 
into or any licence or permit granted prior to 15 April 1992’. 
13 UN Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) on Iraq-Kuwait para 5: ‘Calls upon all States, 
including States non-members of the United Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions 
of the present resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date 
of the present resolution’; Bohr (n 4), 263. 
14 UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) on the situation concerning the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo para 8. 
15 Another example is operation Tchad/RCA. See UN Security Council Resolution 1778 (2007) para 6 
(a) which authorises the EU to deploy a European Union operation. 
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practice which could support the emergence of a new rule of customary international 
law that could bind the EU to UN Security Council resolutions.  
 
A comparative analysis of relations between the UN and other regional organisations 
that engage in military crisis management such as the African Union (AU), 
ECOWAS or NATO also cannot offer a decisive answer as to the legal relationship 
between UN Security Council resolutions and the European Union. The African 
Union has contributed to international peace and security in Africa through a variety 
of operations and has also cooperated with the UN for that purpose. For example its 
operation AMIS in Sudan was replaced by the UN/AU mission UNAMID in 
Darfur.16 The UN aims to develop an effective partnership with the African Union 
and welcomed the AU’s enhanced peace-keeping role in missions that have been 
authorised by the Security Council.17 The Security Council acknowledges the 
African Union’s contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security 
in a manner consistent with Chapter VIII.18 Although they cooperate as partners, the 
UN and the AU still need agree about their respectiv  roles and responsibilities.19 
ECOWAS, too, has developed into a security organisation in the African 
context20and has been engaged in peace-keeping and peace-enforcement.21 However, 
its precise relationship with the UN is unclear. Senior staff from both organisations 
meet regularly to exchange ideas about how to encourage cooperation.22  
 
NATO started to cooperate with the United Nations in crisis management missions in 
the 1990s in the context of the Balkan conflict. Today, NATO and UN specialised 
bodies meet on a regular basis and discuss matters such as civil-military 
cooperation.23 The North Atlantic Treaty does not regulate NATO’s relationship with 
                                                
16 United Nations University (UNU-CRIS), ‘Capacity Survey: Regional and other Intergovernmental 
Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security’ (2008) 
<https://biblio.ugent.be/input/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=938841&fileOId=938848> 
23-25. 
17 Statement by the President of the Security Council, made in connection with the Council’s 
consideration of the item entitled ‘Peace and Security in Africa’ 26 October 2009, S/PRST/2009/26. 
18 Statement by the President of the Security Council (  17). 
19 United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (n 16) 26. 
20 United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (n 16) 68. 
21 ECOWAS role in Liberia will be examined in more detail in chapter seven below. 
22 United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (n 16) 73. 
23 United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) (n 16) 104-105. 
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UN Security Council resolutions but it emphasises the commitment of NATO’s 
members to the principles and purposes of the UN Charter who refrain from the 
threat or use of force in a manner consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter and 
who recognise the Security Council’s primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
peace and security.24 
 
The relationship between regional organisation such as AU, ECOWAS and NATO 
that engage in crisis management and the United Nations is developing. They aim to 
cooperate as partners. Whether these organisations, that are not members of the 
United Nations, are bound by UN Security Council resolutions is unclear. Their 
respective relations with the United Nations therefor  cannot help to analyse the 
EU’s legal relationship with the latter. 
 
Although public international law does not bind the EU to UN Security Council 
resolutions, the European Union could regard itself to be bound by the UN Charter in 




The EU’s legal relationship with UN Security Counci l resolutions viewed 
from the perspective of EU law 
Whether the European legal order itself binds the EU to UN Security Council 
resolutions will be discussed in the following by examining the provisions of primary 
EU law and by analysing the case law of the European courts regarding international 
law in general and UN Security Council resolutions in particular. 
 
1. Primary EU law references to international law a nd the UN Charter 
Although the European Treaties express the EU’s strong commitment to international 
law and the principles of the UN Charter, neither the LTEU nor the LTFEU 
explicitly state that the European Union is bound by international law. According to 
Article 3 TEU, which sets out the general objectives of the European Union, the EU  
                                                
24 Articles 1, 7 North Atlantic Treaty. 
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…shall contribute to…the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter.25  
 
Although these objectives guide all the Union’s actions, and therefore the EU’s 
military crisis management operations that form part of the common security and 
defence policy, the common foreign and security policy of which the latter forms an 
integral part reinforces this commitment. The EU is asked that its action on the 
international scene shall be guided by respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter and international law.26 Furthermore, the principles of the UN Charter as 
well as of international law are identified as forming part of the principles that have 
inspired the EU’s own creation, development and enlargement. These are principles 
the EU seeks to advance in the wider world.27  
 
The principles of the UN Charter and international law are equally mentioned 
alongside other values, including human rights, democracy and the rule of law28 and 
‘[i]n its relations with the wider world, the Union [is asked to] uphold and promote 
its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens’.29 Therefore 
the European Union seems to reinforce the development of its own European 
standard of human rights and the rule of law by ‘gold-plating’ the values of the 
United Nations and international law. Nonetheless, EU treaty provisions, do not offer 
a precise answer as to whether the European Union is bound by international law and 
UN Security Council resolutions. 
 
2. Case law on international law  
The European courts have made several statements on the relationship between the 
European legal order and international law. In Poulsen and Diva Navigation,30 the 
                                                
25 Article 3(5) TEU. 
26 Article 21(1) LTEU. 
27 Article 21(1) LTEU. 
28 Article 21(2) (a), (c) LTEU. 
29 Article 3(5) TEU. 
30 Case C-286/90 Anklagemyndighedenv Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. [1992] 
ECR I-6019 [hereinafter Poulsen and Diva Navigation]. 
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European Court of Justice held ‘…that the European Community must respect 
international law in the exercise of its powers…’31 
 
The Court confirmed its statements in Racke,32 where it decided on the question of 
whether an individual could challenge the validity of a Community regulation under 
rules of customary international law. The customary law in question was concerned 
with the principle that a change of circumstances may lead to the lapse or suspension 
of a treaty, as formalised in Article 62 of the VCLT to which the Community was not 
a party at that time (and neither is the European Union today). The Court held that 
the Community was 
 
 …required to comply with the rules of customary inter ational law when 
adopting a regulation…33 [and added that] rules of customary 
international law …are binding upon the Community institutions and 
form part of the Community legal order.34 
 
The binding nature of customary law in respect of the European Community was 
confirmed by the Court of First Instance in Opel Austria35 with respect to the 
principle of good faith. It argued that ‘the principle of good faith is a rule of 
customary international law whose existence is recognized by the International Court 
of Justice and is therefore binding on the Community’.36  
 
An analysis of European case law in relation to inter ational law in general has 
revealed that the European Union shows an open attitude towards international law 
and considers itself to be bound by rules of customary international law.  
 
In light of these findings, it can therefore be conluded that the European Union as a 
military actor is also bound by the principles established by customary international 
law surrounding the use of force. As outlined in chapter four above, the prohibition 
                                                
31 Poulsen and Diva Navigation (n 30) para 9. 
32 Case C-162/96 A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1998] ECR I-3655 para 45 
[hereinafter Racke]. 
33 Racke (n 32) para 45. 
34 Racke (n 32) para 46. 
35 Case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39 [hereinafter 
Opel Austria]. 
36 Opel Austria (n 35) para 90. 
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of the use of force has acquired the status of customary international law. The 
authorisation of the use of force by the UN Security Council represents one of the 
few legal exceptions to this rule and has itself acquired the status of customary law. 
Therefore, the European Union is required by customary international law to obtain a 
UN Security Council mandate first, before it can impose military sanctions during a 
military crisis management operation, unless it can refer to another accepted 
exception to the prohibition of the use of force, as already discussed in chapter four.  
 
Nonetheless, it still needs to be discussed whether the European Union is bound by 
existing UN Security Council resolutions regarding the use of force in the sense that 
once it decides to accept a UN Security Council mandate and chooses to deploy 
troops, the EU has to follow the wording of the resolution and respect limits of time, 
territory and means of action, for example. It also needs to be discussed what 
happens if the EU chooses not to take part actively in an operation. Is the Union 
under a loyalty obligation not to undermine the effectiveness of such an operation? 
Loyalty obligations might entail negative as well also positive obligations. They may 
ask the EU to refrain from certain actions, for example, to stop including the target 
on a list of states with which trade is to be liberalised; but it may also ask the EU to 
become active, for example to adopt an economic santion regime. 
 
3. Case law on UN Security Council resolutions 
The Court of Justice has no competence to review acts adopted within the common 
security and defence policy under which military crisis management missions take 
place.  Therefore the European courts have never had a chance to address the legal 
relationship between the European Union and UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding the use of force. However, being competent to review Union regulations 
that are adopted in the second stage of the adoption rocess of economic sanctions, 
the Court had the opportunity to address the relationship between secondary Union 
instruments implementing UN Security Council resoluti ns within the Union legal 
order and the latter. 
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Before the development of targeted sanctions against individuals and the Kadi case,37 
the ECJ had to deal in Bosphorus,38 Ebony Maritime39 and Centro-Com40 with 
economic sanction regulations adopted against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) that were giving effect to UN Security Council resolutions 
in the 1990s.  
 
3.1. Bosphorus and the interpretation of Community regulations 
implementing UN Security Council resolutions  
The facts of the Bosphorus case41 have already been discussed in chapter five and it 
is sufficient here to recall that the ECJ had to inerpret Council Regulation No 990/93 
of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the European Economic Community and 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Regulation 990/3 was adopted by the Council 
to give effect to the decision of the Community and the member states, meeting 
within the framework of political cooperation, to implement in the EEC certain 
aspects of the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, including Resolution 820 (1993).  
 
In question was the interpretation of Article 8 of Regulation No 990/93/EEC whose 
wording mirrored the relevant passage in the Security Council resolution in 
substance. According to the ECJ, when interpreting a provision of Community law it 
would be essential to consider its wording, context and aims.42 As the Regulation in 
question was implementing UN Security Council resoluti ns, the Court held that the 
latter’s aim would have to be taken into consideration as well.43 The Court followed, 
Advocate General Jacobs on this point who stated that it would be  
                                                
37 Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities [2005] ECR II-3649 [hereinafter Kadi]. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-
415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission 
[2008] ECR I-6351 [hereinafter Kadi (Grand Chamber)]. 
38 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications and others, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953. 
39 Case C-177/95 Ebony Maritime SA and Loten Navigation Co. Ltd v Prefetto della Provincia di 
Brindisi and others, Italy [1997] ECR  I-1111. 
40 Case 124/95 The Queen, ex parte Centro-Com Srl v HM Treasury and Bank of England [1997] ECR 
I-81. This case will not be discussed in the following. 
41 Bosphorus (n 38). 
42 Bosphorus (n 38) para11. 
43 Bosphorus (n 38) para 14. 
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much more difficult to define the precise purpose of a Community 
measure implementing a resolution of the UN Security Council than it 
would normally be to ascertain the purpose of an ordinary Community 
measure.44  
 
At issue would not be the intention of the Community institutions themselves but the 
purpose of the Security Council resolution.45 Therefore Security Council resolutions 
would require a specific interpretation of the Community regulation.46  
 
Although the question of whether UN resolutions as such are binding on the 
Community was not expressly decided by the ECJ or by the Advocate General, the 
fact that a Community regulation had to be interpreted in the light of the respective 
UN resolution it was implementing, suggests that back then the Community and 
today the EU is bound by Security Council resolutions.  
 
3.2. Ebony Maritime 
In Ebony Maritime,47 the same Council Regulation No 990/93 was questioned. The 
Regulation referred in its preamble to the situation in the former Yugoslavia and to 
several resolutions of the Security Council. It mentioned that ‘the Community and its 
Member States have agreed to have recourse to a Community instrument, inter alia, 
to ensure a uniform implementation throughout the Community of certain of these 
measures’.48 The case concerned a tanker belonging to Loten Navigation and flying 
the Maltese flag. The vessel was scheduled to deliver a cargo of petroleum products 
belonging to Ebony Maritime (that had picked it up in Tunisia) to Rijeka in Croatia.49 
The tanker was inspected in Brindisi, Italy to ensure compliance with the sanction 
regime in force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. During its journey to 
                                                
44 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v 
Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications ad others, Ireland [1996] ECR I-3953 para 41 
[hereinafter Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus]. 
45 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 44) para 41. 
46 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Bosphorus (n 44) para 47. 
47 Case C-177/95 Ebony Maritime SA and Loten Navigation Co. Ltd v Prefetto della Provincia di 
Brindisi and other [1997] ECR  I-1111 [hereinafter Ebony Maritime]. 
48 Opinion of  Advocate General Jacobs Case C-177/95 Ebony Maritime SA and Loten Navigation Co. 
Ltd v Prefetto della Provincia di Brindisi and others [1997] ECR I-1111 para 7 [hereinafter Opinion 
of Advocate General Jacobs in Ebony Maritime]. 
49 Ebony Maritime (n 47) para 10. 
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Croatia, the vessel began to take on water and the master changed course towards the 
nearest coastline of Montenegro, declaring his intention to run the vessel aground.50 
While it was still on the high seas, a NATO/WEU helicopter landed on the deck of 
the tanker and a Dutch military squad took control of the vessel, which was handed 
over to Italian authorities in Brindisi.51 The vessel was impounded and the cargo was 
confiscated.52 In a preliminary rulings procedure, the ECJ had to ecide how Articles 
9 and 10 of the Regulation were to be interpreted. The Court argued that both 
provisions ‘are applicable on those vessels that are within territory of a Member State 
and thus under the territorial jurisdiction of that State, even if the alleged 
infringement occurred outside its territory’.53 It supported its interpretation by 
referring the wording and purpose of the UN Security Council resolution, ‘which, 
with a view to reinforcing the sanctions already adopted, introduced… the 
prohibition of entry into the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro) for all commercial maritime traffic and provides…that ‘all 
States shall detain pending investigation all vessels…and cargoes found in their 
territories and suspected of having violated or being in violation…’’ of the previous 
or the present resolution.54  
 
Advocate General Jacobs shared the view of the Court and argued that the 
Regulation in question had to be interpreted in the light of the Security Council 
resolutions to make the sanctions fully effective.55 Again, the need for the 
interpretation of a Community regulation in the light of UN resolutions speaks in 
favour of their binding character. 
 
In sum, neither of these cases expressly dealt withthe question of whether UN 
Security Council resolutions are binding on the Community. Nevertheless, the 
Court’s decisions indicate a general openness towards international law. The 
requirement to interpret EU instruments in the light of UN Security Council 
                                                
50 Ebony Maritime (n 47) para 11. 
51 Ebony Maritime (n 47) para 11. 
52 Ebony Maritime (n 47) para 12. 
53 Ebony Maritime (n 47) para 19. 
54 Ebony Maritime (n 47) para 20. 
55 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Ebony Maritime (n 48) para 21. 
 211 
resolutions suggests that UN Security Council resolutions are considered to be 
binding the EU in respect of secondary Community law.  
 
3.3. Kadi 
The Kadi case was discussed in chapter one above.56 It is sufficient to recall here that 
the European Court of Justice had highlighted the autonomy of the Community legal 
order vis à vis the international legal order. In consequence it found itself to be 
competent to review secondary Community legislation in the light of European 
fundamental rights as general principles of EC law independently of whether or not 
the Community instrument gives effect to UN Security Council resolutions. 
 
Unfortunately, the Court’s judgment left several questions about the precise 
relationship between the European legal order and UN Security Council resolutions 
unanswered. It only offered a clear indication of the limit of the possible binding 
nature of UN Security Council resolutions by stating that they could not enjoy 
primacy over primary EU law. The question of whether UN Security Council 
resolutions could enjoy primacy over secondary EU law was avoided by the Court. 
In line with its previous judgments in Bosphorus and Ebony Maritime, it held that 
when adopting a Community instrument as part of the second stage of the process for 
the imposition of economic sanction where the EU is implementing a UN Security 
Council resolution, the Community would have to  
 
take due account of the terms and objectives of the resolution concerned 
and of the relevant obligations under the Charter of the United Nations 
relating to such implementation.57  
 
The interpretation of a Community instrument in light of a UN Security Council 
decision indicates that they could be binding but does not offer an argument that 
could not be rebutted. In other words, UN Security Council resolutions could be 
binding on the EU but if they were to be, they would have to respect the general 
principles of EU law comprising, amongst other things, the EU’s own standard of 
European fundamental rights. The way the Court achieved this result is by pointing 
                                                
56 Kadi and Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 37). 
57 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n 37) para 296. 
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to Article 300(7) EC.58 This provision referred to agreements concluded by the 
Community and provided that these agreements were binding on the member states 
but also on Community institutions. The European Union has not however and, for 
the time, being cannot sign and ratify the Charter of the United Nations since 
membership is only open to states. In a second step, th  Court showed however how 
this obstacle could be overcome. It referred to its earlier decision in Intertanko,59 
which is substantially linked to the International Fruit Company case.60 Both cases 
refer to the concept of functional substitution.61 Both cases deal with the situation in 
which the European Union although not a party to an international agreement to 
which all of its member states are parties is bound by that agreement, based on the 
fact that the European Union has taken over the powers previously exercised by the 
member states in this field of policy. Nonetheless, the Court then fell short of 
assessing whether the criteria for a functional substitution of the member states 
through the European Union with regards to economic sanctions were met.62 
Therefore, the EU’s legal relationship with UN Security Council resolutions still 






                                                
58Today’s Article 216 (2)LTFEU; Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n37) para 306. 
59 Case C-308/06 International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Inertanko), International 
Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo), Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Lloyd’s 
Register, International Salvage Union, v Secretary of State for Transport [2008] ECR I-4057 
[hereinafter Intertanko]. 
60 Joined Cases 21 to 24/72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit [ 1972] ECR 1219. 
61 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n37) para 307. 
62 Kadi (Grand Chamber) (n37) paras 306-308 states that 
 ‘Article 300(7) EC provides that agreements concluded under the 
conditions set out in that article are to be binding o  the institutions of 
the Community and on Member States. Thus, by virtue of that provision, 
supposing it to be applicable to the Charter of the United Nations, the 
latter would have primacy over acts of secondary Community law (see, 
to that effect, Case C308/06 Intertanko and Others [2008] ECR 
I0000, paragraph 42 and case-law cited).  That primacy at the level of 
Community law would not, however, extend to primary law, in particular 




What can be learned from the relationship between U N Security 
Council resolutions and the EU in respect of econom ic sanctions 
for an understanding of the relationship between th e EU and UN 
Security Council resolutions in respect of the use of force? 
Neither public international law nor European law provide explicit answers to the 
question whether the European Union is bound by UN Security Council resolutions 
in the conduct of crisis management missions including the use of force. 
Nevertheless, based on the assumption that the European Union is bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions in respect of economic sanctions, it will be argued that 
this finding can be helpful for understanding the relationship between the EU and 
UN Security Council resolutions involving the use of f rce. To carry out this 
analysis, the next section will demonstrate why a comparison between economic and 
military sanctions is useful in this context. A special focus will be put on the EU’s 
comprehensive concept of crisis management. Section two will show that the 
European Union is bound by economic UN Security Council resolutions by drawing 
an analogy with the International Fruit Company case. Finally, section three will 
examine in more detail whether the conditions created by the International Fruit 
Company case for a functional substitution are also met in the context of the use of 
force and thus whether the EU is legally bound by UN Security Council resolutions. 
 
1. The usefulness of a comparison between economic and 
military sanctions – the differences and similariti es they share 
1.1. Perspective of International Law 
At first glance, it appears difficult to argue that economic and military coercive 
measures form comparable grounds from the perspective of international law. 
Economic sanctions adopted by the UN Security Council primarily represent a duty, 
asking all UN member states to apply the sanctions regime to allow for its 
effectiveness. The authorisation of the use of force through the Security Council, on 
the other hand, provides international actors with the right to use force and allows 
them to set the principle of non-intervention, the cornerstone of the UN’s system of 
collective security, aside. 
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Nevertheless, on a closer look, UN Security Council resolutions on economic 
sanctions do not only create a duty for UN member state  to implement economic 
sanctions,63 they also serve as an entitlement.64 The implementing state’s position 
under international agreements and general international law is modified by 
economic Security Council sanctions. To be able to implement Security Council 
sanction decisions, the implementing state is entitl d to disregard obligations it has 
entered into with other international actors without facing negative consequences.65 
This is a result of Article 103 UN Charter according to which UN Charter obligations 
prevail. The target of economic sanctions has to accept their negative impact. 
Economic UN Security Council sanctions legalise the implementing measures by UN 
member states that could not otherwise be justified under general international law.66 
 
UN Security Council resolutions authorising the useof force do not only entail the 
right to use force but they also entail obligations. Although in ‘ordinary speech to 
authorise is to permit or allow or licence’ but ‘not t  require or oblige’,67 once a UN 
member state accepts a Security Council authorisation, it is bound by the wording 
and spirit of the resolution and ‘has an obligation to carry out the tasks outlined in 
the authorization’.68 Those states that choose not to accept a mandate are r quired by 
a general loyalty obligation to abstain from all action or inaction that might 
undermine the success of military sanctions authorised by the UN Security Council. 
For example, a UN member state would have to refrain from shipping arms to a 
targeted country, even if there is no arms embargo in place.  
                                                
63 Article 48(2) UN Charter. 
64 K Osteneck, Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft: 
Völker- und europarechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für ein Tätigwerden der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft im Bereich von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionsregimen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Umsetzungspraxis der EG-Organe, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Band 168 (Springer 
Verlag, Berlin 2004) 36. 
65 V Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility’ 
(1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 87. 
66 Osteneck (n 64) 36; see also T Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International 
Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 2005) 15 who refers to the permissive effect of 
mandatory UN Security Council sanctions. 
67 Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Opinions of the Lords of Appeal For Judgment in R (on the application 
of Al-Jeda) (FC) (Appellant) v Secretary of State for Defence (Respondent) [2007] UKHL 58 para 31. 
68 R Liivoja, ‘The Scope of the Supremacy Clause of the United Nations Charter’ (2008) 57 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 587. 
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It has also been held that mandatory economic UN Security Council sanctions and 
authorised military measures create similar effects regarding UN member states’ 
existing obligations under international law. Both types of measures have been held 
to prevail over existing international obligations according to Article 103 UN 
Charter, although the wording of this provision merely refers to ‘obligations’.69 In 
the absence of a standing UN army, the Security Council cannot do anything to fill 
this void but to authorise willing and capable states to use force.70 If the authorisation 
to use force however cannot prevail over treaty obligations, the UN Security Council 
is restricted in its attempts to maintain and restore international peace and security.71 
 
In addition, the boundary between economic sanctions based on Article 41 UN 
Charter and military sanctions based on Article 42 UN Charter can be blurred in the 
sense that to make economic sanctions effective universal application is required. 
One of the means to achieve universal application is by forceful means, namely by 
using a blockade that will shut down all commercial activity of the target state.72 A 
military blockade is considered however to be a form f military reprisal.73 In light of 
the foregoing, international law does not stand in the way of a fruitful comparison 
between economic and military sanctions. 
 
1.2. Perspective of European law 
The European legal order could be open to this method of comparison between the 
regimes of economic sanctions on the one hand and military sanctions on the other, 
although both types of instruments are governed by ifferent rules and procedures. 
Economic sanctions form part of the supranational sphere of the European Union and 
were formerly covered by the European Community. Crisis management operations 
involving the use of force, on the contrary, fall within the ambit of the 
intergovernmental security and defence policy that is still subject to specific rules 
                                                
69 Lord Bingham of Cornhill (n 67) para 33. 
70 Lord Bingham of Cornhill (n 67) para 33. 
71 Lord Bingham of Cornhill (n 67) para 33. 
72 J Polakas, ‘Economic Sanctions: An Effective Alternative to Military Coercion?’ (1980) 6 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 319. 
73 Polakas (n 72) 319. 
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and procedures, despite de-pillarisation through the Treaty of Lisbon, as outlined in 
chapter two above. Hence, the former pillars still cast their shadows on the European 
Union. 
 
Nevertheless, the abolition of the Greek temple model shows a new interest and 
openness in approaching the project of European integra ion without internal, 
European self-made boundaries. By thinking in pillars, Europe prevented itself from 
seeing the similarities in its project, always highli ting and maybe overestimating 
its internal differences and neglecting the interrelations between its different policy 
spheres.74 The following section will examine the similarities and differences 
between economic and military sanctions within the European legal order.  
 
It will be argued that both types of instruments constrain European member states in 
their domestic foreign policy choices. In addition, the European Union appears to 
have gone through a similar development with regards to the use of force as it has 
done with economic sanctions. In the context of economic sanctions, a European 
competence was disputed by the member states at first but the EU has gradually 
acquired competence in this foreign policy field, as demonstrated in chapter five. 
Within the framework of the common security and defence policy, a process of 
European integration is ongoing but on a much slower scale. In addition to these 
similarities, the European Union and its comprehensiv  concept of crisis 
management support the view that an understanding of the EU’s relationship with 
economic UN Security Council sanctions can help with understanding the EU’s 
relationship with UN Security Council resolutions on the use of force. Therefore, if it 
is  possible to argue that the European Union is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions with regards to economic sanctions it will also be worth examining 
whether the criteria used to argue for their binding nature can also be applied to UN 




                                                
74 Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation In EU External Relations’ (2000) 
37 Common Market Law Review 1135. 
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1.2.1. Economic sanctions and Council decisions pro viding for the use 
of force in the context of an EU crisis management operation – 
constraining the EU member states in the conduct of  their domestic 
foreign policies 
As already discussed in chapter five and in chapter three, European economic 
sanction regulations as well as Council decisions with which a military crisis 
management operation is launched and conducted constrain the European member 
states in the conduct of their national foreign policies. Regarding economic 
sanctions, member states have largely lost their power to act outside the European 
framework. With regards to the use of military force, member states are constrained, 
once they have voted in the Council, to undertake a military crisis management 
operation. Although member states are not obliged to put a certain topic on the 
Council agenda and to create a common policy, they ar  nevertheless constrained in 
the conduct of their national foreign policies through the instruments with which the 
EU launches and conducts its crisis management operations, once they are in place. 
 
1.2.2. European integration in external relations  
Another similarity behind the adoption of economic and military sanctions within the 
European legal order is the gradual development of a European role in these highly 
sensitive foreign policy fields. In the context of economic sanctions, a European 
competence was disputed by the member states at first but the EU gradually acquired 
a competence as demonstrated in chapter five above. Within the framework of the 
common security and defence policy, a process of European integration is ongoing as 
well, but at a much slower scale as discussed in chapters two and three. European 
member states are already constrained in the conduct of their foreign policies through 
Council decisions with which European military crisis management missions are 
launched and conducted. Both developments have beencharacterised through a 
bottom up approach. Most changes were introduced outside the Treaty framework 
and later became formalised. The European Union appears to have gone through a 




1.2.3. A comprehensive concept of crisis management  and practical 
needs 
Although there is no internationally agreed definition of crisis management, the 
statements of the EU, most importantly the European Security Strategy of 200375 
which represents the first strategic concept for the EU as well as its actual practice, 
support the view of a comprehensive concept of crisis management.76 The European 
approach to crisis management is comprehensive in two ways. Not only is the 
European Union prepared and willing to act in the whole life cycle of a conflict, 
including conflict prevention, peace-making, peace-enforcement, peace-keeping as 
well as  post conflict stabilisation, but it is also willing to use a variety of tools that 
are at its disposal.77 
 
In response to the identified key threats, including terrorism, the proliferation of 
weapons of mass estruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime, the 
European Security Strategy recommends a mixture of instruments and considers th  
EU to be ‘particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations’.78 
 
Proliferation may be contained through export contrls and attacked 
through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying 
political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a 
mixture of intelligence, political, judicial, military and other means. In 
failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, 
humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts 
need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be 
needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve 
reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil 
government.79 
 
In the scholarly debate, economic sanctions are not usually incorporated into the 
concept of European crisis management.80 However, to address the whole life-cycle 
                                                
75 European Security Strategy (n 1). 
76 S Blockmans, ‘An Introduction to the Role of the EU in Crisis Management’  in S Blockmans (ed), 
The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2008) 10. 
77 European Security Strategy (n 1) 11. 
78 European Security Strategy (n 1) 7. 
79 European Security Strategy (n 1) 7. 
80 In favour of the inclusion of sanctions into the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management: 
I Anthony, ‘Sanctions Applied by the European Union and the United Nations’ SIPRI (Stockholm 
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of a conflict, a variety of tools is not only necessary and available to the European 
Union but they are also used in practice. The European Security Strategy mentions 
trade measures, including economic sanctions, alongside other tools when it asks the 
EU to be more active in pursuing its strategic objectiv s. This recommendation 
 
applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and 
conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, 
military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies 
are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a 
strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention.81 
 
The Council document  Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measure  
(Sanctions) perceives ‘the effective use of sanctions as an important way to maintain 
and restore international peace and security’ and states that the ‘Council is 
committed to using sanctions as part of an integratd, comprehensive policy 
approach which should include political dialogue, incentives, conditionality and 
could even involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures in accordance with 
the UN Charter’.82  It has been argued that although sanctions are used for crisis 
management purposes in practice, the EU would prefer to label such instruments as 
‘measures to promote regional peace and stability, or to uphold Human Rights and 
democracy’.83 In addition, economic sanctions are not only used s parately but they 
often accompany civilian and military crisis management operations of the EU. As 
they provide a tool to end a conflict they should be included in the overall concept of 
crisis management. The experience of the European Union in Sudan can serve as an 
illustration of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management.  
 
                                                                                                                                
International Peace Research Institute) Yearbook 2002: Armament, Disarmaments and International 
Security (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002) 203; Including economic sanctions into European 
security are M Trybus, N D White and others, ‘An Introduction to European Security Law’ in M 
Trybus and N White (eds), European Security Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007) 4. 
81 European Security Strategy (n 1) 11. 
82 Council of the European Union, ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’ 
Brussels, 7 June 2004, 10198/1/04 REV 1, PESC 450, Annex 1, para 1 and 5. [hereinafter Basic 
Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures]. 
83 C Portela, ‘Where and Why does the EU Impose Sanctions?’ (2005) 3 (17) Politique Européenne 
98. 
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The European Union has supported activities by the African Union (AU) in an 
attempt to stabilise the Darfur region in Sudan with a wide range of measures since 
2004. Financial, political and personnel support fo the Abuja peace talks process 
and the Ceasefire Commission followed European assist nce with planning, 
equipment, technical and financial support to the AU’s mission in the region 
(AMIS). Following a request from the AU, the EU launched its first combined 
civilian and military mission between 2005 and 2007 and assisted and supported the 
AU’s political, police and military efforts in an attempt to end the crisis. Amongst 
other tasks, the EU assisted and trained the police and made military observers and 
experts available. The EU also imposed a number of sanctions, including restrictions 
on admission, the freezing of funds and economic resources, an arms embargo and a 
ban on the provision of certain services.84 At the end of 2007, AMIS handed over to 
a joint UN/AU peacekeeping operation UNAMID authorised by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1769 (2007).85 
 
In sum, European crisis management includes all types of military and civilian CSDP 
operations, covering the whole life-cycle of a conflict, reaching from conflict 
prevention to post conflict rehabilitation, and covering the whole external dimension 
of security, across the different policy areas of the European Union,86 as well as a 
variety of economic, diplomatic and political tools. This comprehensive approach to 
crisis management is also essential if the EU is tobecome a successful, effective, and 
credible international security actor. If it falls short of offering an all-encompassing 
solution to an international crisis, despite having started to interact, the EU appears 
ineffective and weak and could gradually lose its credibility and legitimacy as an 
international actor. In consequence, it is beneficial to analyse economic sanctions, 
civilian or military crisis management missions in u ison. 
 
It is possible to use a comparative method to make the examination of the EU´s 
relationship with economic UN Security Council resoluti ns helpful for an 
                                                
84 Council Common Position 2005/411/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Sudan and 
repealing Common Position 2004/31/CFSP [2005] OJ L 139/25. 
85 Consilium Fact Sheet, EU support to the African Union Mission in Darfur – AMIS, January 2008 
AMIS II/08 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080109-Factsheet8-AMISII.pdf>. 
86 Blockmans (n 76) 11. 
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understanding of the EU’s relationship with UN Security Council resolutions in the 
context of the use of force.  Both economic sanctios and military CSDP decisions 
constrain European member states in their domestic foreign policy choices. The 
European Union has gone through a similar development regarding the use of force 
as it has done with economic sanctions. In addition to these similarities, the European 
Union and its comprehensive concept of crisis management also support the view 
that an understanding of the EU’s relationship with economic UN Security Council 
sanctions can be made useful for understanding the EU’s relationship with UN 
Security Council resolutions with regards to the us of force. The next part will 
assess the EU’s relationship with economic UN Security Council resolutions in more 
detail. 
 
2. The EU’s legal relationship with economic UN Sec urity Council 
resolutions  
Primary EU law is silent on whether the European Union is bound by UN Security 
Council resolutions regarding economic sanctions. The European Union nevertheless 
has a long history of implementing UN Security Council resolutions within the EU 
legal order. However, whenever it transforms UN sanctio  decisions into the EU 
legal order by adopting secondary EU legislation, the EU also has a history of 
avoiding clear legal statements about whether it considers itself bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions.  
 
For example, the preamble to Council Regulation (EU) No 667/2010 of 26 July 2010 
concerning certain restrictive measures in respect of Eritrea,87 states that the 
restrictive measures targeted provided for in Decision 2010/127/CFSP,88 
 
(5) …fall within the scope of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union and, therefore, notably with a view to ensuring their 
uniform application by economic operators in all Member States, 
legislation at the level of the Union is necessary in order to implement 
them as far as the Union is concerned.  
                                                
87 Council Regulation (EU) No 667/2010 concerning certain restricitve measures in respect of Eritrea 
[2010] OJ L 195/16. 




(6) This Regulation respects the fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and notably the right to an effective remedy and 
to a fair trial, the right to property and the right to protection of personal 
data. This Regulation should be applied in accordance with those rights 
and principles.  
 
(7) This Regulation also fully respects the obligations f Member States 
under the Charter of the United Nations and the lega ly binding nature of 
Security Council Resolutions.89 
 
By stating its awareness of the binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding its member states but also by highlightin he need for Union instruments 
to respect the EU’s own standard of fundamental rights protection, the EU therefore 
avoids addressing the EU’s relationship with UN Security Council resolutions. The 
EU also avoids answering questions about what happens if there is a clash between 
its legal obligations under European law and public international law. 
 
Along the same line, the EU has also avoided clear political statements about 
whether or not it regards itself to be bound by UN sanction decisions and has 
stipulated in rather general terms that  
 
[i]n the case of measures implementing UN SC Resolutions, the EU legal 
instruments will need to adhere to those Resolutions. However, it is 
understood that the EU may decide to apply measures that are more 
restrictive.90 
 
Probably the most convincing argument in favour of the claim that the European 
Union is bound by UN Security Council resolutions with regards to economic 
sanctions is the analogy drawn from the ECJ’s decision in the International Fruit 
Company case. In essence this view is based on the argument that the European 
Union has functionally substituted for the European member states in the sphere of 
economic sanctions. This view was promoted by the Court of First Instance in its 
                                                
89 Emphasis added. 
90 Council of the European Union, ‘Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of Restrictive 
Measures (sanctions) in the Framework of the EU Comm n Foreign and Security Policy’, Brussels, 2 
December 2005, 15114/05 para.3 [hereinafter Guidelines on Implementation and Evaluation of 
Restrictive Measures in the Framework of the EU Comm n Foreign and Security Policy]. 
 223 
Kadi decision, as shown in chapter one above. Unfortunately, the CFI generalised its 
finding that the European Community is bound by UN Security Council resolutions 
without distinguishing between primary and secondary Community law. When its 
decision was appealed, the European Court of Justice left the question of the legally 
binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions on economic sanctions open and 
merely addressed the outer limits of their binding character. According to the Grand 
Chamber, UN Security Council decisions cannot enjoy primacy over primary Union 
law. Nonetheless, even the ECJ indirectly referred to the International Fruit 
Company case when it mentioned its earlier decision in Intertanko that also referred 
to the concept of functional substitution. The following will describe the ECJ’s 
reasoning in the International Fruit Company case before it will be tested whether an 
analogy with this can be drawn to economic sanctions. 
 
2.1. The International Fruit Company Case 
In the International Fruit Company case,91 the ECJ was asked whether trade 
Regulations No 459/70, 565/70 and 686/70, providing for restrictions on the 
importation of apples from third countries were invalid for violation of GATT.92 
Hence it had to analyse whether GATT was binding on the European Community, 
although the Community had never formally become a contracting party to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The Court stated that 
 
in so far as under the EEC Treaty the Community has assumed powers 
previously exercised by Member States in the area governed by the 
general agreement, the provisions of that agreement have the effect of 
binding the Community.93 
 
The argument put forward by the ECJ that the European Community had substituted 
for the member states as the relevant actors in GATT was based on five grounds.94 
First, all member states were contracting parties to GATT and therefore bound by its 
                                                
91 Joined Cases 21 to 24-72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit, Netherlands [1972] ECR  I-1219 [hereinafter International Fruit Company case]. 
92 International Fruit Company  (n 91) para 3. 
93 International Fruit Company (n 91) para 18. 
94 Bohr (n 4) 264. 
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rules when they established the EEC.95  In line with the non-circumvention principle, 
‘[b]y concluding a treaty between them they could not withdraw from their 
obligations to third countries’.96 Instead their desire to obey GATT rules followed 
from EEC treaty provisions such as former Articles 110 EEC and 234 EEC, as well 
as from their declarations in GATT.97  
 
Second, ‘[t]he Community has assumed the functions nherent in the tariff and trade 
policy…by virtue of Articles 111 and 113 of the Treaty’.98 By conferring powers 
related to trade and tariff policy on the Community, the member states expressed 
their wish to bind the Community to the obligations they have entered into in the 
GATT framework.99 
 
Third, the Community showed its willingness to be bound by the provisions of the 
general agreement.100 This is illustrated by Article 110 EEC, which mentio s GATT 
objectives, and from statements of the member states when the Treaty of Rome was 
welcomed under GATT Article XXIV.101 Additionally, Article 234 EEC provided 
that ‘[t]he rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before the entry 
into force of this Treaty between one or more Member States on the one hand, and 
one or more third countries on the other hand, shall not be affected by the provisions 
of this Treaty’.  
 
Fourth, the Community has acted within the GATT framework ‘and has appeared as 
a partner in the tariff negotiations and as party to the agreements of all types 
concluded within the framework of the General Agreem nt, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 114 of the EEC Treaty which provides that the tariff and trade 
agreements ‘shall be concluded … on behalf of the Community’.102 Therefore, ‘the 
                                                
95 International Fruit Company (n 91) para 10. 
96 International Fruit Company (n 91) para 11. 
97 P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union: Legal and Constitutional Foundations 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004) 437, 438. 
98 International Fruit Company (n 91) para 14. 
99 International Fruit Company  (n 91) para 15. 
100International Fruit Company (n 91) para 13; Bohr (n 4) 264. 
101 Bohr (n 4) 264. 
102 International Fruit Company (n 91) para 17. 
 225 
transfer of powers which has occurred in the relations between Member Sates and the 
Community has been put into concrete forms in different ways…’103 
 
Fifth, the transfer of powers from the member state to the Community ‘has been 
recognised by the other contracting parties’,104 at least by acquiescence.105 
 
2.2. The International Fruit Company case and UN Security Council 
resolutions imposing economic sanctions 
If the reasoning of the International Fruit Company case could be transferred to the 
relationship between the EU and the UN Security Council resolutions in respect of 
economic sanctions, the EU would be bound by the latt r. Thus the assessment of the 
binding character of UN resolutions must start with the above listed criteria 
established by the ECJ – its core being the functioal substitution of the member 
state by the European Union.106  
 
First, all EU member states are signatories of the UN Charter. However, this cannot 
be sufficient as otherwise all international agreemnts that are binding on all EU 
member states would be binding on the European Union, although neither the 
Treaties nor ECJ case law provide for such a broad cl im.107  However, regarding 
economic UN Security Council resolutions it has been suggested by some that the 
circumvention argument applied by the ECJ in the Int rnational Fruit Company case 
cannot be applied to the European Union. These critics hold the view that the claim 
made by others that EU member states who themselves are bound by UN Security 
Council resolutions would not be in position to transfer more powers than they 
possess themselves to the European Community - a fact th t would indicate that the 
EU is bound by the UN Charter in the same way as its member states, based on the 
so called Hypothekentheorie - would disregard the development of the 
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106 Supporting the view that the EU could be bound by economic Security Council resolutions: 
Eeckhout (n 97) 438, 439. Rejecting this view is Bohr (n 4), 265; also rather negative is  C Eckes, 
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Community.108 They argue that the Community has emerged into a ‘new 
governmental power centre which could not be conceptualized as being made up of 
fragments or splinters of national sovereign authori y’. 109 Although it holds true that 
the European Community and then the EU developed into international organisations 
of a sui generis nature, this does not imply that the EU can invent new powers for 
itself. The EU is still based on the principle of conferred powers and it therefore 
matters what powers the member states have that could p tentially be transferred to 
the European Union.  
 
The member states of the European Union renounced some of their sovereign powers 
through their membership of the United Nations and it is therefore difficult to 
imagine how they can regain those powers indirectly through their membership of 
the European Union - especially in light of the expr ssed commitment of the 
European Union to the principles of the United Nations.  This commitment can be 
found in several Treaty provisions, political documents and in case law.  
Furthermore, the circumvention argument is just onef the arguments used by the 
Court to argue in favour of the functional substitution of the member states by the 
European Union. 
 
Second, the EU has assumed functions previously exercised by the member states. 
As shown in chapter five above, a transfer of power in the field of economic 
sanctions from the member states to the EU has gradually taken place and the 
European Union has acquired competence in this field. As discussed in chapter five, 
it is not clear whether the EU actually has exclusive competence, but the ECJ did not 
refer to exclusive competence in the International Fruit Company case.110 
                                                
108 C Tomuschat , ‘Case T-306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission, Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 21 September 2005; Case T-
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109 Tomuschat (n 108) 543. 
110 Eeckhout (n 97) 438. 
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Subsequent case law is not entirely clear regarding the requirement of exclusive 
competence either.111   
 
In the Kadi decision of the Court of First Instance, focusing on financial sanctions 
against individuals, the cCFI successfully drew a detailed analogy with the 
International Fruit Company case without characterising the EU’s competence for 
the adoption of economic sanctions as exclusive.112 In respect of the necessary 
transfer of power, the Court stated that 
 
[s]ince the entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, the transfer of powers which has occurred in the 
relations between the Member States and the Community has been put 
into concrete form in different ways within the framework of the 
performance of their obligations under the Charter of the United 
Nations.113 Thus it is, in particular, that Article 118a of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 301 EC)114 was added to the Treaty by the Treaty on 
European Union in order to provide a specific basis for the economic 
sanctions that the Community, which has exclusive competence in the 
sphere of the common commercial policy, may need to impose in respect 
of third countries for political reasons defined by its Member States in 
connection with the CFSP, most commonly pursuant to a resolution of 
the Security Council requiring the adoption of such sanctions.115 It 
therefore appears that, in so far as under the EC Treaty the Community 
has assumed powers previously exercised by Member States in the area 
governed by the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of that 
Charter have the effect of binding the Community.116 
 
Although it referred to the exclusive competence of the European Union in the 
sphere of the common commercial policy, the Court failed to answer the question of 
whether the EU has exclusive competence in respect of economic and financial 
sanctions targeted against third parties.  
                                                
111 In favour of  the requirement of exclusivity, M Nettesheim , ‘U.N. Sanctions Against Individuals – 
A Challenge To The Architecture Of European Governance’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 
585. 
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114 Today’s  Article 215 LTFEU. 
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Nevertheless, the special nature of economic sanctions, combining trade measures 
with foreign policy considerations and their unique constitutional setting within the 
EU legal order, linking the intergovernmental common f reign and security policy 
with the supranational EU policy sector, might indicate that the traditional 
competence categories of the supranational EU policies, including shared exclusive 
and parallel competence, might not be appropriate to describe the distribution of 
powers between the EU and the member states in the sp re of economic sanctions. 
This view can be supported by the competence catalogue introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which does not categorise the common foreign and security policy. In 
addition, the Treaty on European Union consistently highlights the special nature of 
the common foreign and security policy, which is subject to special rules and 
procedures. 
 
Therefore it is not appropriate to use a formal approach of traditional competence 
categories to the EU’s competence regarding economic sanctions as already 
indicated in chapter five. Instead it is more helpful to approach the substance of the 
EU’s competence regarding economic sanctions and to examine whether and to what 
extent the member states are constrained in the condu t of their national foreign 
policies through EU sanction decisions to determine wh ther the EU has taken over 
the space previously occupied by the EU member states. As discussed in chapter five 
above, the member states are largely limited in their domestic policies through EU 
sanctions. There is hardly any room left for unilater l economic measures. If the 
member states can make use of Article 347 LTFEU to justify unilateral measures in 
case the procedure of Article 215 LTFEU does not work, they are not free to act as 
they please. They are limited a priori and ex posterior. 
 
In consequence, the findings of the ECJ in Intertanko,117 which asked for the ‛full 
transfer of powers previously exercised by the Membr States to the Community’ as 
a pre-condition for the substitution of the member states through the European Union 
in respect of the International Convention for the Pr vention of Pollution from Ships, 
                                                
117 Intertanko (n 59). 
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as supplemented by the Protocol of 17 February 1978 (Marpol 73/78) and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS),118  cannot counter the 
arguments put forward here. The EU has replaced the member states in the sphere of 
economic sanctions independently of whether one qualifies the nature of EU 
economic sanctions as exclusive, exclusive albeit in a sui generis way, or as non-
exclusive. 
 
Third, the EU has shown its willingness to be bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions. Although the EU never explicitly stated that it would be legally bound 
by UN Security Council resolutions regarding economic sanctions, the Basic 
Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctio s),119 a political document, 
stresses the strong commitment of the European Union towards its obligations under 
the UN Charter and states that, 
 
[w]e are committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way 
to maintain and restore international peace and security in accordance 
with the principles of the UN Charter and of our common foreign and 
security policy. In this context, the Council will work continuously to 
support the UN and fulfil our obligations under the UN Charter.120 We 
will seek to further intensify our efforts within the UN, in line with 
Article 19 TEU, to coordinate our actions on sanctions. We will ensure 
full, effective and timely implementation by the European Union of 
measures agreed by the UN Security Council. We willestablish a 
dialogue with the UN to this effect.121 
 
Practice also shows that the EU often implements UN Security Council resolutions 
when adopting economic sanctions. When doing so, the European Union updates its 
Council decisions and regulations whenever the Security Council slightly changes its 
sanctions regimes. The EU thereby indicates its willingness to be bound by them.  
 
                                                
118Intertanko (n 59) para 49. 
119 Council of the European Union, ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions)’ 
Brussels, 7 June 2004, 10198/1/04 REV 1[hereinafter Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive 
Measures]. 
120Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (n 119), Annex I para 1. 
121 Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (n 119), Annex I para 2. 
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Furthermore, the intention to be bound can be deduced from past practice, including 
the sanctions imposed against Iraq during the Kuwait crisis in the 1990s.122  The 
member states met in the framework of European Political Cooperation and decided 
to adopt economic sanctions against Iraq. After these meetings, UN Security Council 
resolutions were passed that differed in substance to a small extent.123 Before 
formally adopting  European instruments, the EU therefore adjusted its initial plans 
to make them run in line with the adopted UN resoluti ns.124 
 
Fourth, the EU has acted within the framework of the United Nations through the 
implementation of economic UN sanctions in the European legal order. Before 
sanctions are adopted at the UN level, the European Union tries to influence the 
decision and adoption process. In general, the EU attempts to coordinate its actions 
on sanctions in the Security Council and tries to encourage the adoption of universal 
sanctions before it resorts to autonomous EU action, f necessary.125 When 
implementing economic UN Security Council sanctions, the EU usually states that 
‘action by the Community is needed to implement the m asures’ foreseen in the 
respective UN Security Council resolution.126 But it is not only the EU that is present 
at the United Nations in the context of economic sanctions. The UN sanction regime 
against Iran that was agreed in June 2010 was, for example, decided by China, 
Russia, and the US and by the European permanent Security Council member states 
France and the UK and the non-permanent Security Council member Germany.127 
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has supported the 
adoption of the sanctions against Iran and thus demonstrated that the European 
Union and its member states are both present at the activities of the UN Security 
Council.128 
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125 Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (n 119) Annex I para 3. 
126 See for example Council Common Position (1999/727/CFSP) concerning restrictive measures 
against the Taliban, implementing UN Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 1999 
[1999] OJ L 294/1.  
127 M Emerson and others, ‘Upgrading the EU’s Role as a Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the 
Restructuring of European Diplomacy’ (2011) Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) 
<http://ceps.be/system/files/book/2011/01/Upgrading%20the%20EU%20as%20Global%20Actor%20
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Fifth, the contracting parties of the UN Charter must have recognised the substitution 
of the member states by the EU. Although it has no eat in the UN Security Council 
and therefore does not have a status at the United Nations which is equivalent to its 
seat at the table of GATT,129 the EU nevertheless plays an influential role within t e 
system of the United Nations that cannot be left unnoticed by other UN member 
states. Even before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the influence of the EU 
was visible and the EU member states that were also members of the UN Security 
Council were asked to concert and to keep the other member states informed.130 The 
permanent UN Security Council members France, and the UK, were obliged to 
defend European positions and interests through their actions. The Treaty of Lisbon 
has led to the strengthening of the role played by the EU in the Security Council and 
the Union was no longer merely represented through its member states. Instead the 
EU could be represented through the newly created institution of High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who could intervene on 
behalf of the EU. According to Article 34 LTEU,  
 
[w]hen the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the 
United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit 
on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be 
invited to present the Union’s position. 
 
The UN Security Council’s Provisional Rules of Procedure enable European 
positions to be represented at the Security Council o e a common position has been 
agreed on within the common foreign and security policy.131 According to Provision 
39,  
 
[t]he Security Council may invite members of the Secretariat or other 
persons, whom it considers competent for the purpose, t  supply it with 
information or to give other assistance in examining matters within its 
competence. 
 
                                                
129 Nettesheim (n 111) 585. 
130 Article 19 TEU (Nice version). 
131 Emerson and others (n 127) 69. 
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In line with this provision, the European member states that have a seat at the 
Security Council or the European Union itself can ask to be allowed by the Security 
Council to participate in its open debates, once agr ement on a European position has 
been reached.132  Since 2010, this opportunity has been used regularly.133 However, 
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has so far made only 
a few statements at the UN Security Council.134 Although it has not substituted the 
member states in the UN Security Council completely yet, the European Union’s 
partial presence should be recognised by third parties. As all the International Fruit 
Company case criteria are fulfilled, the EU is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions with respect to economic sanctions.   
 
3. The International Fruit Company case and UN Security Council 
resolutions authorising the use of force 
Although it has no jurisdiction over the common security and defence policy, the 
European Court of Justice’s reasoning in the Int rnational Fruit Company case might 
be suitable for comprehending the relationship betwe n the EU and UN resolutions 
regarding the use of force. The next section will therefore test whether the criteria for 
functional substitution are met in EU crisis management missions.  
 
First, all member states are contracting parties to the United Nations. They are 
legally obliged to implement binding UN Security Council resolutions on the use of 
force. As shown in chapter four, they do not have to accept a military mandate in the 
sense that the have deploy their military personnel. Nonetheless, they are under a 
loyalty obligation that asks them not to undermine th  success of a military 
operation. This obligation can entail negative as well as positive obligations. 
 
Second, the EU must have acquired powers in the field of the common security and 
defence policy, and in particular with regards to the use of force in crisis 
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management operations. The member states are reluctant to lose some of their 
competences in security and defence matters as they are perceived to lie at the very 
heart of state sovereignty. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in chapter two, a process of 
European integration is slowly ongoing within the EU’s common security and 
defence policy. The European Union has been equipped with bodies, institutions and 
capabilities and has legally binding instruments at its disposal with which it can 
pursue crisis management tasks. Although Council desions can only be adopted by 
unanimous decisions of the member states, member states are not obliged to put 
certain topics on Council meeting agendas and can thereby avoid unified European 
approaches to international crises while Council decisions can be phrased in very 
vague and open terms and could thus leave room for domestic measures, chapter 
three has demonstrated that once such a decision is in place, European member states 
are bound by it. Once a Council decision is adopted to launch and conduct a military 
crisis management operation, member states are constrained in the conduct of their 
domestic foreign policies.  
 
If the member states in the Council decide to launch a European crisis management 
mission of a military nature, the legally binding character of the adopted Council 
decision is reinforced by the principle of loyal cooperation. The principle of loyal 
cooperation asks the member states to support the EU’s external and security policy 
actively and unreservedly, to comply with the Union’s action and to refrain from any 
action that is contrary to Union interest or might impair the effectiveness of the 
Union’s action as discussed in chapter three.135  
 
The entailed positive as well as negative obligations do not ask the member states to 
take part in a European crisis management operation of a military nature by sending 
their troops. Member states’ military capabilities are not reserved for CSDP 
purposes.136 Thus, member states are free to supply their military personnel for a UN 
                                                
135 Article 24 (3) LTEU. 
136 European Council, ‘EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations: Elements of 
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mission, for example, without acting within the framework of a European crisis 
management operation. In such cases, the EU has offered to provide a ‘clearing 
house process’ amongst its member states.137   ‘The ‘clearing house process’ aims at 
creating a framework by which Member States could, on a voluntary basis, exchange 
information on their contributions to a given UN operation and, if they so decide, co-
ordinate these national contributions.’138 Nevertheless, if the member states in the 
Council decide to launch and to conduct an EU crisis management operation (in 
support of the UN for example) instead and not just a military coordination 
operation, this operation would be ‘under the political control and strategic direction 
of the EU’.139  The two differing roles the EU has foreseen for itself in the context of 
military operations therefore indicate that once a crisis management operation within 
the framework of the common security and defence policy is launched, the operation 
acquires a unique character. A CSDP military operation appears to be of a different 
nature than a group of European member states coordinating their resources within a 
European framework.140  In Somalia, the European Union launched both types of 
missions in the context of the CSDP. Operation EU NAVCO was a military 
coordination action in support of UN Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008) under 
the auspices of the CSDP. Its aim was to ‘support the activities of Member States 
deploying military assets in theatre, with a view to facilitating the availability and 
operational action of those assets, in particular by setting up a coordination cell in 
Brussels…’141  With the start of operation Atalanta, the coordination cell was closed 
and an EU Operation Commander was appointed.142 Taken together with the legally 
binding nature of Council decision adopted in the context of crisis management 
                                                
137 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 5. 
138 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 5. 
139 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 7. 
140 According to T Tardy, the clearing house process wa activated in 2004 when the EU Satellite 
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the Democratic Republic of Congo. See T Tardy, ‘EU-UN Cooperation in Peace-Keeping: a 
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support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO) [2008] OJ L 252/40, Article 2 
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142 Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP on a European military operation to contribute to the 
deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast [2008] 
OJ L 301/33, preamble (8), Article 3. 
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missions it is therefore possible to argue that the European Union has assumed 
functions in the field of the common security and defence policy.  
 
Third, the EU must have shown its willingness to be bound by the provisions of UN 
Security Council resolutions. As previously illustrated in this chapter, the EU 
Treaties avoid a clear statement as to whether or not the European Union is bound by 
international law and the UN Charter. Nevertheless, they highlight the EU’s respect 
for the international legal order and the values and principles of the UN Charter.  
 
Political documents of the European Union such as the European Security Strategy 
of 2003 emphasise the EU’s commitment to upholding and developing international 
law without admitting to the binding character of the UN Charter.143 The ESS states 
that, 
 
[t]he fundamental framework for international relations is the United 
Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities 
and to act effectively, is a European priority.144 
 
Similarly, the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management 
mentions that ‘the European Union reasserts its commit ent to contribute to the 
objectives of the United Nations in crisis management’. 145  
 
In previous years, the European Union has improved its capacity for rapid response 
military crisis management operations. The Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation 
in Crisis Management includes a statement according to which the European 
battlegroup concept can be used ‘in response to requests from the UN Security 
Council, under a UN mandate where appropriate’.146 In practice, the European Union 
                                                
143 European Security Strategy (n 1) 9. 
144 European Security Strategy (n 1) 9. 
145 Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis 
Management’, Brussels, 19 September 2003, 12730/03, para 1[hereinafter Joint Declaration on UN-
EU Co-operation in Crisis Management]. 
146 Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’, 
Brussles, 7 June 2007, Press Release <http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-
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has responded to these statements and has used the newly created capabilities for 
crisis management. On the request of the United Nations, the European Union has 
launched and conducted military crisis management operations under the framework 
of the common security and defence policy for that purpose. Operation Artemis,147 
the Union’s first military crisis management operation, was conducted at the request 
of the United Nations.148 During the conduct of military crisis management missions, 
the European Union so far has cooperated with the United Nations and thereby 
indicated its willingness to be bound. Whenever the European Union has accepted a 
UN mandate so far it has acted as if it were bound by it. 
 
Fourth, the EU must have acted within the framework of the United Nations. In the 
absence of a standing army, the United Nations needs capable and willing actors. 
Therefore, the EU’s rapidly deployable troops can add value to the international 
security system and are of interest to the United Nations.149  The European rapid 
response capabilities or the battle group concept, have been designed predominantly 
for operations requested by the UN.150  As mentioned above, the European Union 
considers EU crisis management operations as a way to support the United 
Nations.151 This can be done either through an EU stand alone operation or through a 
modular approach.152 Within the modular approach the EU would be ‘responsible for 
a specific component within the structure of a UN mission’.153 The European 
component ‘would operate under political control and strategic direction of the 
EU’.154  If a rapid response to a crisis is needed, the EU-UN Cooperation in Military 
Crisis Management Operations: Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint 
Declaration has developed two models of deployment in support of he United 
                                                                                                                                
UNstatmntoncrsmngmnt.pdf> para 4 [hereinafter Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in crisis 
Management]. 
147 Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP on the European Union military operation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo [2003] OJ L 143/50. 
148 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management (n 145) para 2. 
149 J Wouters and T Ruys, ‘UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management’ in J Wouters, F Hoffmeister 
and T Ruys (eds), The United Nations and the European Union: An Ever Stronger Partnership 
(T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2006) 248. 
150 Wouters and Ruys (n 149) 235. 
151 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 7. 
152 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 7. 
153 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 7. 
154 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 7. 
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Nations – the bridging model and the stand-by model. The bridging model is 
designed to give the UN time either to organise a new operation or to reorganise an 
existing one by deploying an autonomous EU mission.155 The EU’s operation 
EUFOR Tchad/RCA was conducted as a military bridging operation.156 The stand-by 
model consists of an EU reserve in support of an UN mission.157 Not only was the 
above mentioned Operation Artemis conducted by the European Union upon the 
request of the United Nations but also operation EUFOR RD Congo. The structural 
and operational partnership between the EU and the United Nations in crisis 
management operations thus supports the view that the EU acts within the UN 
framework. 
 
Fifth, the EU should have been recognised by the UN as a substitute for the member 
states in the sphere of military crisis management operations. The United Nations 
appears to recognise both the European member states and the European Union as 
partners in international crisis management. In the Security Council, the EU can be 
represented by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
According to Article 34(2) LTEU,  
 
[w]hen the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the 
United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit 
on the Security Council shall request that the High Representative be 
invited to present the Union’s position. 
 
In addition, the ‘[m]ember states which are also memb rs of the United Nations 
Security Council will concert and keep the other Memb r States and the High 
Representative fully informed’.158 This obligation will enable the EU gradually to 
build up the necessary expertise in cooperating with the United Nations in order to 
influence the debates in the Security Council in the long term.159 The High 
                                                
155 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 9. 
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157 EU-UN Co-operation in Military Crisis Management Operations (n 136) para 13. 
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Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy can propose military crisis 
management operations.160 In consequence, she could potentially enter into 
negotiations on behalf of European member states with the relevant Security Council 
members.161 In practice however, the permanent Security Council members France 
and the UK still play a significant role in the UN Security Council. In the case of 
Libya in 2011, both actively supported a possible intervention while the non-
permanent UN Security Council member Germany opposed an operation.162  
 
The European member states are not restricted usingtheir military capabilities within 
European operations conducted under the framework of the common security and 
defence policy. They can deploy their forces within NATO or in an ad hoc coalition 
of states. If however, the European member states supply their forces as part of a 
European crisis management operation, the United Nations and other international 
actors stop contacting the individual contributing member states and build 
operational structures with EU institutions and bodies. They then communicate with 
EU bodies such as the EU Operation Commander, the Political and Security 
Committee and the EU Military Committee, for example.  
 
Additionally, the EU has developed specific crisis management structures. Rapid 
reaction mechanisms are offered to the United Nations n the name of the EU and not 
in the name of the individual member states. Therefore the UN experiences the EU as 
a partner in crisis management.163 Formal contacts between the UN and the EU in 
this context started to develop in 2000.164  In practice, the UN Security Council has 
authorised the European Union under Chapter VII UN Charter to deploy an operation 
in Chad.165  The intention to conduct a European military operation in Bosnia-
                                                
160 Article 42(4) LTEU. 
161 Pirozzi, Juergenliemk  and Spies (n 159) 13. 
162 Pirozzi, Juergenliemk and Spies (n 159) 13. 
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Herzegovina was welcomed by the UN Security Council.166 The Security Council 
decided that the European military crisis management ission ‘EUFOR RD Congo is 
authorised to take all necessary measures’.167 In the context of the fight against 
piracy off the Somali coast, the UN Security Council recognised the planning process 
of a possible EU naval operation168 and UN Security Council Resolution 1851 (2008) 
welcomed the launch of EU Operation Atalanta.169  Consequently the UN recognises 
both the European member states and the European Unio as partners in international 
crisis management. If however, the European Union launches a military crisis 
management operation, third parties will stop contacting the contributing EU 
member states and will build operational structures with EU institutions and bodies. 
Therefore, the UN should recognise the EU as substit ting the member states in the 
context of European crisis management operations. 
 
All five criteria established in the International Fruit Company case are met. 
Therefore it is possible to conclude that the EU has substituted for its member states 
in EU-led crisis management mission involving the us  of force. This does not mean 
that the European member states have been replaced by the EU in all aspects of the 
use of force. Whenever EU member states decide to dploy their forces outside EU 
crisis management operations they are free to do so. They do not have to involve the 
EU in military operations. They are free to act outside the CSDP. However, once 
they decide to act within the common security and defence policy and unanimously 
vote in favour of an EU-led military crisis management operation, they are 
represented by the European Union in the internatiol sphere and are constrained in 
the conduct of their national foreign policies. 
 
In consequence of its substitution for the member state  during military crisis 
management operations, the European Union is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions. The European Union does not have to accept a Security Council 
resolution authorising the use of force in the sense that it has to start a military crisis 
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management operation. However, if it accepts a UN mandate, the EU is bound by the 
UN Security Council resolution in its entirety. Henc , the EU must accept the 
conditions set up for the use of force by the resoluti n, including, for example, time-
limits. But UN Security Council resolutions are also binding on the Union if it 
decides not to play an active role. In such a situation, the EU would be under the 
negative obligation not to undermine the effectiveness of the actions by the UN 
members that accepted the UN mandate. Hence, in the spirit of a loyalty obligation, 
the European Union would, for example, have to stopits member states from selling 
weapons and other military equipments etc. to the target. However, the binding 
nature of UN Security Council resolutions is not unlimited. 
 
Part 4 
Legal limits to the binding nature of UN Security C ouncil resolutions 
authorising the use of force  
Although it has been argued that the EU is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions regarding the use of force, this rule is not without exceptions. The limits 
to the binding nature of UN Security Council resoluti ns are created by international 
law as well as by the European legal order. 
 
1. Limits created by international law – Ultra vires UN Security Council 
decisions 
It was argued in chapter four above that if the Security Council oversteps the 
purposes and principles of the UN Charter its acts become ultra vires. The same has 
to be said if it violates norms of jus cogens. The purposes and principles of the UN 
Charter and the concept of jus cogens include the core of international human rights 
and the core of humanitarian law. Security Council resolutions that are ultra vires do 
not produce legal effects and international actors can refuse compliance. Therefore 
UN Security Council resolutions are not binding on the EU when they are ultra vires 





2. Legal limits created by EU law – European fundam ental rights 
The European legal order, too, decides when UN Security Council resolutions stop 
being binding, irrespective of whether they are binding from the perspective of 
international law. This is a result of the autonomy of the EU legal order.  In Kadi, the 
European Court of Justice rightfully held that UN Security Council resolutions 
cannot enjoy primacy over primary Community law. The European legal order 
represents an autonomous legal system that is based on general principles of law 
including the rule of law and European fundamental rights.  
 
The Treaty of Lisbon that de-pillarised the EU and le  to the end of the European 
Community also partly resolved the dispute of whether e European Union is bound 
by human rights as general principles of EU law when it is acting externally. Article 
6(3) LTEU now expressly refers to general principles of Union law. It thus supports 
the view that the European Union is not only bound by human rights internally but 
also when it is acting externally under the common foreign and security policy as 
well as the common security and defence policy.170  
 
The European Union is not only bound by human rights but also by rules of 
humanitarian law when it is engaged in the use of force as recognised by the 
European Union itself. The Updated European Union Guidelines on Promoting 
Compliance with International Humanitarian Law state that  
 
[t]he European Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. 
This includes the goal of promoting compliance with IHL.171 
 
In consequence, the EU is not bound by UN Security Council resolutions regarding 
the use of force if the Security Council has acted ultra vires, for example, by 
violating the core of human rights or the core of humanitarian law. In addition, EU 
law draws the boundaries for the binding nature of UN Security Council decisions. 
                                                
170 F Naert, ‘Accountability for Violations of human Rights Law by EU Forces’ in S Blockmans (ed),  
The European Union and Crisis Management: Policy and Legal Aspects  (T.M.C. Asser Press, The 
Hague 2008) 388. 
171 Council of the European Union, Updated European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) of 15 12 2009, OJ C 303/12. 
 242 
Even if they are valid from an international law perspective, they could be contrary 
to primary EU law, including European fundamental rights or norms of humanitarian 
law. Kadi has shown that in the view of the European Court of Justice human rights 
standards applied by the UN Security Council and human rights standards developed 
within the European legal order could differ from each other. No information is 
available for humanitarian law, probably due to the rather young development of the 
EU as a military actor. However, if the EU develops it  own standards of 
humanitarian law that might be stricter than the ons demanded by international law 
in general, UN Security Council resolutions likely to infringe those standards would 
not be binding on the European Union. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the European Union is legally bound by UN 
Security Council resolutions within the context of the use of force. The EU needs to 
obtain an explicit UN Security Council mandate befor  it can engage in the use of 
force during a crisis management operation. Once the UN Security Council has 
authorised the use of force, the European Union is bound. The European Union is 
obliged to respect the wording and the purpose of the authorisation of the use of 
force. Force cannot lawfully be used outside the designated territory, after the time 
limit has expired, for purposes that have not been id tified in the UN resolution or 
in a fashion or manner that is not covered by the resolution itself. It also would not 
be lawful for the EU to use force to extinguish thegoverning elite of a state in order 
to settle a conflict if the resolution does not provide for it; neither is the EU supposed 
to deploy land forces if the UN Security Council resolution limits the use of force to 
naval operations. 
 
Even if it does not accept a UN mandate and does not launch a military crisis 
management mission, the EU is bound by UN Security Council resolutions 
authorising the use of force in the spirit of a loyalt  obligation. The EU is obliged not 
to undermine the success of a military operation through either its action or inaction.  
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The binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions is not however without its 
limits. UN Security Council resolutions stop being binding on the EU when they stop 
being binding under international law in general, in particular when the UN Security 
Council is acting ultra vires. The EU legal order also creates boundaries for UN 
Security Council resolutions. If they violate primary EU law, including European 
fundamental rights, UN Security Council resolutions do not produce legally binding 
effects in the autonomous European legal order.  
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Chapter 7: The implications of silence in the conte xt of the use of force 
 
Introduction 
So far it has been argued that the European Union is bound by UN Security Council 
resolutions in the context of the use of force. It has also been held that within the 
European common security and defence policy, European member states are bound 
by existing CSDP decisions. The present chapter will test the findings of the previous 
chapters and will take them a step further. This chapter will look at the meaning of 
different dimensions of silence in the context of the use of force and how silence 
affects the three different actors involved - the United Nations, the European Union 
and the European member states. A key example illustrating the questions raised in 
this chapter can be found in the EU’s inability to speak with one voice during the war 
against Iraq in 2003.   
 
Within the European Union no serious effort was made to reach a consensus over 
Iraq. Only the Greek Presidency called for an extraordinary European Council 
meeting in February 2003 to find common ground and limit damage.1 The 
conclusions of this meeting merely recognised the primary responsibility of the UN 
Security Council to deal with Iraqi disarmament. They emphasised the EU’s 
commitment to UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (1992) in this respect and 
expressed the wish of the people of Europe to disarm Iraq in a peaceful way. They 
also emphasised Iraq’s final chance to resolve the crisis peacefully.2 The 
extraordinary European Council meeting mainly reaffirmed the conclusions of the 
GAERC of 27 January without making much progress.3 The presidency conclusions 
                                                
1 T Salmon, ‘‘United in its Diversity’ (or Disunited in Adversary): That is the Question for the EU and 
the European Security and Defence Policy’ (2004) 5 Perspective European Politics Society, Special 
Issue on European Security Post Iraq 448. 
2 Council of the European Union, Extraordinary European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 17 
February 2003, Conclusions, 6466/03, 1. 
3  2482nd Council meeting General Affairs and External Relations, Brussels, 27 January 2003, 
PRES/03/08 
‘The Council, deeply concerned about the situation in Iraq, reaffirms that its goal remains the effective 
and complete disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The Council fully supports the 
efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq with all relevant resolutions of the 
Security Council, in particular with UNSCR 1441 of 8 November 2002. The resolution gives an 
unambiguous message that the Iraqi Government has afinal opportunity to resolve the crisis 
peacefully.’ 
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were viewed as a compromise and as an attempt to uni e Europe. While trying to 
achive a peaceful solution, military measures were viewed to be a last resort. 
Nevertheless, it was held that it would be for the UN Security Council to set a time 
limit.4 
 
Because of profound disagreements between European member states, informal 
attempts to agree also failed.5 In consequence, the EU did not adopt a legally binding 
common position or joint action6 dealing with support for or the rejection of military 
action against Iraq. The European Union remained silent in accordance with the 
absence of a UN Security Council resolution authorizing military sanctions against 
Iraq. The UK and Spain supported the US led ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, beginning 
on 19 March 2003, while France and Germany opposed the war.7  
 
By examining the relationship between the European Union and the United Nations, 
chapter six above showed that the European Union is bound by positive UN Security 
Council decisions authorising the use of force in the sense that the EU, although not 
obliged to accept military mandates, is nevertheless under an obligation to respect the 
wording and limits of the authorising UN Security Council resolutions once it 
decides on engagement. Furthermore, the European Union is duty-bound not to 
undermine the success of the use of military coerciv  measures through its actions or 
inactions if it does not accept a mandate. Nevertheless the question remains about 
whether the European Union can deploy an EU-led military intervention without an 
explicit UN Security Council mandate or whether thesilence of the UN Security 
Council needs to be interpreted as a prohibition of the use of force. The answer to 
this question is linked to an understanding of the UN’s system of collective security 
in general and the nature of the authorisation of the use of force through the UN 
Security Council in particular. 
 
                                                
4 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, FAZ.NET, ‘EU einigt sich auf Irak-Erklärung’, 17 February 2003 
<http://www.faz.net/artikel/C30189/irak-krise-eu-einigt-sich-auf-irak-erklaerung-30124326.html>.  
5 Salmon (n 1) 448. 
6 The instruments are now known as Council decisions. 
7 D McGoldrick, From ‘9-11’ To The ‘Iraq War 2003’:  International Law in an Age of Complexity 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) 13, 16. 
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Focusing on the relationship between the European Union and its member states in 
respect of the use of force, the question arises whether member states are free to use 
national military sanctions unilaterally, in ad hoc coalitions or within a regional 
organisations such as NATO, in case no agreement has been reached within the 
common security and defence policy; or whether silence within the common security 
and defence policy indicates that the European Union d es not want its member 
states to deploy military force. Are member states fr e to act as they please, if the EU 
cannot agree on a common stance?8 The answer to this question depends on the 
understanding of the binding nature of the common security and defence policy that 
was addressed in chapter three above. 
 
To analyse the meaning of silence in the context of the use of force, the first part of 
this chapter will examine silence as a legal concept. This will be followed in part two 
with an analysis of the meaning of silence within the United Nations. It will be 
argued that only an explicit and a priori obtained mandate by the UN Security 
Council to use military sanctions is lawful. Anything else but such an authorisation is 
equivalent to a silence of the UN Security Council. Part three will demonstrate how 
the claimed implicit authorisation to use force is open to political abuse in practice. 
Part four will test how the silence of the UN Security Council affects non UN-
members like the European Union. Turning to the EU legal order itself, the final part 
will examine whether the development of an cquis securitaire has the potential of 
qualifying silence within the common security and defence policy in a certain way.  
 
Part 1 
Silence as a legal concept 
Usually silence does not have a meaning, or to be more precise, although it might be 
possible to guess what silence does not mean, to deduce a positive message from a 
silence is usually too vague to be of any legal value. Therefore, law normally does 
                                                
8 In the case of Iraq the EU had implemented economic UN Security Council sanctions. Would it thus 
be possible to interpret the silence of the EU that ran in line with the absence of a UN Security 
Council resolution authorising the use of force, as suggesting that the EU rejects military sanctions 
and considers the past economic sanctions regime as sufficient and proportional? And could this 
silence prevent member states from imposing autonomus national measures? 
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not treat silence, which could also be classified as negative action or inaction, as a 
positive action. The underlying reason for this is that silence is not a declaration of 
intention. The person who keeps silent expresses neither consent nor rejection.  
 
However, in some national legal systems, for example in Germany, silence can have 
an objective legal meaning comparable to positive action and can thus be treated as a 
declaration of intent. Three cases are possible. First, parties can agree beforehand 
that silence in response to a specified situation should be given a particular meaning; 
second, a legal provision can grant silence with the specific legal value of a 
declaration. In slight contrast with the first two scenarios, silence might not be 
considered to be equivalent to a declaration but it can be treated like one, namely 
when the party that remained silent would have been under a legal duty to give an 
opposite declaration, according to qui tacet, consentire videtur, ubi loqui debuit 
atque potuit.9 In sum, to be treated like positive action, silence must be qualified in a 
certain way, for example through a duty to act or by legal provisions. In general, 
silence must be interpreted within the context of its legal system. It is this qualifying 
act that grants silence a specific value and allows it to be interpreted in narrow terms.  
 
Within the international legal order, the question of the interpretation of silence has 
been addressed by the International Court of Justice when it was requested to give an 
advisory opinion on the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of 
Kosovo.10 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bennouna argued that ‛[i]n all events, 
silence must be interpreted by reference to the entirety of the direct context and its 
background’.11 Although transferring legal principles from one legal order to another 
can be problematic, especially from the domestic level to the international level, the 
present chapter will try to show that the above outlined principles are applicable 
universally. 
 
                                                
9 O Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch: BGB (46th edn C.H.Beck, München 1987) Einführung von § 
116 Rn 3. 
10 International Court of Justice, Accordance with Inter ational Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010. 
11 Judge Bennouna, International Court of Justice, Accordance with International Law of the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010, 
para 60. 
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Therefore, this chapter will put special emphasis on the individual elements that 
qualify silence in the context of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter and the EU’s common security and defence policy. It will be shown that 
these qualifying elements are to be found in the general system of the United Nations 
on the one hand and in the structure of the common foreign and security policy on 
the other hand. 
 
Part 2 
The silence of the UN Security Council in the conte xt of the use of force  
When turning to the relationship between the European Union and the United 
Nations and explains how silence of the UN Security Council impacts on the EU and 
the use of force, two sets of the problems need to be distinguished. First, the meaning 
and legal implications of silence by the UN Security Council needs to be examined.  
It will be shown that the UN’s system of collective s curity determines how the 
silence of the UN Security Council needs to be interpreted by its member states. 
Second, how the silence of the UN Security Council affects non-members of the 
United Nations, such as the European Union, will be addressed.  
 
1. Interpreting the silence of the UN Security Coun cil in the context of 
the UN’s system of collective security 
Turning to the first question i.e. how the silence of the UN Security Council in 
respect of the use of force has to be interpreted, the system of collective security of 
the United Nations is decisive. The assessment will start with the nature of the 
United Nations as a vertical, centralised system of international law enforcement in 
which the member states have granted the UN Security Council with the primary 
responsibility to maintain and restore international peace and security. In 
consequence, member states are only permitted to use force unilaterally, that is 
without UN Security Council authorisation, in narrowly defined UN Charter 
exceptions. Otherwise they must convince the members of the UN Security Council 
to authorise the use of force or refrain from military sanctions. The argument put 
forward here is that only the explicit and a priori authorisation by the UN Security 
Council to use force is permissible under the system of the UN Charter. This will be 
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supported by the delegation technique applied by the UN Security Council in 
practice.  
 
1.1. The UN as a vertical, centralised system of la w enforcement 
Through the creation of the United Nations as an international organisation, the UN 
member states committed themselves to a vertical, centralised system of law 
enforcement12 as described above in chapter four. They bound themselves to the 
procedures and substantive rules of the UN Charter nd they created the competence 
for the UN Security Council to solve disputes through binding decisions. The UN 
member states conferred ‛on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security’ and agreed ‘that in carrying out its 
duties under this responsibility the Security Council a ts on their behalf’. In turn, 
they renounced their power to enforce international law on a horizontal level, if and 
as far as the UN Security Council acts. The member states were motivated to transfer 
their power to use force to an international organis tion by the belief that their 
individual national interests were best served by the protection of the interests of the 
community of states as a whole.13 
 
The UN Security Council is envisaged as a maker of objective decisions based on the 
principles and values of the United Nations and thereby avoids becoming a party to 
disputes.14 Although it is made up of representatives of fifteen member states, the 
UN Security Council’s decisions are supposed to represent all member states, 
therefore almost all states in the world. It is this idea of universality and collectivity 
behind the decisions of the UN Security Council which grants them their legitimacy. 
In consequence, the target state must accept the collective measures imposed against 
it and cannot claim to be acting in self-defence. States that suffer economic losses 
                                                
12 K Osteneck,  Die Umsetzung von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionen durch die Europäische Gemeinschaft: 
Völker- und europarechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für ein Tätigwerden der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft im Bereich von UN-Wirtschaftssanktionsregimen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der Umsetzungspraxis der EG-Organe, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht: Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht Band 168 (Springer 
Verlag, Berlin 2004) 8. 
13 D Sarooshi, The United Nations and the Development of Collectiv Security: The Delegation by the 
UN Security Council of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 5- 6. 
14 Osteneck (n 12) 8. 
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due to collective military sanctions, although not direct targets, have to accept the 
negative side effects of the enforcement of the colle tive will.  
 
Another corollary of membership in a vertical centralised system of law enforcement 
is the rejection of the unilateral use of force in general. The United Nations is based 
on the principle of non-intervention. This principle, although not explicitly 
mentioned by the Charter itself, flows from several Charter provisions, including the 
prohibition of the use of force Article 2(4) UN Charter) the principle of sovereign 
equality15 as well as the principle of non-interference in the internal matters of a 
state.16 Based on this general understanding of the UN Charter as a system of 
collective security, member states are only permitted o use force when authorised 
by the UN Security Council as agents of the collectiv  will.17 Non-authorised and 
therefore unilateral use of force requires justification.18 The UN Charter itself 
recognises individual and collective self-defence.19 Whether more unwritten 
exceptions to the prohibition of the use of force have acquired the status of 
customary international law is highly disputed.20 By limiting the possibility for 
invoking a Charter exception, the subjective use of force that is prone to abuse is 
limited.  
 
In consequence of this understanding of the UN Charter s a vertical system of law 
enforcement centred on the UN Security Council as the ultimate decision making 
body, the authorisation of military coercive measure  must be explicit and a priori. 
Only a clear and unambiguous mandate by the UN Security Council has the special 
legitimising function envisaged by the UN Charter, based on the idea that its 
decisions are objective and represent the collectiv will of all member states. 
Impartial decisions by a third party, based on a procedure all parties to a conflict 
have agreed to beforehand, are the most effective means to end a conflict and  to 
                                                
15 Article 2 (1) UN Charter. 
16 Article 2 (7) UN Charter. 
17 Osteneck  (n 12) 12. 
18 Osteneck (n 12) 9. 
19 Article 51 UN Charter. 
20 See chapter four. 
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avoid escalation.21 To argue against the need for a clear, explicit and  priori 
mandate to use military sanctions would grant state th  opportunity to use force 
based on individual and subjective considerations by pretending to be acting on 
behalf of the collective will of the international community of states. This practice 
was tried several times in the past, usually in attempts to legitimise the unilateral use 
of force by referring to the general legitimising power of UN Security Council 
decisions under Chapter VII UN Charter. The need to legitimise the unilateral use of 
force by referring to ambiguous UN Security Council practices is felt, as states that 
act without a clear military mandate not only violate the system of collective security 
they claim to be part of but also fall back into the old habits of horizontal and 
decentralised law enforcement in international law that was widely abolished by the 
creation of the United Nations. 
 
In light of the arguments put forward here that only an explicit and a priori mandate 
by the UN Security Council corresponds to the system of centralised and vertical law 
enforcement the member states agreed to through the creation of the United Nations, 
the silence of the UN Security Council must thus be interpreted as the non-
authorisation of the use of force. The non-authorisation of the use of force is 
equivalent to the rejection of military measures by the international community of 
states. 
 
1.2. The general law of international institutions and the delegation of 
the use of force 
The view put forward here that authorisation of theus  of force cannot be implied 
but must be made explicit before the use of force is xercised corresponds with the 
general law of international institutions as well as with the non-delegation doctrine. 
The general law of international institutions asks the delegator to manifest its desire 
to delegate its powers expressly.22 This principle was confirmed in practice in the 
Meroni case23 in which the European Court of Justice had to assess in an annulment 
                                                
21 Osteneck (n 12) 8. 
22 Sarooshi (n 13) 8.  
23 Case 9/56 Meroni & Co. Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steal Community [1958] ECR 133 [hereinafter Meroni].   
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procedure the claim brought forward that the High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community would have committed a misuse of its powers by delegating to 
the Brussels Agency powers conferred to it by the Treaty. The Court held that  
 
[a] delegation of powers cannot be presumed and even wh n empowered 
to delegate its powers the delegating authority must take an express 
decision transferring them.24 
 
Although many differences between the High Authority and the UN Security Council  
exist, the Meroni case refers to a general principle of international law and is 
therefore relevant for an understanding of the powers of the UN Security Council to 
delegate  its Chapter VII powers to states.25 
 
The non-delegation doctrine additionally supports the proposed requirement of an 
explicit a priori UN Security Council authorisation. This doctrine is concerned ‘with 
the extent to which the exercise of a power entrusted to an authority may be 
delegated to another entity’.26 Although some argue that the UN Security Council’s 
enforcement powers do not stem from a delegation but rather originate from the UN 
Charter itself, it is more in line with the wording of Article 24(1) UN Charter27 to 
conclude that the Security Council’s source of power originates from the collectivity 
of the member states.28 The UN member states have transferred their powers via the 
mechanism of the UN Charter and in particular through Article 24(1),29 a view that 
allows the application of the non-delegation doctrine with regards to the Security 
Council.30 
                                                
24 Meroni (n 23) 151. 
25 N Blokker, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to 
Authorize the Use of Force by ‘Coalitions of the Able and Willing’’ (2000) 11 European Journal of 
International Law 554 
26 Sarooshi (n 13) 21. On the application of the non-delegation doctrine to international organisations 
see also D Sarooshi, ‘The Essentially Contested Nature of  the Concept of Sovereignty: Implications 
for the Exercise by International Organizations of Delegated Powers of Government (2004) 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1127 and the following pages. 
27 Article 24 (1) UN Charter states that the UN members ‘agree that in carrying out its duties under 
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.’ 
28 Sarooshi seems to be in favour of delegation by member states. 
29 Sarooshi (n 13) 26, 27. 
30The nature of the power that has been delegated to the UN Security Council is debated as well. The 
proposed views range from states’ sovereignty per se; to an international police power granted by 
states that possessed the power to use force to maintain international peace and security prior to the 
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The non-delegation doctrine argues that the authority that has been attributed with a 
specific discretion or power by the founders of theorganisation must exercise this 
discretion or power in person. By granting certain powers to the authority, the 
founders placed their trust in this entity’s indiviual abilities.31 The drafters of the 
UN Charter envisaged that the UN Security Council would use its discretion to 
decide whether a conflict or crisis was grave enough to qualify for an Article 39 UN 
Charter situation. The Security Council was entrusted with the task of deciding 
whether and if so what kind of enforcement measure should be applied. By 
exercising its discretion, the Security Council puts the promotion and protection of 
the purposes and principles of the UN Charter into concrete terms. If it would be for 
states to use force in the anticipation that their actions would be approved later by the 
Security Council, they would take on the Security Council’s primary functions 
themselves. In consequence, the authorisation of the use of force has to be made 
explicit and a priori by the Security Council.  
 
The non-delegation doctrine also limits the competence of the Security Council to 
delegate its Chapter VII powers to member states. The non-delegation doctrine 
prevents the Security Council from delegating some of its powers completely, 
including the decision whether or not an Article 39 UN Charter situation exists, as 
this decision serves as the gateway to the enforcement easures under chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.32 If states resort to military sanctions under Article 42 UN Charter 
without an explicit Security Council mandate, they control the decision about 
whether a crisis already represents a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression. 
 
Furthermore, the Security Council has to be in overall authority and control with 
regards to the actual exercise of delegated enforcement powers. The Security Council 
needs to be competent to influence the way the delegated powers are carried out and 
                                                                                                                                
entry into force of the UN Charter; to policing power delegated from the international community. See 
Sarooshi for more details (n 13) 28, 29 and M Craven, ‘Humanitarianism and the Quest for Smarter 
Sanctions’ (2002) 13 European Journal of Internatiol Law 52. 
31 Sarooshi (n 13) 21. 
32 Sarooshi (n 13) 33.  
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the objectives that should be achieved. It has to be able to ensure that the use of force 
is exercised in line with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.33  The UN 
Security Council’s overall control of the military operation, and in particular the start 
or termination of an operation, originates from thecentralisation of the use of force 
under the present UN Charter system.34 Its lack of competence for delegating an 
unlimited or unspecified power of command and control to member states reinforces 
the need for a clear Security Council mandate. Otherwis  states could assume broad 
powers that not even the delegator possesses.  
 
1.3. Legitimacy consideration 
The legal requirement for capable and willing actors to obtain an explicit UN 
Security Council mandate before resorting to military enforcement measures is 
reinforced by the ratio underlying the system of the United Nations as a vertical 
centralised system of law-enforcement. Only a clear authorisation by the UN 
Security Council adopted according to the procedural rules of the UN Charter can 
transfer the perceived legitimacy of UN Security Council decisions onto the states or 
regional or international organisations. Only if they base their actions on Security 
Council decisions can military actors appear to be acting on behalf of the 
international community, without being politically biased or without even becoming 
a party to the conflict - at least in theory. By following the rules of the system of the 
United Nations, international actors encourage mutual trust in the values and 
procedures of the United Nations, which in turn reinforces the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of its system of collective security.35  
 
The above arguments show that only the explicit and a priori authorised use of force 
through a UN Security Council mandate is in line with international law and the non-
delegation doctrine on the one hand and the constitutional foundations of the United 
                                                
33 Sarooshi (n 13) 35, 156. 
34 E De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Security Council (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2004) 294. 
35 In light of the first year anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan stressed the central role of the UN Security Council and emphasised that the 
effectiveness of an international security system that is based on multilateralism depends on the 
authority of the Security Council. Address of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in the General 
Assembly, When Force is Considered, There is no Substitute for Legitimacy Provided, 12 September 
2002, Press Release SG/SM/8378, GA/10045. 
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Nations on the other hand. Any use of force that has not been explicit and authorised 
a priori is illegal unless it can be justified by one of theaccepted exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force as discussed in chapter four above.36 In consequence, 
states that intend to impose military sanctions need an explicit mandate by the 
delegator – the UN Security Council – granting them the right to use force. To argue 
otherwise and to allow implicit authorisations would provide the delegates – the 
states – with the opportunity to decide when to use force. This would be in clear 
contrast to the delegation model applied in the lawof international institutions 
according to which the delegator has the final say. In the context of the United 
Nations, it is therefore only for the UN Security Council to decide whether there is a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression according to Article 39 
UN Charter. It is only for the UN Security Council to decide in a further step whether 
and if so what kind of military or non-military collective action should be taken.  
 
Whenever the UN Security Council delegates its Chapter VII powers it confers 
elements of its legitimacy on the delegates, the member states.37 The use of force 
based on anything else but an explicit, clear and  priori obtained UN Security 
Council resolution does not enjoy the same degree of l gitimacy. The possibility for 
the abuse of force is evident.  
 
The argument put forward here is that only an explicit, a priori mandate corresponds 
to the system of the United Nations and the law of international institutions, anything 
else but a clear, explicit and a priori mandate by the UN Security Council is 
equivalent to the lack of a mandate. For the purpose of this chapter, the lack of a 
mandate to use force is equivalent to the silence of the UN Security Council. The 
silence of the UN Security Council cannot therefore b  interpreted as a legal 
authorisation to use force. Based on this reasoning, the silence of the UN Security 
Council can take on many different variations. The following part will look at the 
practice of some states, ad hoc coalitions and regional organisations that have argued 
that in the absence of a clear mandate their unilateral use of force would have been 
implicitly authorised by the UN Security Council. The claim for implicit 
                                                
36 De Wet (n 34) 295. 
37 Sarooshi (n 13) 5. 
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authorisation can be sub-divided into different categories that range from explicit 




Claims of implicitly authorised use of force in pra ctice 
When they impose military enforcement measures without an a priori obtained 
Security Council authorisation, international actors nevertheless try to base their 
military actions within the system of the UN Charter.  In order to draw from the 
legitimacy of UN Security Council decisions, they often argue that the use of 
military force has been authorised by the UN Security Council implicitly. The claims 
put forward include the revived authorisation to use force, ex post authorisations, the 
rejection of a condemnation of the use of force and  explicit albeit merely 
symbolic disapproval of the use of force by the Security Council.  
 
All of these sub-categories of implicit authorisation have to be qualified as the 
silence of the UN Security Council according to the above developed definition. The 
following section will offer some examples of previous attempts to justify the 
unauthorised use of force by the silence of the UN Security Council. It will become 
evident that the different categories of implicit authorisation that have been chosen 
often appear randomly and have been politically motivated. This reinforces the 
argument developed above that only the explicit, a priori authorisation of the use of 
force through the UN Security Council is in line with the system of the United 
Nations and can carry with it the legitimacy of theorganisation 
 
1. Revived authorisation to use force - Operation I raqi Freedom of 2003 
The war against Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century divided the international 
community of states as to whether the use of military force was authorised by the UN 
                                                
38 In addition to the claim of an implicit authorisation to use force, it has also been suggested that 
states and regional organisations would enjoy an implied or residual power to resort to force. The 
implied power doctrine has predominantly been discus ed in the context of unilateral humanitarian 
interventions when the UN Security Council has been paralysed by a veto. See V Gowlland-Debbas, 
‘The Limits of Unilateral Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace 
Maintenance’ (2000) 11 European Journal of Internatio l Law 373, 374. The right to humanitarian 
intervention has been discussed in chapter four. 
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Security Council or whether it remained silent on this topic. The legal dispute 
accompanying the invasion of Iraq and in particular the question whether the use of 
military sanction can be justified by a revived UN Security Council resolution that 
had previously allowed for the use of ‘all necessary means’ can only be understood 
against the background of Iraq’s history, dating back to the beginning of the 1990s.  
 
1.1. The invasion of Kuwait 
The UN Security Council condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and 
determined a breach of international peace and security according to Article 39 UN 
Charter.39 When Iraq did not withdraw its troops from its neighbouring country, the 
majority of the UN Security Council, with the abstention of China, adopted UN 
Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
authorised states to ‘use all necessary means’ if Iraq would ‘comply not fully with 
Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions’.40 The mandate to use 
force was open worded, referring to international peace and security in the area in 
general although being inspired by the need to liberate Kuwait.41 This Security 
Council mandate lacked a time-limit.42 After Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, the UN 
Security Council acknowledged the cease-fire agreement with the adoption of 
Resolution 687 (1991).43  
 
UN Security Council Resolution 687 affirmed previous resolutions, including 
Resolutions 660 and 678, ‘except as expressly changed below to achieve the goals of 
the present resolution, including a formal cease-fire’ and ‘decides to guarantee the 
inviolability of the above mentioned boundary and to take, as appropriate, all 
necessary measures to that end in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations’.44 
 
                                                
39 UN Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) . 
40 UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990). 
41 For a discussion of UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) see De Wet (n 34) 281. 
42 De Wet (n 34) 281. 
43 UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
44 UN Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991) para 1 and para 4. 
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1.2. Air strikes against Iraq to establish safe hav ens and no-fly zones 
between 1991 and 2003  
After Iraq was forced to leave Kuwait, the humanitarian situation of Kurds and 
Shiites in Iraq worsened since they were accused of acting against the Iraqi 
Government during the Kuwait crisis.45 In April 1991, the Security Council adopted 
Resolution 688 (1991), condemning the ‘repression of the Iraqi civilian population in 
many parts of Iraq, including most recently the Kurdish populated areas…which 
threaten international peace and security in the region’.46  
 
To prevent Iraqi citizens from being targeted by their own government, safe havens 
for refugees in Iraq and no-fly-zones were introduced in 1991 and 1992.47  France, 
the UK and the US conducted patrol flights to monitr Iraqi compliance.48 The legal 
justification for the introduction of the non-fly zones and the use of force against Iraq 
whose aircrafts had entered these areas were claimed to be in accordance with either 
UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1991)49 or Resolution 688 in conjunction with 
Resolution 678.50  
 
Resolution 688, however, neither explicitly authorised the introduction of no-fly-
zones nor explicitly authorised the use of force for that purpose.51 It merely 
condemned ‘the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq’.52 It 
is also not convincing to argue that Resolution 688 (1991) would qualify as a 
‘subsequent resolution’ within the scope of Resoluti n 678 (1990) and that the use 
force in Resolution 678 (1990) would contain the enforcement of Resolution 688 of 
1991.53 Resolution 678 (1990) refers to resolutions subsequent to Resolution 660 
                                                
45 N Krisch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council’ 
(1999) 3 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 73.
46 UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1990). 
47 Krisch (n 45) 73, 74. 
48 Krisch (n 45) 74. 
49 UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1991). 
50 T Gazzini, ‘The Rules on the Use of Force at the beginning of the XXI Century’ (2006) 11 Journal 
of Conflict & Security Law 323; For a detailed analysis see Krisch (n 45) 74-79. 
51 Krisch (n 45) 75. 
52 UN Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) para 1. 
53 See Krisch (n 45) 76. 
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(1990) but not to resolutions in the aftermath of Resolution 678 (1990) itself.54 It can 
in fact be argued that Resolution 678 (1990) expired with the adoption of Resolution 
687 (1990).55  In addition, Resolution 688 (1991) was not concered with the 
relationship between Kuwait and Iraq anymore and this therefore makes it difficult to 
link it with Resolution 678 (1991), which focuses on Kuwait only.56 In consequence, 
the use of force against Iraq was not authorised by the UN Security Council. Its 
silence could not be interpreted as a delegation of its Chapter VII powers to France, 
the UK and the US. 
 
1.3. Violations of the cease-fire agreement 
In 1993, Iraq violated the cease-fire agreement of 1991 several times through the 
unauthorised crossing of the border with Kuwait and through the non-removal of 
police posts from the Kuwaiti section of the demilitarised zone.57 Furthermore, Iraq 
refused to guarantee the free movement and safety of UN weapons inspectors whose 
task it was to monitor the compliance with Resolutin 687 (1991).58 The UK, the US 
and France responded with air strikes and tried to justify their military actions on a 
revival of Resolution 678 (1990) that would have ben triggered by the breach of the 
cease-fire Resolution 687 (1991).59 The material breach of Resolution 687 (1991) 
had been previously acknowledged in a statement of the Presidency of the Security 
Council.60 Nevertheless, the UN Security Council failed to authorise the use of force 
in response to this material breach. Resolution 687 (1991) ended with the decision of 
the UN Security Council to ‘remain seized of the matter and to take such further 
steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to 
secure peace and security in the region’.61  It thereby clearly indicates that it is for the 
UN Security Council and not for individual states to decide on further action.62 
                                                
54 See Krisch (n 45) 78; De Wet (n 34) 282; H Neuhold, ‘Collective Security After ‘Operation Allied 
Force’’(2000) 4 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 93. 
55 De Wet  (n 34) 284. 
56 See Krisch (n 45) 78. 
57 De Wet (n 34) 285. 
58 De Wet (n 34) 285. 
59 De Wet (n 34) 285; J Lobel and M Ratner, ‘Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous 
Authorizations to Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi nspection Regime’ (1999) 93 The American 
Journal of International Law 150. 
60 De Wet (n 34) 285. 
61 UN Security Council Resolutions 687 (1991) para 34. 
62 Lobel and Ratner (n 59) 150. 
 260 
Therefore, the silence of the UN Security Council again could not be interpreted as 
the authorisation of an ad hoc coalition of states to use force. 
 
1.4. Air strikes in response to Iraq’s failure to f ulfil disarmament 
obligations 
At the beginning of 1998, Iraq denied the UN Special Commission for Iraq for 
monitoring the Destruction and Surrender of Mass Detruction Weapons (UNSCOM) 
access to strategic sites.63 When an agreement with Iraq was finally reached, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1154 (1998), stres ing that a violation of Iraq’s 
disarmament obligations would result in ‘severest consequences’.64 In October 1998, 
Iraq again restricted the weapon inspectors’ access to certain strategic sites which 
resulted in condemnation through the UN Security Council in Resolution 1205 
(1998).65  The US and the UK carried out air strikes in response. This use of force 
was claimed to be justified by Resolution 1154 (1998) which foresees ‘severest 
consequences’ or by a revival of Resolution 678 (1990) that would have been 
triggered by Resolution 1205.66   
 
Resolution 1154 (1998) cannot serve as a UN Security Council authorisation to use 
force since it is for the collective decision of the UN Security Council to determine 
when and what kind of ‘severest consequences’ Iraq should face.67 The argument of 
implied authorisation through the revival of Resoluti n 678 (1990) also fails to 
convince as its drafters in 1990 had not elaborated th  enforcement of weapons 
inspections in 1998 as one of its purposes.68 The attempt by the UK and the US to 
base the use of force on previous UN Security Council resolutions is even more 
astonishing in light of the events in the Security Council at that time. The air strikes 
                                                
63 See Krisch (n 45) 65. 
64 See Krisch (n 45) 65. 
65 UN Security Council Resolution 1205 (1998); Krisch (n 45) 65. 
66 De Wet (n 34) 288; Krisch (n 45) 66. 
67 Lobel and Ratner (n 59) 152. 
68 De Wet (n 34) 288; In favour of a continuous authori y to use force stemming from Resolution 687: 
R Wedgwood, ‘Unilateral Action in the UN System’ (2000) 11 European Journal of International Law 
359; R Wedgwood, ‘The Enforcement of Security Council Resolution 687: The Threat of Force 
Against Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’ (1998) 2 The American Journal of International Law 
724-728. 
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were already under discussion in the Security Council but its members had yet to be 
consulted in a debate.69 
 
1.5. War against Iraq in 2003 
During the war against Iraq in 2003, the UK, unlike the US, never claimed 
justification by self-defence.70 The Attorney-General of the UK advised the 
combination of Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 as being the legal basis for the use of 
force.71 After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, UN Security Council resolution 
660 (1990) asked Iraq to withdraw immediately.72 When Iraq did not comply, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 678 (1990) which authorised the member states 
to ‘use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660’ and ‘to restore 
peace and security in the area’.73 The expression ‛all necessary means’ was 
understood in Security Council debates to include the use of force.74 The ceasefire 
Resolution 687 (1990) maintained an extensive sanctions regime, including the 
inspections regime UNSCOM to monitor and verify Iraq’s compliance with a 
disarmament regime, asking for the destruction of chemical and biological 
weapons.75 Although it is possible to argue that once Iraq left Kuwait, peace and 
security were restored in the area and Resolution 678 was extinct as was the 
authorisation to use force; others claimed that Resolution 678 remained in force and 
that it was not repealed by Resolution 687. It was argued that the authorisation of 
Resolution 678 was only suspended as long as Iraq complied with the ceasefire 
conditions and that the authorisation could be revived if Iraq would materially breach 
Resolution 678.76  
 
                                                
69 Krisch (n 45) 65, 67. 
70 P Sands, Lawless World, America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (Penguin Group, 
London 2005) 186. 
71 The Advice of the United Kingdom Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, on ‘The Legal Basis for the 
Use of Force against Iraq’, 17 March 2003, printed in D McGoldrick , From ‘9-11’ to the ‘Iraq War 
2003’: International Law in an Age of Complexity (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004) Appendix VII. 
72 UN Security Council Resolution 666 (1990). 
73 UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990). 
74 McGoldrick (n 7) 55. 
75 UN Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). 
76 McGoldrick (n 7) 56. 
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Military action on the basis of revived Resolution 687 had indeed been taken in 1993 
and 1998.77 After Iraq failed to co-operate with UN inspectors,78 Security Council 
Resolution 1441 (1992) was adopted, recalling Resolutions 678 and 687 and warning 
Iraq that it would face ’serious consequences’ if it continuously violated its 
obligations.79 However, Resolution 1441 did not use the wording ‘all necessary 
means’ and Russia and France took steps to remove formulations from the draft that 
could permit an automatic unilateral use of force.80 Therefore Resolution 1441 could 
not authorise the war against Iraq.  
 
The Attorney-General of the UK thus claimed that Resolution1441 would give Iraq a 
final opportunity to comply with the continuous obligations of Resolution 687.81 He 
held that Resolution 687 would not terminate but only suspended Resolution 678. A 
material breach of Resolution 687 would revive the authority to use force under 
Resolution 678. The Security Council would have determined that Iraq remained in 
material breach of Resolution 687 and therefore Resolution 678 would have revived. 
In consequence, Resolution 1441 would only require a port and a discussion within 
the Security Council of Iraq’s shortcomings, but not an additional decision to 
authorise force.82  
 
This line of argument is not convincing. On the one hand, the purpose of Resolutions 
660 and 678 was to get Iraq out of Kuwait. They didnot mention the regime 
change83 that was anticipated in 2003 by the US and the UK.84 Something that could 
not have been authorised in 1991 by Resolutions 660 and 678 could not be revived in 
2003. On the other hand, Resolution 1441 as the basis for a claimed revival must be 
interpreted in the light of its context, its objectives, its purpose, and in good faith.85 
Paragraph 4 provides that if Iraq failed to comply with its obligations, ‘this resolution 
shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to 
                                                
77 McGoldrick (n 7) 56. 
78 Sands (n 70) 184. 
79 UN Security Council Resolution 1441 (2002). 
80 Sands (n 70) 192. 
81 United Kingdom Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith (n 71). 
82  United Kingdom Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith (n 71). 
83 Sands (n 70) 189. 
84 Sands (n 70) 183. 
85 Sands (n 70)191. 
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the Council for assessment’. The requirement of ‛assessment’ by the Council could 
only met by a meeting of the Security Council that would decide on the situation of 
Iraq and that also would consider whether Iraq’s behaviour was sufficient to justify 
military sanctions. A report to the Security Council as such is not sufficient.86 
Therefore, Resolution 1441 was not a revival of the authorisation to use force,87 and 
the military sanctions imposed against Iraq could not be based on an explicit UN 
Security Council resolution. 
 
2. Ex post authorisation through acceptance  
In practice it has been claimed that use of force without a UN Security Council 
mandate could be authorised x post through acceptance by the UN Security Council.  
In this case the use of force would have to be considered legal ex tunc. Discussed 
examples include ECOWAS’ military intervention in Liberia in 1990 and NATO’s 
air campaign in Kosovo in 1999.88  
 
2.1. ECOWAS and Liberia 
In Liberia, ECOWAS militarily intervened without being explicitly authorised to use 
force by the UN Security Council in order to end the human rights violations during 
the civil war.89  Following the military intervention, the UN Security Council 
commended ‘ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, security and stability in 
Liberia’.90 ECOWAS’ initiative generated hardly any international opposition91 and 
has therefore been referred to as one of the few examples of uncontested implicit UN 
Security Council approval.92 Nevertheless, according to the above outlined criteria, a 
retroactive authorisation contradicts the system of the United Nations. Thus 
ECOWAS’ action in Liberia might have been legitimate but not legal. 
 
 
                                                
86 Sands (n 70)191, 192. 
87 Sands (n 70) 192. 
88 De Wet (n 34) 299- 301 & 304-308; Lobel and Ratner (  59) 132. 
89 Lobel and Ratner (n 59) 132. 
90 UN Security Council Resolution 788 (1992) para 1. 
91 C Greenwood, ‘International Law and the NATO Intervention in Kosovo’ (2000) 49 International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 929. 
92 Lobel and Ratner (n 59) 132. For a more critical view see De Wet (n 34) 299-301. 
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2.2. NATO and Kosovo 
During the later stages of the Kosovo crisis near the end of the 1990s,93 the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1160 in 1998, in which it called on the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to ‘achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo’ and 
also called upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action.94  
The resolution emphasised ‘that failure to make constructive progress towards the 
peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of 
additional measures’.95 Although the resolution was adopted on the basis of Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council failed to determine a threat to the peace 
according to Article 39 UN Charter, due to Russia’s opposition.96 
 
The situation worsened quickly. The Yugoslav Army and the Serbian security forces 
employed excessive military force which resulted in large numbers of civilian 
casualties, the displacement of large amounts of peple and an enormous flow of 
refugees.97 The Contact Group for the Former Yugoslavia agreed to the imposition of 
new sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – again with the exception 
of Russia.98 In light of the use of force by Serbian security personnel, some states felt 
the need for more robust action and considered air strikes. They wanted a Security 
Council resolution authorising the use of force.99 However, Russia again signalled its 
disagreement.100 
 
In September 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 that finally 
determined that ‘the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo’ was ’a threat to peace 
and security in the region’.101 During the debate in the Security Council, it became 
obvious that Russia was of the opinion that Resolution 1199 did not consider the use 
                                                
93 For a detailed analysis of the events see T Gazzini, ‘NATO Coercive Military Activities in the 
Yugoslav Crisis (1992 – 1999)’ (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 391-435. 
94 UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) para 1, 2. 
95 UN Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) para 19. 
96 Krisch (n 45) 79. 
97 B Simma, ‘NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects’ (1999) 10 European Journal of 
International Law 6. 
98 Simma (n 97) 6. 
99 Krisch (n 45) 80. 
100 Simma (n 45) 6. 
101 UN Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998). 
 265 
of force, despite its reference to Chapter VII,102 and that Russia would veto any draft 
resolution authorising the use of force.103 The US on the other hand stated that 
NATO was considering military measures to ensure compliance with Resolution 
1199 if need be.104 Thus, the UN Security Council was paralysed. Although the 
gateway to Chapter VII measures had been opened throug  the determination of an 
Article 39 UN Charter situation, no further resolution could follow authorising the 
use of force.105  
 
In October 1999, NATO Secretary General Solana stated that NATO was prepared to 
threaten and to use force to end the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo without 
another UN Security Council resolution authorising the use of force, which was 
unlikely to be adopted in the near future.106 In the days following the NATO 
announcement, a cease fire was established and the two Holbrooke agreements 
between FRY and OSCE as well as between FRY and NATO were concluded.107 
The Security Council formally endorsed the agreements through the adoption of 
Resolution 1203 (1998), acting under Chapter VII and reaffirming that the situation 
in Kosovo would represent a ‘continuing threat to peace and security in the 
region’.108 Gradually, violence again increased and the humanitarian situation 
worsened. After numerous threats, NATO started a range of air strikes in March 
1999.109  
 
The NATO air campaign to end a humanitarian catastrophe was both supported and 
condemned. One of its supporters included the European Union (although the EU did 
not participate in the use of force).110 Russia, Belarus and India prepared a draft 
resolution that was intended to condemn the air strikes but this failed to be 
adopted.111 In the absence of an explicit UN Security Council resolution authorising 
                                                
102 Gazzini (n 93) 405. 
103 Simma,  (n 97) 7. 
104 Gazzini ( n 93) 405. 
105 Simma (n 97) 7. 
106 Simma (n 97) 7. 
107 See Simma (n 97) 7. 
108 UN Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998). 
109 Gazzini (n 93) 407. 
110 Krisch (n 45) 83. 
111 Krisch (n 45) 84. 
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the use of force, justification was sought in the doctrine of humanitarian intervention 
but also in an implicit ex post authorisation through the UN Security Council.112 In 
June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which established an 
international security presence under the auspices of the United Nations made up of 
states and relevant international organisations. They were authorised to use ‘all 
necessary means’ in order to fulfil the responsibilities enumerated in paragraph 9 of 
Resolution 1244.113 These responsibilities included the  
 
[d]eterring [of] renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary 
enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the 
return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and 
paramilitary forces.114 
 
As the use of ‛all necessary means’ is textually linked to the future tasks of the 
security presence it is not however convincing to interpret Resolution 1244 as an ex
post authorisation to use force. Although the UN Security Council appeared to 
approve of the results of the NATO air campaign, the results needed to be 
distinguished from an approval of the means.115  
 
3. Rejection of condemning the use of force 
It has also been argued that the UN Security Council’s rejection of condemning the 
use of force can be interpreted as the authorisation to use force. Examples include US 
action in Cuba and NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo. 
 
3.1. USA and Cuba 
During the Cuban crisis in 1962, the US argued thatit was not explicitly but 
nevertheless implicitly authorised to stop Soviet vssels approaching Cuba.116 It 
based its claim on the silence of the UN Security Council. After all, the Security 
Council would not have voted on a draft Soviet resoluti n that was aimed at 
                                                
112 For a discussion see Simma (n 97) 10;  Blokker (n 25) 546; V Gowlland-Debbas (n 38) 374, De 
Wet (n 34) 307. 
113 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) para 7. 
114 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) para 9 a). 
115 Krisch (n 45) 85, 86. 
116 Lobel and Ratner (n 59) 131. 
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condemning the American action.117 However, since the Security Council also did 
not vote on a draft US resolution that was designed to approve American action, it 
becomes quite obvious that inaction of the Security Council cannot be interpreted as 
an authorisation to use force.118  
 
3.2. NATO and Kosovo  
Similarly, the NATO air campaign in Kosovo could not be justified on the basis of a 
failed attempt to condemn NATO in the UN Security Council through the adoption 
of a draft resolution initiated by Russia.119  In the case of Kosovo, this is even more 
apparent as the motivation to vote against the condem ation of the unauthorised use 
of force through NATO necessarily resulted not from the wish to approve the use of 
force but rather from the fear that support for the draft resolution could be interpreted 
as support for the ongoing events in Yugoslavia.120 In general, Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter asks for a positive decision authorising the use of force and ‛not the absence 
of a negative one’.121 
 
4. Explicit disapproval as implied ex post authorisation - The symbolic 
condemnation by the Security Council in conjunction  with the absence 
of sanctions – the case of Israel and the Osiraq nu clear reactor 
It has even been held that explicit disapproval by the UN Security Council can lead 
to implicit consent. The example discussed under this heading is Israel’s air strike of 
1981 against the Osiraq nuclear reactor in Iraq. It was claimed that Israel’s use of 
force would have been implicitly authorised by the S curity Council, although the 
organ had strongly condemned the use of force through Resolution 487 in 1981.122 It 
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was argued that this condemnation would have been purely symbolic as no sanctions 
or penalties would have been imposed against Israel.123  
 
In sum, the system of vertical, centralised law enforcement of the United Nations as 
a system of collective security, together with the general competence of international 
institutions to delegate powers subject to certain co ditions, asks for an explicit and a 
priori  mandate to use military force by the UN Security Council. The system of 
collective security and the law of international inst tutions qualify the silence of the 
UN Security Council in the sense that anything but an explicit a priori mandate must 
be interpreted as a non-authorisation of the use of force. Taking this reasoning a step 
further, non-authorisation of the use of force needs to be interpreted as the refusal by 
the community of member states to impose military sanctions. International actors 
that base the use of force on anything but an explicit UN Security Council decisions 
thus violate their obligations under the UN Charter.  
 
Part 4 
How does the silence of the UN Security Council aff ect non-members of 
the United Nations such as the European Union? 
Now that it has been established that only an explicit a priori UN Security Council 
mandate grants UN member states with the right to use force, we need to address 
how non-UN member states are affected by this assumption. Are international actors 
that are not members of the United Nations – either because they choose not to be or 
because they do not fulfil the membership criteria like the European Union – free to 
use military force, even when the UN Security Council has not adopted an 
authorising resolution?  
 
In respect of non-UN members, the argument that member states have renounced 
their power to enforce international law horizontally in favour of the creation of a 
central organ whose task it is to decide in an objectiv  manner about the use of force 
based on values the members of the community have agre d to loses it strength. Non-
UN members have not consented to the system of collective security and are 
                                                
123 D’ Amato (n 122) 586. 
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therefore not bound by its rules, unless these rules m rely codify principles of 
customary international law. 
 
The prohibition of the use of force as the cornerstone of the UN Charter as well as 
some of its exceptions have acquired the status of customary international law124 and 
are thus binding on all subjects of international law, whether they are members of the 
United Nations or not and whether they are states or international organisations like 
the European Union. It has been held in chapter four that in particular the 
authorization of the use of force through the Security Council in the absence of a 
standing UN army has acquired the status of customary international law.  
 
The European Union, as an emerging international military actor that is prepared to 
engage in peace-enforcement without the consent of the target state, needs therefore 
to seek authorisation from the UN Security Council in order to make use of military 
measures lawfully. The authorisations of non-UN memb rs need to fulfil the same 
criteria as the authorization of UN members. All UN Security Council authorisations 
need to be explicit and a priori.  
 
To conclude, anything but the explicit and a priori authorisation by the UN Security 
Council to use force is equivalent to the silence of the UN Security Council. Non-UN 
members like the EU are bound by the silence of the UN Security Council which is 
equivalent with the refusal to authorise the use of force. The EU would act illegally if 
it engaged in the use of military force when the UNSecurity Council has not yet 
adopted an authorising resolution. Therefore, the EU needs to obtain a UN Security 
Council mandate before it can lawfully engage in robust military crisis management 
operations without the consent of the target state under the auspices of the EU’s 





                                                
124 See chapter four. 
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Part 5  
Silence within the EU’s common security and defence  policy  
When turning to the relationship between the European Union, the member states 
and the use of force, the questions that need to be addressed are whether member 
states are free to use national military sanctions if no agreement has been reached 
within the common security and defence policy or whether silence within the 
common security and defence policy has to be interpreted as a rejection of the use of 
military measures. Would this rejection be equivalent to a positive Council decision 
rejecting the use of force and could it therefore constrain the member states in their 
domestic foreign policies? As illustrated in chapter three, Council decisions adopted 
within the framework of the common security and defence policy are binding on the 
member states. Therefore the next part will examine wh ther member states are free 
to act as they please if the EU cannot agree on a common stance, as in the case of 
Iraq in 2003. 
 
The war against Iraq in 2003 has been one of the most pr minent examples so far in 
which the European member states failed to coordinate their domestic foreign 
policies and thereby prevented the European Union fr m speaking with one voice on 
the international scene. The experience of a divided Europe that was unable to 
exercise its potential political weight in the world was decisive in the drafting of the 
European Security Strategy125 that aimed to provide Europe with a strategic concept 
as explained above in chapter two.  
 
According to the above developed argument that silence in legal terms needs to be 
interpreted within its legal context, the interpretation of silence within the common 
security and defence policy is influenced by the nature of the system of the common 
security and defence policy itself. It will be shown that, unlike the United Nations, 
the European Union cannot be characterised as a system of collective security. The 
argument put forward in relation to the United Nations that member states have 
                                                
125 European Council, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy’  Brussels, 12 
December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf > 11[hereinafter 
European Security Strategy]. 
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renounced their power to use force in favour of the competence of the UN Security 
Council does not have an equivalent within the EU.  
 
However, silence within the common security and defence policy could be qualified 
by past decisions. CSDP Council decisions are binding on member states as shown in 
chapter three above. If it would be possible to prove that decisions adopted within the 
common foreign and security policy are capable of pr ducing binding effects for the 
future and not just for the occasion for which they ave been adopted, silence within 
the common security and defence policy would have to be interpreted in light of past 
decisions. Therefore the next sections will address the loyalty obligation of the 
member states within the sphere of the common security and defence policy and the 
development of an acquis securitaire through past practice of the European Union.  
 
1. The structure of the common security and defence  policy 
The interpretation of the meaning of silence within the common security and defence 
policy has to start with the structure of the common security and defence policy 
itself. Unlike the United Nations, the member states did not intend to create a system 
of collective security. They did not choose to create  strong centralised organ that 
was empowered to decide with binding force, based on objective values shared by 
the community of member states. On the contrary, the member states are still the 
driving forces behind the decisions adopted in the Council as illustrated in chapter 
two above. EU member states have been unwilling to transfer their sovereign power 
on security and defence issues to the European Union, as these matters are 
considered to lie at the very heart of state sovereignty. Council decisions involving 
the use of military force can only be adopted by the unanimous decision of all EU 
member states. Once the EU member states decide on the launch of an EU-led 
military operation, they are legally bound by the rspective Council decision. 
However, EU member states are under no duty to put a specific topic on the Foreign 
Affairs Council’s agenda or to cast a vote on a specific crisis management topic. 
Nevertheless, the principle of systematic cooperation, the loyalty obligation and the 
gradual development of an acquis securitaire might be capable of qualifying the 
meaning of silence within the common security and defence policy.  
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2. The principles underpinning the common security and defence policy 
– the principle of systematic cooperation and the p rinciple of loyal 
cooperation 
The principle of systematic cooperation states thate member states ‘shall consult 
one another within the European Council and the Council on any matter of foreign 
and security policy of general interest in order to determine a common approach’.126 
The wording of Article 32 LTEU indicates through the usage of the word ‘shall’ that 
the member states are under an obligation to inform and consult each other. The 
principle of systematic cooperation entails the negative obligation for the member 
states not to go public with domestic positions on CSDP matters of general interest 
before the matter has been discussed within the CSDP framework first.127 Matters of 
general interest have to be determined not from the perspective of the member states 
but from that of the European Union.  When a topic of security and defence policy of 
general interest to the Union is concerned, the member states are not free to act as 
they please but are under the obligation to consult one another in the forum of the 
Union in order to enable a common approach.  
 
However, the principle of systematic cooperation does not indicate that member 
states have to consult until they reach either a positive or a negative decision within 
the Council. It merely requires them to provide the opportunity for a potential 
common approach. The extraordinary meeting of the Gr ek European Council in 
respect of the war against Iraq in 2003 fulfils these criteria. If a common approach 
cannot be reached, member states can opt for unilatera  national measures. In 
consequence, the principle of systematic cooperation v ewed independently is not 
strong enough to conclude that silence within the common foreign and security 
policy has to be interpreted as a rejection of imposing military sanctions by the 
Council which would be constraining member states in the adoption of national 
decisions. 
                                                
126 Article 32 LTEU. 
127 C Hillion and R Wessel, ‘Restraining External Competences of EU Member States under CFSP’ in 
M Cremona and B De Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals: Essays 
in European Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) 82. 
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According to the principle of loyal cooperation, Article 24(3) LTEU is more specific 
than the general obligation of the member states to fulfil Treaty obligations and the 
principle of sincere cooperation as expressed in Article 4(3) LTEU,128 since it 
requires that the member states  
 
shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. The Member 
States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action whic is contrary to the 
interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations.  
 
The use of the term ‘shall’, indicates that the memb r states are obliged to act loyally 
and to cooperate. The mandatory character is underli ed through the requirement that 
the member states must support the Union’s policy ‘a tively’ and ‘unreservedly’.  
 
The loyalty obligation involves both positive and negative obligations. The positive 
obligation asks the member states to work together actively to enhance and develop 
the Union’s external and security policy. The negative obligation requests that the 
member states refrain from any action which runs counter to the interests of the EU 
or is likely to infringe its effectiveness. In consequence, the principle of loyal 
cooperation in combination with Council decisions constrains the member states in 
the conduct of their domestic foreign policy as shown above in chapter three. 
 
In relation to the question of how silence within the common security and defence 
policy is interpreted, the principle of loyal cooperation indicates that member states 
might have to seek guidance in the general foreign policy interests of the EU. These 
interests are expressed in political statements by the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the President of the European Council. Depending on 
this information, member states are aware of the official line of European external 
policies and should know whether the EU is anticipating adopting economic 
                                                
128 W Wessels and F Bopp, ‘The Institutional Architecture of CFSP after the Lisbon Treaty – 
Constitutional Breakthrough or Challenges Ahead?’ (2008) Research Paper No. 10, Challenge – The 
Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security <h tp://www.ceps.eu> 12.  
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sanctions or is interested in conducting a crisis management mission. Member states 
are under an obligation to act accordingly; otherwise they violate the negative 
obligation stemming from the principle of loyal obligation. Nevertheless, this 
principle viewed on its own is not sufficient to qualify silence within the common 
security and defence policy with particular meaning.  
 
The next section will look at the gradual development of an acquis securitaire that in 
conjunction with the duty of loyal cooperation might be capable in the future of 
opening silence within the common security and defence policy to a narrow 
interpretation. If silence within the CSDP can be interpreted to have a particular 
meaning, then this silence could be binding on the member states and comparable to 
a positive CSDP Council decision. 
 
3. The development of an acquis securitaire 
The European Union undertakes more and more crisis management missions all over 
the world. The development of a strategic culture enhanced through the lessons 
learned in these missions will gradually develop an acquis securitaire. Comparable 
to the acquis communautaire, the EU and the member states will develop patterns of 
behaviour and create expectations for acting in certain ways when confronted with 
certain types of conflict or crisis. Models will emrge in which the EU prefers merely 
to impose economic sanctions, or when the EU will use a combination of different 
policy tools or when the EU will use specific types of civilian or military crisis 
management missions. Future patterns could emerge which ill determine when the 
EU is prepared to engage in a military intervention.   
 
The development of an acquis securitaire is evolving. It could reach a stage that 
member states and EU institutions are in the position to forecast European reactions 
to international crises. They could be aware of how the EU usually reacts to a certain 
international crisis - due to political statements made in the past and due to past 
practice of the EU in a similar situation. In a case like this, the member states would 
be in the position to interpret the silence of the Council within the common foreign 
and security policy of which the CSDP forms an integral part. They would be aware 
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whether a Council decision is likely to be adopted in the near future or whether the 
EU as a whole is unlikely to impose measures or launch a crisis management 
operation of a civilian or military nature. Therefore the development of an acquis 
securitaire has the potential to restrict member states in their c oice of foreign policy 
instruments even before a CFSP Council decision has been adopted.  
 
The development of an acquis securitaire is still at very early stages but it will be 
argued in the following section that the more the European Union acts as a crisis 
management actor, the more its member states, its ins itutions and third parties will 
expect the Union to act in a certain way when faced with a certain type and a certain 
gravity of crisis or conflict. The development of an cquis cannot be prevented and it 
is desirable for the build-up of a unique European identity in international crisis 
management. The purposes of an acquis are to ensure continuity and to preserve a 
core of values, concepts and principles of the constantly evolving European Union as 
an external actor.129 By ensuring consistency the acquis also generates an impulse for 
future EU external action.130  
 
3.1. The implications of the development of the acquis securitaire 
The assumption that the development of an acquis securitaire is ongoing entails two 
consequences for the member states and for the condu t of their national foreign 
policies. First, the member states of the European Union will find it more difficult to 
act unilaterally before a Union decision within the common security and defence 
policy has been taken if they are aware that their domestic action is contrary to an 
established line of the practice of the European Union. For example, if member states 
are aware that the EU usually reacts to a certain crisis by imposing first economic 
sanctions or by using diplomatic tools, or if they know that the EU adopts a certain 
strategy in relation to particular countries, for example in light of the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy, member states will find it politically challenging to justify 
unilateral behaviour that is contrary to or more sever  than the expected common 
                                                
129 L Azoulai, ‘The Acquis of the European Union and International Organisations’ (2005) 11 (2) 
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European approach.131 If they are completely unbound and act as they please, 
although they have reason to expect a common European approach in the near future, 
member states will have it in their power to create situations that could not be 
reversed by a European approach. They could prevent th  EU from speaking with 
one voice and they could undermine the values, interes s and strategies that the EU 
usually pursues with its external relations. In this regard, the duty to act in 
accordance with the acquis securitaire of the European Union could be reinforced by 
the above discussed duty of cooperation. 
 
Second, if they are aware from previous experiences that the EU is likely to 
contribute with an EU-led operation in a similar crisis, member states will find it 
more difficult to justify their involvement in the settlement of this crisis outside a 
European framework, and to act only within NATO, the UN or an ad hoc coalition of 
states. This is even more so in the light of the recent practice of the EU as a crisis 
management actor. At each stage of the decision making process behind the launch 
of European crisis management missions, a discussion takes place about the role that 
the EU should assume in a particular conflict. It will be discussed whether the EU 
should start an independent EU-led operation on its own or in cooperation with other 
international actors or whether the European member states should rather contribute 
their troops to missions under the auspices of the UN, NATO or an ad hoc coalition 
of states or international organisations outside a European framework instead.132 
 
3.2. Sources behind the development of an acquis securitaire 
The development of an acquis securitaire within the European Union is the product 
of several mixed influences. It is motivated by political documents such as the 
European Security Strategy of 2003133 but derives one of its biggest impetuses from 
the actual implementation of the common security and defence policy through crisis 
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management missions in practice. In addition, the Treaty on European Union entails 
legal provisions that indicate the existence of an acquis securitaire. Lastly, the 
international law principle of good faith supports the idea of a growing acquis 
securitaire against which future EU action has to be measured.  
 
3.2.1. The European Security Strategy of 2003 as a benchmark for future 
military crisis management action 
The European Union has developed a distinctive takeon security that is based on 
European values and interest.134 The European Security Strategy of 2003 is the first 
strategic document of the European Union that covers foreign policy as a whole. It 
sets out the key threats and challenges faced by the Union and the strategic 
objectives the EU intends to use in order to address theses threats. The ESS does not 
provide operational guidelines but it sets out the principles that should guide the EU 
in its actions in order to ‘advance the EU’s security interest based on [the core 
European] values’.135 The values and principles that distinguish the EU from other 
security actors are its strong emphasis on the promoti n of human rights and the call 
for effective multilateralism.136 The ESS states that the  
 
best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic 
states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political 
reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule 
of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening 
the international order.137 
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The implementation Report of the European Security S rategy of 2008 also 
emphasises the EU’s commitment to the R sponsibility to Protect as agreed on the 
2005 UN Wold Summit138 and provides that  
 
[l]asting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with 
a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take 
responsibility for the consequences of their actions a d hold a shared 
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.139 
 
With regards to effective multilateralism, the European Security Strategy states that 
the EU is 
 
committed to upholding and developing International Law. The 
fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations 
Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities 
and to act effectively, is a European priority.140 
 
The values and interests the EU aims to base its act on on as an international security 
provider will need to be put into concrete forms by the European Union in the actual 
undertaking of its missions. By doing so, the EU will gradually define what it 
actually means when referring to such vague terms as human rights promotion or 
when it calls for effective multilateralism. The actual military crisis management 
practice of the EU will shape its profile and will build up its portfolio. Not only 
European member states but also third parties, including states and international or 
regional organisations, will develop an understanding of when the EU is likely to act 
and whether the EU is more likely to start ‘just’ a civilian mission or whether they 
can expect the support of a military operation and if so whether force is going to be 
used merely for self-defence and to protect civilians or whether the operation will 
have a strong and robust mandate. The gradual developm nt of a pattern for how the 
EU will act when faced with a certain crisis is essential in building up an acquis. The 
                                                
138 De Vasconcelos (n 136) 6. 
139 ESS Implementation Report 2008 (n 134) 2. 
140 European Security Strategy (n 133) 9. 
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creation of an acquis securitaire is crucial for the build-up of the EU’s legitimacy 
and identity as an international security provider.  
 
3.2.2. The development of an acquis securitaire and its foundations in 
the EU legal order 
Unlike the development of the acquis communautaire that was driven by the case 
law of the European Court of Justice, the acquis securitaire will predominantly be 
shaped by the EU’s practice as an international security provider, due to the lack of 
jurisdiction of the European Court over the common f reign and security policy, 
including the common security and defence policy. 
 
The development of an acquis securitaire nevertheless has a basis in the Treaty on 
European Union. Article 32 LTEU refers to a common approach in matters relating 
to the common foreign and security policy and indicates that the development of an 
acquis securitaire is viewed as a prerequisite for the Union to assert its interests and 
values on the international scene. When read in this way, Article 32 LTEU also 
shows that the development of an cquis securitaire is driven forward by the 
European Council and the Council; and that European institutions and bodies as well 
as member states have to follow their policy guidelines when putting the common 
foreign and security policy into concrete forms. 
 
According to Article 32 LTEU 
 
Member States shall consult one another within the European Council 
and the Council on any matter of foreign and security policy of general 
interest in order to determine a common approach. Before undertaking 
any action on the international scene or entering into any commitment 
which could affect the Union’s interests, each Membr State shall consult 
the others within the European Council or the Council. Member States 
shall ensure, through the convergence of their actions, that the Union is 
able to assert its interests and values on the international scene. Member 
States shall show mutual solidarity.  
 
When the European Council or the Council has defined a common 
approach of the Union within the meaning of the first paragraph, the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
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and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States shall 
coordinate their activities within the Council. 
 
The development of an acquis securitaire is not only ongoing but it is also desirable 
from a European perspective. If the EU can transform its values and interests into 
concrete policy guidelines, it will make its foreign and security policy and its 
common security and defence policy more effective. Cl ar foreign policy goals will 
also enhance the coherence of the EU’s external reltions competences that are 
scattered over different policy sectors but form part of the EU’s comprehensive 
concept of crisis management. 
 
3.2.3. The development of an acquis securitaire and the principle of 
good faith 
The development of an acquis securitaire can also be supported from an 
international legal perspective. The European Union enjoys international legal 
personality and as an international organisation it is subject to general rules of 
international law. The principle of good faith, in the form of equitable estoppel, asks 
the European Union not to act contrary to the legitima e expectations it has created 
through its previous behaviour. Therefore, the more the European Union engages in 
crisis management missions, more concrete patterns of it behaviour will develop. 
These patterns will reveal when the EU considers human rights violations grave 
enough to support a mission and they will show what conditions have to be met for 
the EU to engage in different forms of the use of force, ranging from peace-keeping, 
humanitarian missions and peace-enforcement.  
 
3.2.4. The duty of loyal cooperation 
The argument put forward here that member states are constrained in the conduct of 
their domestic foreign policies through the development of an acquis securitaire can 
be reinforced by their duty of loyal cooperation. The duty of loyal cooperation has 
been used in the context of the EU’s external relations and in particular regarding the 
Union’s competence to conclude international agreements to argue that even if the 
EU has not yet exercised its external competence, member states must step away 
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from any measure that would undermine the future exercise of Union competence.141 
The duty of cooperation in the context of the EU’s external relations is linked to the 
general goal of achieving unity in the EU’s international representation. This motive 
has been influential in creating broad and exclusive European competences for the 
conclusion of international agreements and the introduction of a European role for 
the adoption of economic sanctions in order to avoid d ffering and therefore 
ineffective unilateral member state sanctions. In line with this reasoning, the 
development of an acquis securitaire and the constraining effects it could produce on 
member states’ domestic foreign policy choices could enhance the EU’s ability to 
speak with one voice in the international arena, which will increase the effectiveness 
of the use of force by the European Union and could in turn strengthen the legitimacy 
of the EU as an international military crisis management actor. 
 
The gradual development of an cquis securitaire will help to define how the silence 
of the EU in the common security and defence policy can be interpreted. However, 
the development of the acquis securitaire as a political concept is not yet advanced 
enough to constrain European member states legally in their domestic foreign policy 
choices. So long as the Council has not adopted a positive decision within the 
common security and defence policy, member states ar  free to act as they please; 
even if that means that they prevent the European Union from speaking with one 
voice on the international scene.  
 
Conclusion 
By using a speculative approach, it has been questioned how silence in the context of 
the use of force needs to be interpreted. Silence is generally too vague to be of any 
legal value unless it can be qualified in a certain way. This qualifying act needs to be 
found in respective legal systems. In the context of he United Nations, only an 
explicit and a priori obtained UN Security Council mandate corresponds to the 
system of collective security, the general law of international institutions and the 
non-delegation doctrine. Thus, anything but an explicit UN Security Council 
                                                
141 A Tizzano, ‘The Foreign Relations Law of the EU Betw en Supranationality and 
Intergovernmental Model’ in E Cannizzaro (ed), The European Union as an Actor in International 
Relations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 139. 
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mandate to use force needs to be interpreted as the ilence of the UN Security 
Council. In turn, the silence of the UN Security Council must be interpreted as a 
refusal to authorise the use of force.  
 
It has been tested in the context of the EU’s common security and defence policy 
whether silence can be interpreted as constraining the member states in the conduct 
of their domestic foreign policies. Although the European Union is slowly building 
up an acquis securitaire through its crisis management missions in practice, this 
political concept is not yet mature enough to provide silence in the context of the 
CSDP with a precise legal meaning. Silence in the common security and defence 
policy cannot therefore limit the EU member states in their national foreign policy 
choices. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion - The European Union as an em erging 
international military actor 
 
Since the common security and defence policy became operational in 2003, the 
European Union has launched and conducted nine military crisis management 
operations all over the world. Some of these missions were carried out at the request 
of the United Nations. All of them were conducted with the consent of the host state.  
The European Union is slowly taking on more responsibilities as an international 
security provider. With Operation Atalanta off the Somali coast, it undertook its first 
naval operation. Although it has not yet engaged in peace-enforcement operations, 
the European Union has the legal capacities at its disposal and the political will to 
engage in more robust interventions.  
 
The use of force by the European Union generates a number of questions for the EU 
legal order itself, for the EU’s relationship with its member states and for its place 
within the international community (and, in particular, for its relationship with the 
United Nations). 
 
At the beginning of the European project, it was unthinkable that the EU could 
engage in the use of force. Chapter two of this thesis described the historic 
development of the European legal framework for the us  of force and demonstrated 
that the creation of a European security and defenc policy was characterised by 
many set backs and cooling off periods. It largely developed outside the Treaty 
framework through a bottom-up approach that later became codified. The European 
Union made most progress in security and defence matters in the aftermath of an 
international crisis. Faced with its inability to react to the conflict in the Former 
Republic of Yugoslavia on its doorstep, the European Council meeting in Cologne 
decided that  
 
the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by 
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness 
to do so, in order to respond to international crisis without prejudice to 
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actions by NATO. The EU will thereby increase its ability to contribute 
to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of 
the UN Charter.1 
 
Following the war against Iraq during which the EU could not speak with one voice 
and thus fell short of exercising its political weight in the world, the European 
Security Strategy2 was supposed to provide the EU with its first strategic concept. 
The ESS indicates a unique European approach to security. This distinctive approach 
is characterised through a comprehensive concept of crisis management that 
approaches different dimensions of security in an integrated way and in a multilateral 
setting. 
 
The European Union is now equipped with military capabilities, procedures and 
structures for military crisis management missions. I  the absence of a European 
army the EU depends on capable and willing member states to make their military 
personnel available to it. The member states are not legally obliged to contribute 
troops to EU-led operations. Nonetheless, chapter thr e demonstrated that European 
member states are legally obliged to support the Union’s common security and 
defence policy actively and that they are not supposed to undermine the success of an 
operation through their action or inaction. In addition to their loyalty obligations, 
member states are also bound by Council decisions with which crisis management 
operations are launched and conducted. Admittedly, the binding nature of Council 
decisions is limited: they can only be adopted by a un nimous decision. Furthermore, 
member states do not have to put a topic on the agend  of the Council and can thus 
prevent a common approach to a crisis. Even when it is adopted, a Council decision 
can be phrased in very vague terms and therefore leav  room for national measures. 
 
Nevertheless, once they have voted in the Council, member states are bound by 
Council decisions. The member states are, on the one ha d, under an obligation to 
                                                
1 Cologne European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 3 and 4 June 1999, Annex III, European 
Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security And Defence, para 1. 
2 Europan Council, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy” Brussels, 12 
December 2003 <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>. 
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support the Union’s policy actively and, on the other, they are under an obligation to 
refrain from any unilateral or multilateral actions that could undermine the respective 
Council decision adopted in the context of military crisis management operations. 
Their binding nature is enhanced and reinforced by the principle of systematic 
cooperation and the principle of loyal cooperation. Although they are reluctant to 
lose some of their powers in the highly sensitive fields of security and defence, 
chapter three has demonstrated that member states are already constrained in the 
conduct of their national foreign policies through the EU’s common security and 
defence policy and that a process of European integration continues to evolve.  
 
The use of force in European crisis management mission  cannot be understood on 
the basis of the European legal order alone. The European Union has so far acted 
upon the request of the United Nations and it is willing to supply the UN with much 
needed rapid reaction mechanisms. If the European Union engages in peace-
enforcement in the future and launches and conducts a military crisis management 
mission against the will of a host state, which would thus turn into a target, the EU’s 
relationship with the United Nations would need to be addressed. Unlike all its 
member states, the European Union is not a member of the collective security system 
of the United Nations. For the time being, the EU cannot accede to the UN. 
However, in its call for effective multilateralism, the European Union highlights the 
primary responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. In practice, the European Union pr vides the United Nations with 
much needed capabilities for this purpose.  
 
Nevertheless, neither EU Treaties nor political statements on behalf of the EU offer 
an explicit answer regarding the precise legal relationship between the European 
Union and the UN. In consequence of the lack of jurisdiction of the European courts 
over the common security and defence policy, no preced nt is available regarding the 




The European Court of Justice has however provided some guidelines on the 
relationship between the European Union and economic UN Security Council 
decisions although most aspects are far from being resolved. Based on the 
assumption that the European Union is bound by UN Security Council resolutions 
regarding economic sanctions in light of the International Fruit Company case3 of 
the European Court of Justice,  a comparative method was chosen to find out whether 
the examination of this relationship could be helpful for an understanding of the 
relationship between the EU and UN Security Council resolutions with regards to the 
use of force.   
 
The thesis outlined the similarities and differences b tween economic and military 
instruments from an international as well as from a European legal perspective. In 
addition, the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management was used 
throughout the thesis to support a comparison of the two types of foreign policy 
instruments.  
 
Chapter four examined the international legal framework for the use of force. This 
was to determine whether the European Union as an emerging international actor has 
to respect not only the EU legal order when it engages in military crisis management 
missions but if it also has to fulfil additional requirements originating from 
international law. This framework was primarily developed with states in mind.  
 
Chapter four demonstrated that the system of the United Nations is centred on the 
general prohibition of the use of force which has acquired the status of customary 
law over time. As such it was argued that it is binding on the European Union as an 
international legal actor that is engaged in military crisis management operations. In 
consequence, the European Union needs to justify military sanctions in the context of  
peace-enforcement operations on one of the few accepted exceptions to the principle 
of non-intervention, for example an authorisation t use force by the UN Security 
Council. The European Union also appears to favour the concept of the responsibility 
                                                
3 Joined Cases 21 to 24-72 International Fruit Company NV and others v Produktschap voor 
Groenten en Fruit, Netherlands [1972] ECR 1219. 
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to protect. Whether or not this still rather unclear concept allows for the use of force 
without a Security Council authorisation is highly disputed.  
 
Chapter four also showed that UN Security Council resolutions of a military nature 
provide an entitlement to use force. At the same tie and similarly to economic UN 
Security Council sanctions, they also create legal obligations. Although they are not 
obliged to send their troops, UN member states are under a positive duty of 
assistance and cooperation and they are under the negative duty not to undermine the 
success of a military operation. This negative obligation results from a loyalty 
obligation that is inherent in the vertical centralised system of law enforcement of the 
United Nations. The negative obligation to abstain from anything that would 
undermine the effectiveness of the use of force authorised by the Security Council 
can ask UN member states, for example, to become active and to introduce travel 
bans. But it can also ask member states to refrain from doing something, for example 
to abstain from selling weapons and other military equipment to the target. Usually 
an economic sanction regime is in place when the UN Security Council resorts to the 
use of force, but this does not necessarily have to be the case. UN Security Council 
resolutions lose these characteristics and stop being binding if they violate the core of 
human rights and humanitarian law. 
 
Chapter five was dedicated to an examination of economic sanctions within the 
European legal framework in order to prepare for the comparative method used in 
chapter six. It was demonstrated that the European Union has acquired a crucial role 
in the adoption of economic sanctions over time. The special nature of economic 
sanctions, combining trade measures with foreign policy considerations, and their 
unique constitutional setting within the EU legal order, linking the intergovernmental 
common foreign and security policy with the supranational EU policy sector, show 
that the traditional competence categories of the supranational EU policies are not 
appropriate for describing the distribution of powers between the EU and the 
member states in the sphere of economic sanctions. Nothing is gained for an 
understanding of the nature of economic sanctions within the European legal order 
by labelling the EU’s competence for their adoption as exclusive or non-exclusive. 
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The substance of the EU’s competence to impose economic sanctions can only be 
understood by questioning to what extent the member states are constrained in the 
conduct of their national foreign policies through EU sanction decisions.   
 
It has been demonstrated that member states are largely constrained in their domestic 
policies through EU sanction decisions. There is hardly any room left for unilateral 
economic measures. The European Union has largely taken over the powers 
previously exercised by its member states in the spre of economic sanctions. 
 
Chapter six demonstrated that the European Union is legally bound by UN Security 
Council resolutions in the context of the use of force. The European Union does not 
have to accept a mandate. It does not have to condut a military operation. However, 
if the EU accepts a mandate, it is bound by the respective UN Security Council 
resolution, in particular its wording and its purpose. The EU needs to respect limits 
of time, territory and purpose, for example. In thecontext of a European military 
crisis management operation, force cannot lawfully be used outside the designated 
territory, after the time limit has expired, for pur oses that have not been identified in 
the UN resolution or in a fashion or manner that is not covered by the resolution 
itself. It would also be unlawful for the EU to use force to extinguish the governing 
elite of a state in order to settle a conflict if the resolution does not provide for it and 
the EU is not supposed to deploy land forces if the UN Security Council resolution 
limits the use of force to naval operations, for example.   
 
The EU is bound by UN Security Council resolutions, even if it does not accept a 
mandate and refuses to take part actively by contributing a crisis management 
operation. In this case, the European Union is under a loyalty obligation not to 
undermine the success of the military operation either hrough its action or inaction. 
This could, for example, indicate that the EU would have to put an economic 
sanction regime into place to prevent the selling of certain products to a target or 
could ask the EU not to put a certain state on a list of states with which trade is going 
to be liberalised. 
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The binding nature of UN Security Council resolutions is not however unlimited. UN 
Security Council resolutions stop being binding on the EU when they stop being 
binding under international law in general, particularly when the UN Security 
Council acts ultra vires. The EU legal order additionally creates boundaries for UN 
Security Council resolutions. If they are violating primary EU law, including 
European fundamental rights, they do not produce legally binding effects in the 
autonomous European legal order.  
 
The finding that the European Union is bound by UN Security Council resolutions 
despite not being a member of the United Nations was developed through a 
comparative method. It was argued that despite their differences, there are enough 
similarities between economic and military sanctions to allow a comparison between 
both types of instruments. Chapters three and five demonstrated that the European 
member states are largely constrained in the conduct of their national foreign policies 
through the EU’s power to adopt economic sanctions. Similar to the constraints they 
face in the light of Council decisions authorising the use of force in crisis 
management missions, they are therefore limited in their domestic foreign policy 
choices.  
 
The gradual development of a European competence for the imposition of economic 
sanctions despite the member states’ reluctance to accept a European role in this 
highly sensitive policy field was chosen as an example of the unique form of 
European integration in the external sphere and offers a glimpse of what may still lie 
ahead for the European Union regarding military crisis management.  
 
In addition, the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management encourages an 
open and integrated approach to the analysis of economic and military sanctions. The 
European approach to crisis management is comprehensive i  two ways. Not only is 
it prepared and willing to act in the whole life cycle of a conflict, including conflict 
prevention, peace-making, peace-keeping as well as post conflict stabilisation, the 
European Union is also willing to use a variety of t ols that are at its disposal, 
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including diplomacy, trade measures and civilian or military crisis management 
missions. 
 
Therefore it was held that if it is possible to conlude that the European Union is 
bound by economic UN Security Council resolutions, it would be worth testing 
whether the same criteria could be applied to the relationship between the European 
Union and UN military sanctions. To assess the legal relationship between the 
European Union and UN Security Council resolutions regarding economic sanctions, 
the case law of the European courts with regards to economic UN Security Council 
sanctions was assessed. The Kadi case4 focused on targeted financial sanctions 
against individuals but unfortunately left several questions about the legal 
relationship between the European Union and UN Security Council resolutions open. 
The Court did not resolve the question of whether t European Union is bound by 
UN Security Council resolutions. It did however outline the outer limits of a possible 
binding nature. It held that UN Security Council resolutions could not enjoy primacy 
over primary EU law. Thus the possible binding nature of UN Security Council 
resolutions is limited by European fundamental rights.  
 
To examine the legal relationship between the EU and UN economic Security 
Council resolutions, the reasoning of the International Fruit Company case was used 
to argue in favour of a functional substitution of the European member states by the 
European Union with regards to economic sanctions, irrespective of whether the 
competence of the EU to adopt economic sanctions is qualified as exclusive in 
nature. 
 
When transferring the criteria of the International Fruit Company case to the use of 
force in the context of EU military crisis management operations, it then was argued 
that all five criteria for functional substitution were met. First, all EU member states 
are contracting parties to the United Nations. Second, the EU has acquired powers in 
the field of the common security and defence policy, and in particular with regards to 
the use of force in crisis management operations. As demonstrated in chapter three, 
                                                
4 Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International 
Foundation v Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351. 
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once a Council decision has been adopted to launch a d conduct a military crisis 
management operation, member states are constrained in the conduct of their 
domestic foreign policies. Third, the EU has shown its willingness to be bound by 
the provisions of UN Security Council resolutions. In political statements such as the 
European Security Strategy and the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in 
Crisis Management,5 the EU has expressed its commitment to internationl law and 
the United Nations and emphasised its aim to contribute to the objectives of the 
United Nations. In practice, the EU has launched anconducted military crisis 
management operations at the request of the United Nations, for example Operation 
Artemis. During the conduct of military crisis management missions, the European 
Union has so far cooperated with the United Nations a d thereby indicated its 
willingness to be bound. Whenever it has accepted a UN mandate so far, the 
European Union has acted as if it were bound by it. Fourth, the EU has acted within 
the framework of the United Nations. It has conducted military crisis management 
operations on the request of the United Nations. The EU has even developed two 
models of deployment in support of the United Nations – the bridging model and the 
stand-by model.  Fifth, the UN recognises the EU as a substitute for the member 
states in the sphere of military crisis management operations. If European member 
states are prepared to supply their forces as part of a European crisis management 
operation, the United Nations and other internationl actors stop contacting the 
individual contributing member states and will build operational structures with EU 
institutions and bodies. They will communicate with EU bodies such as the EU 
Operation Commander, the Political and Security Committee and the EU Military 
Committee, for example. In the Security Council, the EU will be represented by the 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Additionally, the EU 
has developed specific crisis management structures as xplained above. These rapid 
reaction mechanisms, for example, are offered to the United Nations in the name of 
the EU and not in the name of the individual member states. Therefore the UN 
experiences the EU as a partner in crisis management. In practice, the UN Security 
                                                
5 Council of the European Union, ‘Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management’, 
Brussels, 19 September 2003, 12730/03. 
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Council also authorised the European Union under Chapter VII UN Charter in UN 
Security Council to deploy an operation in Chad.   
 
It is therefore possible to conclude that the EU has substituted for its member states 
in EU led crisis management missions involving the us of force. This does not mean 
that the European member states have been replaced by the EU in all aspects of the 
use of force. Whenever EU member states decide to deploy their forces outside of 
EU crisis management operations, they are free to do so. They do not have to involve 
the EU in military operations. They are free to act ou side the CSDP. However, once 
they decide to act within the common security and defence policy and unanimously 
vote in favour of EU-led military crisis management missions, they are represented 
by the European Union in the international sphere and they are constrained in the 
conduct of their national foreign policies. 
 
Now that it has been established that the European Union is bound by existing UN 
Security Council resolutions and that the European member states are constrained in 
the conduct of their national foreign policies through existing Council decisions 
adopted in the context of military crisis management operations, the last chapter 
adopted a more speculative approach. It examined th meaning of different 
dimensions of silence in the context of the use of force and how silence affects the 
three different actors involved - the United Nations, the European Union and the 
European member states.  
 
A key example illustrating the questions raised in the final chapter was the EU’s 
inability to speak with one voice during the war against Iraq in 2003, which was not 
authorised by UN Security Council resolutions. It was demonstrated that the meaning 
of silence needs to be interpreted within its legal context. Based on the system of 
collective security of the United Nations and the non-delegation doctrine it was held 
therefore, that only an explicit authorisation by the UN Security Council before the 
use of force is exercised can be interpreted as a lawful authorisation to use force. 
Anything else has to be interpreted as the silence of the UN Security Council. The 
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silence of the UN Security Council is equivalent to he refusal to authorise the use of 
force.  
 
Within the context of the European Union, it was examined whether the gradual 
development of an acquis securitaire as a political concept could help to interpret the 
meaning of silence within the common security and defence policy in the sense that 
European member states could be constrained in the conduct of their national foreign 
policies even if no Council decision has been adopted yet. The European Union is 
undertaking more and more crisis management mission all over the world. It is 
thereby building up its profile and portfolio as an international security provider. The 
development of a strategic culture enhanced through the lessons learned in these 
crisis management missions will gradually develop an cquis securitaire. 
Comparable to the acquis communautaire, the EU and the member states will 
develop patterns of behaviour and create expectations t  act in certain ways when 
confronted with a certain type of conflict or crisis. Models will emerge in which the 
EU prefers to impose merely economic sanctions, or when the EU will use a 
combination of different policy tools, or when the EU will use specific types of 
civilian or military crisis management missions. In addition, patterns could emerge 
where the EU is prepared to engage in military interventions.  The development of an 
acquis securitaire is slowly ongoing. It could reach the stage where member states 
and EU institutions are in the position of being able to predict European reactions to 
international crises. They would be aware of how the EU usually reacts to certain 
situations - from past political statements made and from past practices of the EU in 
similar scenarios. In these cases, the member states would be in the position to 
interpret the silence of the Council within the common foreign and security policy of 
which the CSDP forms an integral part. They would be aware whether a Council 
decision might be adopted in the near future or whether the EU as a whole is unlikely 
to impose measures or launch a crisis management opration of a civilian or military 
nature. Therefore the development of an cquis securitaire has the potential to 
restrict member states in their choice of foreign policy instruments even before a 
CSDP Council decision has been adopted. However, at this stage, the crisis 
management practice of the European Union is not advanced enough to argue in 
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favour of a mature acquis securitaire. Therefore, it is not possible to interpret silenc 
in the context of the common security and defence policy in ways that could 
constrain the member states in the conduct of theirdomestic foreign policies. 
 
Nevertheless, the development of an acquis securitaire is ongoing and desirable from 
a European perspective. If the EU could create a strong role in it for the values on 
which it is internally based and that it is also trying to promote externally, including 
European fundamental rights, democracy and the rule of law, this could add value to 
the EU’s ambition to establish itself as a unique int rnational security provider. If its 
future military crisis management mission can correspond to its acquis securitaire, 
the EU’s credibility as an international security provider could be enhanced. In turn, 
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